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Abstract
There has been an unprecedented increase in the use of smart devices globally, together
with novel forms of communication, computing, and control technologies that have
paved the way for a new category of devices, known as high-end wearables. While
massive deployments of these objects may improve the lives of people, unauthorized
access to the said private equipment and its connectivity is potentially dangerous. Hence,
communication enablers together with highly-secure human authentication mechanisms
have to be designed.
In addition, it is important to understand how human beings, as the primary users,
interact with wearable devices on a day-to-day basis; usage should be comfortable,
seamless, user-friendly, and mindful of urban dynamics. Usually the connectivity between
wearables and the cloud is executed through the user’s more power independent gateway:
this will usually be a smartphone, which may have potentially unreliable infrastructure
connectivity. In response to these unique challenges, this thesis advocates for the adoption
of direct, secure, proximity-based communication enablers enhanced with multi-factor
authentication (hereafter refereed to MFA) that can integrate/interact with wearable
technology. Their intelligent combination together with the connection establishment
automation relying on the device/user social relations would allow to reliably grant or
deny access in cases of both stable and intermittent connectivity to the trusted authority
running in the cloud.
The introduction will list the main communication paradigms, applications, conventional
network architectures, and any relevant wearable-specific challenges. Next, the work
examines the improved architecture and security enablers for clusterization between
wearable gateways with a proximity-based communication as a baseline. Relying on
this architecture, the author then elaborates on the social ties potentially overlaying the
direct connectivity management in cases of both reliable and unreliable connection to
the trusted cloud. The author discusses that social-aware cooperation and trust relations
between users and/or the devices themselves are beneficial for the architecture under
proposal. Next, the author introduces a protocol suite that enables temporary delegation
of personal device use dependent on different connectivity conditions to the cloud.
After these discussions, the wearable technology is analyzed as a biometric and behavior
data provider for enabling MFA. The conventional approaches of the authentication factor
combination strategies are compared with the ‘intelligent’ method proposed further. The
assessment finds significant advantages to the developed solution over existing ones.
On the practical side, the performance evaluation of existing cryptographic primitives,
as part of the experimental work, shows the possibility of developing the experimental
methods further on modern wearable devices.
In summary, the set of enablers developed here for wearable technology connectivity is
aimed at enriching people’s everyday lives in a secure and usable way, in cases when
communication to the cloud is not consistently available.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Research Motivation and Background
Today, the number of interconnected devices is growing rapidly worldwide. With this
increase, conventional connectivity through wired technology can no longer meet the
requirements of this highly dynamic and mobile communication ecosystem. Naturally,
the spread of wireless technology has been driven by its ability to support communication
between various types of electronic devices.
Modern wireless technology is one of the most progressive fields of research in the
telecommunications era. Wireless telecommunication has exponentially increased data
volumes furthermore this trend is expected to continue, and mainly through mobile data
usage in the years to come [3]. The lion’s share of this data traffic will be produced by
the Internet of Things (IoT) devices, enabling cross-communication between humans and
machines.
One of the most significant parts of IoT adoption is the emergence of personal wearable
devices that are ‘worn’ by humans. These wearables have the ability to communicate
with a chosen network, most commonly via short-range radio interface to a smartphone
gateway, that in turn is equipped with long-range wireless technology delivering data to
the cloud [4]. The wearable market has already developed extensively, and this growth
trend is expected to continue [5].
There is a vast range of wearable devices on offer. From activity trackers, smartwatches,
and AR glasses through to smart clothes, etc., wearable devices have a strong presence
in the marketplace already in both consumer [6] and medical fields [7]. The possibility
to customize and style them along with technological enhancements towards small-scale
electronics and modern applications make wearables a strong contender in the IoT
technological race. Almost one billion wearable devices are expected to join the IoT
family by 2021 [3].
Currently, the strategy of making wearable technology (WT) communicate through
a gateway device such as a smartphone leads to a number of security and privacy
challenges. Conventionally, both groups were managed by a trusted centralized authority
also controlling connectivity. However, one of the most significant tasks addressed in
this work is related to operation under intermittent network connectivity constraints, i.e.,
when such centralized management is partially or entirely unavailable.
A reliable connection is needed between the user of a wearable device and the wearable
device itself, requiring additional novel input. One option could be to build the trust
relations on top of social connections between participants. Such relationships should
be either active, preloaded in advance, or empirically based on shared interests. This tie
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could be further used in many types of applications, including shared use of an electronic
device, collaborative proximity-based gaming, and for access to services/devices.
Even when there is a pre-connection established and keeping in mind the fact that direct
connectivity between two users can already be established manually on most smartphones,
handling mobility and security may be challenging in high network dynamics [8]. Today,
there are still no solutions available on the market that enable dynamic yet secure
clustering when in proximity and in cases when a trusted authority is not present
(tunnels, planes, distant resorts, or network overload due to a mass event). Despite that,
social proximity would potentially enable varied wireless technology use cases whilst
conventionally connecting to the cloud, i.e., through a known gateway of a socially-close,
trusted user, or directly between devices in physical proximity [9].
Nonetheless, the fundamental basis of any secure and private communication is authentica-
tion. Checking the validity of a user/device has the potential to be significantly simplified
by combining various biometric/behavior data from wearables together whilst also relying
on a concept of MFA, i.e., the intellectual co-utilization of various data sensor points to
enable usable and secure authentication.
This thesis focuses on the study of how WT could benefit from secure social clustering and,
at the same time, may improve human lives by being a factor provider for MFA. Unlike
most academic research and in addition to the design and evaluation of the solutions
suggested, the data measurements taken from market-available wearable devices are
provided.
1.2 Main Contributions and Scope
This thesis will focus on the challenging aspects of different wearables, including user
sociality, security, privacy, trust, and any further related challenges to connectivity. This
work looks at both theoretical and practical components, using simulations and prototyping
as the primary drivers. The main contribution is made in enabling secure clustering and
communications between wearable devices’ gateways in cases where connectivity to the
trusted authority is not reliable.
This work continues the author’s M.Sc. research activity in the field of proximity clustering,
showing how a framework based on secure sociality that had been developed previously may
improve overall system-level metrics for both user- and machine-triggered communications.
Next, we developed a set of protocols that preserve privacy for the temporarily-delegated
use of wearable devices in cases when there is only intermittent connection to the trusted
authority. The complete set of protocols proposed allows for extension and modification
of the delegation rules, whether or not the infrastructure network is accessible by any
of the user gateways. Moreover, we propose an MFA framework enabling differentiated
dissemination of content during a mass event in the broadcast communication link.
Additionally, a set of measurements is established on smartphones and smartwatches
(currently available on the market) to assess possible implementation of these proposed
frameworks and how users will be affected during the execution of cryptographic primitives.
Finally, there is an overview of the current state-of-the-art MFA solutions and the
corresponding perspective brought by the broad adoption of WT and IoT in general. It
is found that present connectivity strategies do not meet security or usability criteria. To
overcome that challenge, we propose an intelligent factor combination approach.
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1.3 Structure of the Thesis
There are seven chapters, followed by a compilation of seven publications [P1]– [P7].
There are also references to several co-authored publications, closely related to the topic
of this thesis. Furthermore, proximity-based social clustering research considered in this
work is partly used in the author’s master thesis [10].
Chapter 2 of the introductory section gives the motivation, objectives, and state-of-the-art
in addition to a detailed overview of potential wearable applications for both consumer
and enterprise markets.
Chapter 3 outlines current wearable communication architectures. This chapter also
provides an overview of the main networking paradigms that involve communications
and computing of wearable electronics. At the end of this chapter, an algorithm enabling
secure group formation between the devices in proximity is described.
Chapter 4 details the applicability of social ties between users aiming to improve the
communication metrics of interest such as throughput and energy efficiency. It starts with
technology adoption, its relation to sociality and the corresponding aspects of proximity-
based interaction. The chapter ends with the evaluation of the communication in one
network cell where direct links can be established based on a pre-defined sociality/closeness
between users or devices.
Chapter 5 details one of the most significant aspects of today’s information technology
market – collective (or shared) use. The protocol suite enabling temporary delegation
of device usage under intermittent connectivity to the cloud is provided and analyzed
in terms of power consumption. Next, a methodology for differentiable access to the
broadcast data during a mass event based on two or more authentication factors is
described. The chapter ends with a comprehensive evaluation of cryptographic primitives
on real portable devices.
Chapter 6 addresses how wearable electronics could benefit from the concept of MFA.
Next, the comparison of conventional factor grouping strategies is given from a security
vs. usability perspective, and an improved intelligent methodology is proposed. The
chapter ends with a vision from the perspective of MFA application for the advanced IoT.
Chapter 7 concludes the introductory part, followed by a compilation of the publications.

2 Wearable Technology as a Part of
the Advanced Internet of Things
This chapter provides a perspective and background to wearable market technology.
First, there is a review of the global challenges from connectivity, security, and human
perspectives. This is followed by current applications for consumer and enterprise
wearables.
2.1 Historical Overview on Wearables
The global communications system of the Internet has faced incredible transformation in
recent years, and the evolution of its main paradigms is shown in Figure 2.1. Just over 20
years ago, computers were interconnected by a fixed network, thus allowing those first
millions of users to communicate over email, enabling the concept of ‘connected places’.
Next, home and office Access Points (APs) took their position in supporting readily
available connectivity. Simultaneously, users’ communication options also increased.
Since the beginning of the present century, there has been a dramatic transformation
in connectivity. The proliferation of smartphones and tablets equipped with various
wireless modules has allowed billions of users to connect to the Internet. Since this
increased connectivity, global swathes of the population have become exposed to a richer
style of media content and communications across the entertainment market. As this
connectivity has grown and people expect more from their devices, it has been seen as
time for machines to take the lead. Today, there is a shift towards supporting a high
number of devices with entirely different traffic patterns, known as the phenomenon of
‘the Internet of Things’ (IoT) [11]. It aims to support tens of billions interconnected
smart devices by the end of this decade [3].
The IoT era is depicted as an entirely new technological penetration into the everyday
lives of modern humans – it covers a vast number of use cases, ranging from robotics to
smart grids and cities [12]. Current IoT devices are already collecting, processing, storing,
and combining enormous volumes of information that result in new areas of behavioral
knowledge and can lead to efficient designs and decision-making. The primary task of all
of the above is to improve society by automating critical and routine tasks in many areas
of technology.
By simplifying people’s lives, IoT brings many challenges from a communications per-
spective. Interconnecting an unprecedentedly high number of devices with different
technologies operating under different protocols and each with their own requirements
concerning throughput, latency, reliability, etc. is an extremely challenging task for
5
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Figure 2.1: The evolution of the Internet paradigms [P3]
system architects. Proper selection of all of the above requires not only careful planning
but also vision and expertise while collaborating with other vendors and researchers.
As devices become more interconnected they rely more and more heavily on surrounding
objects, not only for transmitting the data but also for its processing [13]. Conventional
IoT systems usually involve a high number of low-cost devices such as actuators, sensors,
and smart meters – these periodically transmit collected data to the chosen gateway
responsible for pre-processing and aggregation. These massive IoT deployments are
sometimes resource and power constrained, thus requiring the reconsideration of traditional
security methods. In the last decade, IoT security and privacy have been one of the most
significant topics of interest, especially in the areas of light-weight cryptography [14], and
secure connection establishment [15, 16] conjointly to privacy-related problems [17].
In contrast to constrained devices, the trending topic of security today centers on the
worldwide penetration of advanced IoT (A-IoT). This includes personal smart devices,
smart vehicles, consumer drones, and other environmental devices (see Figure 2.2). These
devices are defined by higher computational power and increased memory efficiency. They
are more expensive and less battery dependent (e.g. we are already used to charging our
smartphones every night). Therefore, delivering a higher level of security is a natural,
progressive step to make – enabling guaranteed secure machine-to-machine (M2M)
connections as an A-IoT feature.
Simultaneously, potentially unauthorized access to such powerful devices leads to new
risks. These range from conventional theft to placing human life in danger. For example,
by manipulating the data shown by AR glasses, one can change navigation-related
information. Therefore, authentication and reliable assessment of who owns the device,
directly projected into trust, become critical challenges in delivering easy-to-use and
secure operation of IoT devices.
Utilization of a vast number of wireless access technologies [18] coming hand in hand
2.1. Historical Overview on Wearables 7
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with a plethora of connected ‘things’ is only the beginning of a profound convergence
between humans and machines that could, in turn, take humanity to an entirely new
Internet epoch. Interconnected things carried by humans, namely, ‘wearables’ provide
innumerable benefits for improving our life. They act not only as data collectors but
as smart assistants when it comes to our health, safety, and many other aspects of life.
Worldwide, the wearable market has already reached sales of approximately 25.1 million
devices [19]. It takes us to an entirely new level of the evolution of the Internet: the
Internet of Wearable Things (IoWT) [20].
Today’s consumer-wearable technology is beyond its first steps but is still very much
in its infancy. Moreover, information gathered and used in context can deliver a truly
personalized user experience for end users [21]. In addition to conventional sports trackers,
smartwatches, on-body cameras, heart rate meters, and eyewear, the upcoming generation
of wearables will also involve AR and VR devices, wearable smart clothes, and proprietary
enterprise wearable equipment. As Ericsson envisions it, close to 70% early adopters are
already interested in correlating their lives with next-generation wearables [22]. Even
today, the process of improving health and obtaining sport-related information is made
extremely simple by means of wearable technology that is tightly connected to the cloud
services and delivered by Apple, Google, Garmin, Polar, TomTom, and others. Generally,
modern IoWT devices are already providing a smartphone-like experience by employing
voice and gesture control together with well-designed input and output interfaces.
Even though wearables can easily penetrate our lives and are small regarding form factor,
they are more intuitively subject to power consumption limitations that other ‘portable’
devices [23]. Despite that, the swiftly growing number of wearables brings a problem
of system scalability [24]. Current wearable connectivity architecture usually implies
constant availability of the gateway device, e.g., a smartphone and any communications
to the traditional Internet are expected to be organized through that ‘gateway’ node. By
this means, a wearable device is not ready for communicating with another device in
proximity (notably, made by different vendors). This is likely to be the case even if the
alternative connection is a more efficient one than its gateway. To make this alternative
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connectivity more feasible, new communication opportunities need to be explored to
enhance user experience. However, current connectivity assumes the WD or user will face
the challenge of not fulfilling the assumption of their constantly available cloud connection
due to various factors – ranging from network failure, obstacles, or distances.
Therefore, we identify the primary wearable-specific constraints as limited computational
power and limited operation under intermittent network connectivity. This leads to the
primary goal of this research – the absolute need to rethink old data security, integrity, and
reliability approaches for cases of intermittent connectivity to the operational cloud. Firstly,
it must be considered that personal wearable devices usually hold extremely sensitive
owner-related data and are naturally more exposed to the public than other portable
devices. Some say that by using wearables, we are publicly ‘wearing’ a portion of the
most significant and personal information about ourselves, including health, relationships,
activity, and our favorite locations. Under this banner, wearables simultaneously become
one of the most private and yet exposed sets of devices in our entire technological
ecosystem. Thus, adequate protection of this private data is an immediate concern. Being
already relied upon heavily for all kinds of medical data, information carried in wearables
should adopt and improve the best practices of data privacy preservation as soon as
developments allow.
Today, authentication is one of the most widely-used techniques to achieve data privacy [25].
The classical definition of authentication, that authors agree on, is when a “user identifies
oneself by sending x to the system; the system authenticates the identity by computing
F (x) and checking that it equals the stored value y” [26]. Over the years, the definition
remains the same even though x today has the potential not to be a password or key
but a biometric factor such as a fingerprint. The main drawback of dynamic on-the-fly
authentication is indeed the complexity of application in large-scale scenarios [27] and
especially if there is a need to transmit and store data across heterogeneous environments
that are not only in proximity but also remote [28]. Such a diversity regarding both
devices and connectivity options also leads to increased complexity concerning access rights
management. This further supports the need for beyond 5G-grade wireless communication
opportunities inside the “personal cloud” or the user [29]. Since the wearable market
is always being filled with new products and concepts available to an individual, new
solutions and techniques are necessary to manage security. In particular, wearable devices
in proximity to each other create opportunities to cluster together and establish trusted
clouds between the services and devices themselves, unified by different users [1].
In a broader sense, data privacy is bounded to the control over user’s sensitive information
which, in turn, implies the assured level of trust – especially during the transmissions
when partners are expected to be whom they claim to be [30]. In the very beginning of
the Internet era, trust was consistent with the physical terminal computers connected
with wires where users authenticated themselves with local accounts. With systems
development, the centralized remote servers became responsible for managing the access.
More recently, it has become more expected for things to take advantage of connecting
with their surrounding objects, the devices in their ecosystem, and also us. Once again,
this is all aimed at improving usability and device security using a novel heterogeneous
approach combined with a centrally distributed mechanism.
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2.2 Consumer Wearable Applications
Smart consumer wearables devices have become part of many areas of our everyday
activity [31, 32]. Emerging WT allows for several different types of multi-user interactions
and user-centric contextual services that rely on dynamic local data sharing [33], such as
proximity gaming or AR/VR services. Some consumer examples of wearable applications
are given in Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.3: Potential user-centric wearable applications [P4]
Today, there is a large amount of wearable clothing and accessories available on the market
that has been found to enhance human capabilities markedly. Many large conglomerates
are currently in pursuit of promising wearable startups – often resulting in acquisitions.
Examples include: Intel who acquired Recon Instruments and Replay Technologies, etc.
or Fitbit who paid $23 million for Pebble. Some new releases have also come onto the
market recently, such as Samsung brainBAND, utilized for body measurements during a
match. Such deals have resulted in an extreme market rise, with expectations to exceed
US$ 24.640 billion by 2022 [34].
In fact, the previous development and production of wearables were primarily focused on
delivering a higher level of automation, and this was mainly in the field of healthcare.
Most were pragmatically driven by the standard business model, which required a clear
return-of-investment strategy [35]. Even by this time, the environmental and contextual
features of such systems were not hard to model or monitor due to their predictable
behavior – leading to solutions that operated flawlessly in a predefined context but failed
in real life. One example of this: AR/VR applications [36].
One of the most significant niches of the wearable market is mass consumer applications.
However, a recent survey claimed that more than a 50% of people who purchased a wearable
device would most probably stop using it after only half of a year [37]. Consequently,
some companies offer new wearables for a “try-before-buy” time interval, showcasing an
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‘unconventional type’ of collective use application. The company Lumoid, for example,
offers a way to pick the most suitable fitness band by trying it for only 20$. When the
trial period ends, a person can either return the unwanted product or purchase it. In
contrast, company ByeBuy uses a “pay-as-you-go” model for its advanced smart devices.
Remarkably, when the device is returned to the shop, some sensitive data could still
be stored in its memory even after a factory reset. The potential collective use of such
personal devices is usually neglected when the device is sold or disposed of. In contrast,
big companies have policies on how to properly recycle the hard drive of any smart device
thus preventing sensitive data leakage.
In contrast to personal use, collective use or rental applications bring the attention back
to questions of data privacy and trust. Further compelling use cases of this application
are listed here. Despite conventional use cases, on-body cameras, Depth gauges, and
spearfishing guns could be obtained directly from a scuba diving vessel. While talking
about distant resorts, rental of smart skiing equipment with boot sensors, smart body
armor, augmented reality glasses would be able to improve the entertainment of the
visitor as well. The gigantic market of in-flight entertainment could be offered with a
solution based on a VR headset for gaming or enjoying the movies. Access to properties
or electronic devices could also be based on proximate connectivity. Here, the access
could also be granted for special services in cases of emergency, i.e., for a medical staff, a
firefighter, or a police officer.
Predicted within this thesis, the “pay-as-you-go” model is increasingly used in markets
including car-sharing and apartment rental when granting physical access. Furthermore,
companies such as Netflix or Spotify apply the same model to digital content. People are
getting used to this convenient way of life, and the author believes that many services
and objects will adopt the same level of flexibility and subscription-model shortly.
2.3 Enterprise Wearable Applications
In contrast to consumer electronics, enterprise or industrial wearable devices are usually
less personalized and do not carry excessive personal information. Wearables can also be
used for leisure and entertainment. Generally, this will be in areas such as proximity-based
AR/VR gaming, non-confidential information sharing, and similar non-critical services
that could be of significance from this perspective. These applications do not necessarily
need evidence of explicit social relations between device owners, and the sociality of
devices may instead drive trusted communications. Typical scenarios of interest in this
category may focus on users distributed in a particular area with similar interests, e.g.
information dissemination at a stadium, a university campus, or even a restaurant. In
these scenarios people will be matched according to their interests, age, familiarity, etc.
and will interact through their devices.
For urban scenarios, mobile wearable technology is already utilized for public safety
and security [38]. Advanced wearables are being used across various branches of the
special forces including. Those devices include smart-cameras, health monitors, and
communication units [39]. One of the most notable projects has been developed by
industrial giant Motorola and involves the so-called “Connected Law Enforcement Officer”.
This project aims at improving response times within a mission-critical ecosystem by
enabling real-time collaboration between different specialized devices. In other words,
Motorola has found a solution which allows teams of people to communicate in an effective,
secure, reliable, and cooperative way, in real time, regardless of their network or carrier
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with a centralized authority connection. The proposed system has applications that
include data, exchange, voice and video streaming, ‘push-to-talk’, report writing, data
capture and others. The proposed set of devices includes: (i) a body-mounted camera
with a video speaker microphone and touchscreen interface. This will be utilized for
intuitive capture and storage of the evidence; (ii) the important classical technology for
special units communication is ‘push-to-talk’ radio, used for emergency two-way radio
connectivity; (iii) a handheld smartphone that offers reliable broadband connectivity
and enables users to enjoy the intelligent support of the entire team; (iv) AR glasses
that are coming soon. They assist the user in a range of tasks and provide real-time
analysis of the surrounding environment for faster response; and (v) a connected car can
provide many opportunities – including TETRA communications, mobile computing
features, mission-critical 3GPP and LTE broadband connectivity for the personal cloud.
This vehicle is mainly of interest for our case study due to its superior computation and
caching capabilities, as well as more stable connectivity to the network infrastructure.
Similar technology is adopted by firefighters [40, 41]. The main additional component is a
custom in-mask thermal camera with the real-time display that offers a clear, preprocessed
vision by continuously augmenting a thermal image in the helmet.
In contrast to the usability and reliability in the case of the special forces, professional
sports WT was aimed, initially and primarily, at increasing the level of spectators’
entertainment and secondly at improving the player’s skills. WDs for sports players have
been around for some time, and when worn during the training they make it possible to
improve advice given by coaches and doctors. Note that such devices are still prohibited
from being worn during actual competitions [42]. In football, for example, the only
wearable allowed in the field is the referee’s watch – used to notify him/her when a goal
is scored [43].
Outside of current rules, another reason why football players or some other active sports
participants do not wear additional devices during a match is the weight. In contrast to
football, hockey players carry a weighty set of protective pieces like pads, guards, and
helmets. This theoretically allows for the installation of various lightweight sensors and
small cameras around the body. Moreover, those wearables have been in development for
more than 20 years already [44, 45, 46] and are very slowly coming to the market [47]. For
example, the National Hockey League have already installed tracking devices in players’
clothes and the puck in 2015, thus allowing for more informed post-match discussion and
overall performance increase.
One of the most promising entertainment trends is about providing spectators with an
enhanced sense of immersion into a game. Wearable technology will hugely overtake
the 20th century immersion solution that was the television broadcast, bringing with it
a whole new range of opportunities. The data collected from players is currently only
available to an extremely narrow circle of people. The author believes that new, emergent
services will allow a spectator to have a first-person view of his/her favorite player whilst
they are scoring a goal, for example, in just a few years.
Many companies are already integrating their devices into professional sports. Adidas
offers a solution called miCoach that is a combination of wireless sensors capable of
monitoring heart rate, speed, athletic performance, and other health metrics. The
collected data is continually sent to the coach for better individual monitoring and
training. Another device utilized in professional sports is called Viper Pod. It is mounted
on the chest and collects data related to position, acceleration, compass, and heart rate.
It is mainly used by rugby teams. Another notable device is the Catapult OptimEye G5,
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designed explicitly for goalkeepers. It tracks their movement, together with a number
of other statistical data [48]. The company Armour has created a smart t-shirt called
the ‘E39 performance shirt’ with similar functions. Another exciting piece of technology
is a ShotTracker – this is used in baseball and is a combination of a wristband and net
monitor, allowing players to monitor, track, and then analyze their hits after a game.
This market-driven progress proves that wearable technology has many promising oppor-
tunities. This is not just about creating products for profit from consumers but also for
application in mission-critical scenarios and professional sports. The examples listed here
are about making the lives of many people more safe, reliable, and enjoyable.
3 Wearable Devices Communication
Opportunities
This chapter will focus on the communication architectures analyzed during the research
phase. It will start with an introduction to the Information and Communications
Technology (ICT) global paradigms that may be applied to IoWT. Next, the central
network architectural aspects required for WDs are discussed. Then, the information
security framework developed for the dynamic clustering of the devices closes the chapter.
3.1 Wearable Communications State-of-the-Art
Overall, current wearable devices use the owner’s smartphone as a gateway to connect to
the Internet. Operational efficiency can, therefore, be limited if the gateway’s battery is
drained or the connectivity options are not adequate. Conversely, some wearable devices
are already equipped with a long-range wireless radio, but continuous use is still not
recommended due to the higher power consumption.
From a technological perspective, most of the ‘mobile’ wearables use short-range wireless
technologies to access the gateway. These include, for example, IEEE 802.15.4 (BLE,
ZigBee) or the more power hungry IEEE 802.11 (WiFi) [49]. Some vendors even suggest
connection to conventional WiFi infrastructure from, for example, a smartwatch. In
contrast, AR/VR wearable equipment requires a higher data rate and thus can only
be connected through either 5G cellular or at least IEEE 802.11n links – this is due
to the bulky data streams. Note, cellular connections are limited due to the licensed
spectrum limitation, but there are researchers with a deep interest in licensed solutions
for proximity-based communications, such as LTE-Direct [50]. However, many think that
managing the interference and power control may be challenging in this scenario and thus
practical device-to-device (D2D) applications should take their niche [51]. Note D2D is
defined as proximity-based wireless communication which is maintained by the remote
control center.
The technology for D2D is already available on many smartphones. WiFi-Direct allows
us to use conventional WiFi chips without any additional modifications for D2D as
well. Developers today are intensely researching technologies that operate on a higher,
unlicensed frequency, e.g., IEEE 802.11ad and IEEE 802.11ac that can provide Gigabit
data rate. Moreover, the utilization of this higher frequency has its propagation limitations,
which are eventually a benefit for use in densely-packed scenarios, where human bodies
act as a natural blocker and allow better spatial reuse [52].
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3.2 Wearable-related Communication Paradigms
Clearly, proximity-based communication performance could be achieved using user-
triggered links or conventional cloud solutions. However, when there is a failure in
the gateway connectivity, this may be extremely challenging. One possible solution for
improving the reliability of the wearable device’s operation is to use trusted nodes in close
geographical proximity to relay essential data to the cloud or another personal device of
the user. The following section will list the paradigms potentially involved in this type
of communication.
Since computational power and battery commonly limit wearable devices, one of the
related paradigms is Cloud Computing (CC) that was already adopted at the end of 00’s.
This concept is about transferring the complex computations and data processing from
the constrained device to large data centers [53]. The key driver in this cloud paradigm
was initially the prevalence of wireless and broadband networking in a trade-off with
storage and processing costs. Simply put, the network side is exceptionally overloaded,
but the computations are complicated on the end node. Therefore there is a possibility of
running wearable device services that cannot be executed in the remote cloud, in addition
to simultaneously oﬄoading cloud-enabled applications.
In 2012 Cisco Systems defined the Fog Computing as an “extension of the cloud computing
paradigm (that) provides computation, storage, and networking services between end
devices and traditional cloud servers” [54]. The computation is not necessarily performed
in the actual cloud but at different nodes, side on, orchestrated by the main cloud [55].
Therefore, the first property of computational and communications heterogeneity is
presented by the fog concept [56].
After just one year, IBM and Nokia Siemens Network introduced the concept of Mobile
Edge Computing (MEC). The main idea behind this was to enable a flexible platform
deployed on a different vendor network to the operators’ edge hardware – so that any
applications could be executed immediately after the data was transmitted over the
wireless channel [57]. The delay related to data traveling between the edge and the cloud
could also be neglected, decreasing the load on intermediate routing hardware. One of the
real examples of MEC is Mobile Edge Scheduler [58] which minimizes the LTE downlink
traffic delay. From an application developer’s perspective, MEC functionality is expected
to be open for third parties, i.e., not only kept for the cellular operator, and thus opening
a road for entirely new services.
Interesting from the author’s perspective, one of the most significant technological aspects
of wearables is Mobile Cloud Computing (MCC) [59]. The primary driver behind
this technology is an attempt to redirect the computation and/or data storage to less
constrained devices close by [60]. The main difference from MEC is the ability to run the
execution on not only the infrastructure network edge nodes, but also on any neighboring
devices and, potentially, the gateway.
3.3 Main Network Architectures
The paradigms mentioned above could not be discussed without also mapping out the
supporting network architecture. As wearables mainly communicate through smart-
phone gateways, they naturally employ ‘direct’ communication that not only acts as
a conventional data transfer technology but also enables many applications in M2M
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communication. Next, the communication flows to the edge devices and then to the cloud,
as shown in Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1: Personal cloud example [P3]
Below is a list of the main connectivity options that involve communication between
wearable devices and/or gateways in MCC. This section focuses on providing an overview
of architectures and potential solutions for securing the connectivity between nodes.
Standard network use and coverage today involves an implied central control node
through which all communication and data exchange occurs. From an information
security perspective, the infrastructure network is defined as a trusted authority (TA)
that manages connections and distributes security- and trust-related information. Public
Key Infrastructure (PKI) [61] solutions are commonly utilized for providing security in
those cases.
In specific real-world scenarios, there will be times when connectivity to infrastructure is
not available at all (see Figure 3.2). For example, this may happen on a cruise or a distant
ski resort, etc. Here, users/wearers may still want to communicate, play AR-enabled
games, and share memories from their head-mounted cameras. Today, there are no
market-available solutions to these situations. However, Apple or Android users can
use short-range communication to share data between smartphones through AirDrop or
WiFi-Direct, though this is not always possible or straightforward. That only proves
that the technology enabler is already integrated into most of the devices on the market,
there is just a place for an additional level of extraction that allows the gateways to share
the link with their wearable devices. From a security perspective, there needs to be an
option to utilize a preloaded certificate from PKI, therefore providing some level of trust,
through which ID-based cryptography or a one-time password could be used to make the
final connection. Therefore, it would be possible to provide some level of service in cases
where it was not previously offered at all. Moreover, the neighboring gateway may be
utilized as a node relay without an appropriate connection to the infrastructure. However,
challenges of data privacy, trust, and signaling overheads arise. New primitives need to
be developed to enable such an operation.
Generally, wearable devices and related proximity-based communication are expected to
generate a significant share of data traffic during the oncoming years. Thus, the main effect
of D2D communication on future 5G systems will be to relieve conventional infrastructure
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Figure 3.2: Urban wearable communications scenario [1]
networks from the additional load. Even though the technology is only present in certain
devices, this already has the potential to help. D2D links based on WiFi-Direct or BLE
could be used to oﬄoad the traffic whenever used, especially for data distribution as
generated by wearables between users [62]. Overall, D2D is slowly achieving Quality
of Service (QoS) improvements from the user side and mitigating licensed spectrum
congestion on the other [63]. Later on, this work will look at the security enablers making
proximity-based communication more safe by integrating centralized and distributed
systems together [64]. The corresponding clustering procedure is based on the majority
rule and can be executed either automatically or by human choice based on predefined
policies during when nodes are added/removed from the group.
Conventional solutions were not originally designed to provide reliable security and safety
in cases where the quality of the infrastructure connectivity could not be guaranteed.
Furthermore, they also require the group formation capabilities to be included in every
edge-enabled service.
To unshackle the developers from adding the coalition forming as part of the application
logic, an appropriate framework for operation needs to be developed along the network edge.
The main idea behind the formation is to develop secure and private data delivery between
proximate users in cases of both infrastructure and distributed operation. Nonetheless,
some nodes may have a stable connection to the centralized authority, bringing an
opportunity to create their own secure formations from both a logical and physical point
of view. Today, user addition and removal is managed by the cloud while the proposed
methodology extends such operation to scenarios without a reliable connection to the
centralized entity [65].
3.4 Secure Group Formation for Wearables
From an information security perspective, the establishment of a secure coalition without
the connection to the trusted authority may be extremely complicated. Most of the
existing networks use an IP to enable routing inside the network. This unique temporary
address is usually provided by the network with dynamic behavior over time in most cases,
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excluding Mobile IP. When the centralized network is unavailable, it becomes necessary
to construct and use new policies and routing strategies on top of conventional means,
mainly due to the limitations set by the LTE core itself [66] which in turn limits the
potential of proximity-based communications.
Together with the Brno University of Technology, we have developed and tested, in the
live 3GPP LTE core, a framework that allows for proximity-based communication between
smartphones even when connection to the cloud was not 100% available. The framework
is developed according to [67], where the centralized control node is deployed inside the
cellular operator core. Users can establish secure coalitions connected to the cloud while
user addition and removal was achieved without such connectivity. The server was mainly
responsible for the management of security and connectivity [68].
Modern widely deployed cellular networks do not yet have efficient enablers for delivering
cellular-assisted communication. User dynamics and continuously changing topology put
limitations on the reliable operation of such systems. Particularly noteworthy in this
work is users’ trust while being outside of the network coverage but still connected. The
very moment a device reaches the infrastructure connectivity again – it would report all
status updates to the cloud. This was the main reason why pure ad hoc solutions could
not be applied in the D2D context, as our preliminary work [64] demonstrated.
Figure 3.3: Possible general operation states [1]
Let us concentrate on an arbitrary coalition in the network. As it is shown in Figure 3.3,
the options in cluster connectivity define some individual cases for our chosen scenario.
The coalition may be located entirely in the cellar Base Station (BS) coverage. In
this scenario, the information security procedures are performed over the infrastructure
connections via the cloud. The first case in Figure 3.3 presumes that the actual data flow
and security-related signaling is traveling through the cellular interfaces of the devices.
The second case depicts a scenario when all users are connected to the network, and thus
all the coalition establishment procedures are managed remotely. In the third case, the
data and signaling are transmitted using direct links, providing a possibility for any users
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in proximity also to validate their communication when there is intermittent connectivity,
i.e. when the connection to the cloud was not present for a certain period. Finally, the
cluster could be entirely out of network coverage. Here, ad hoc strategies were used to
establish adequate and timely direct connections for the users. In the following D2D
paradigm, the presence of the centralized control is assumed, with initialization, execution,
and cancellation being managed by the centralized network service.
The author’s framework developed and evaluated during his M.Sc. studies is built relying
on the 3GPP model, allowing proximate communication when the device location is
either handled by the cellular operator or by short-range wireless technology or, for
example, BLE on the device side. Each user has a unique ID and certificate signed by
the trusted authority. The certificate is either pre-installed with, for example, a SIM
card, or is delivered during the registration of the user into the system. It is for secure
group establishment and user validation. Based on this definition, the certificate retrieval
requires some connectivity to the trusted authority.
Overall, the grouping procedure is the only one where connectivity to the cloud is required
for future monitoring purposes and main group secret generation. After the devices have
received their secret and public keys together with the corresponding certificate, any user
can trigger the coalition initialization procedure with its neighbors. The willing user
is then generating a request that contains the joining coalition node IDs to the cloud.
Further, the users are polled to verify that they have agreed to enter the coalition. Note
that it would be possible to automate this procedure. When users have agreed, a group
certificate and group secret are generated by the cloud, refer to [64] for the details. Next,
the server can be contacted by active group participants to add or remove users based on
the majority rule, but the group secret remains the same.
Of course, users may come and leave the cellular connectivity alone or together as a group.
If this happens, cloud connectivity cannot be guaranteed, so further techniques should
be used to support communication between the users inside the coalition. The data, in
this case, is sent directly between users. However, new coalitions cannot be created due
to a lack of certificate authority for any future validation. On the other hand, users can
still add and remove other ones based on community-oriented voting. Fundamentally, the
Lagrange polynomial utilized in the clustering allows for the group secret to be recovered
and creates a new secret share for a new user to join. Importantly, not all users in the
coalition need to vote in favor for this to happen, but there must at least be a predefined
amount of positive votes. The generation of the coalition is triggered by this number of
positive votes.
In case a group of users is willing to exclude someone from the coalition, they may trigger
a similar, but opposite, procedure. However, they would have to securely redistribute
the shares to everyone in the active coalition excluding the unwanted user. The required
number of users (defined during the coalition creation) would trigger another set of polling,
and then group together and indirectly reconstruct the group secret, redistributing new
shares between those. Management of this procedure would preferably happen on the
most power-independent device, but it could also just be selected at random within
the group.
4 Proximity Social Clustering
This chapter will center on the sociality aspect and the corresponding potential benefits
brought by its utilization while interconnecting users in proximity. Starting with the
adoption of this technology and possible applications, the chapter will focus more on how
current technology may benefit from utilizing the over-the-top layer of social relations to
improve overall communication. Next, the aspects of proximity-based social interactions,
such as trust, ‘closeness’, ‘betweenness’, and others, are discussed. Numerical evaluation
of the potential benefits in terms of conventional communication metrics is given at the
end of this chapter.
4.1 Social Relationships for Human and Machine Connectivity
The rapid standardization and promised benefits of proximity-based communication
under centralized network control brought the attention of the research community to
the question of how those links could benefit from social user interactions that bridged
the physical and virtual worlds?. Enabling such dynamic interactions would deliver
a number of challenges related to establishing connections to both known nodes and
unfamiliar devices. Historically, the field of identity and access management (IAM) aimed
at offering solutions for flexible access to systems and services [69, 70]. The epoch of
new and continually emerging applications supports the requirement for easy-to-use
and straightforward IAM solution development. D2D communication in that mold is
no different. The challenges range from data privacy preservation to operation in a
mission-critical environment. An essential problem here is the fact that traditional IAM
frameworks may fail under unreliable connectivity constraints.
In our previous works [64, 66], an information security framework was developed, allowing
dynamic clustering in cases of intermittent connectivity to the trusted authority. This
chapter provides a vision of the central vectors of trust and sociality in proximity-based
communications. The numerical evaluation shows how devices can benefit from direct
links even after the introduction of transitional and computational overheads of the
clustering.
Despite straightforward benefits brought by using ‘simple’ D2D communications (higher
system throughput, lower latency, etc.), the impact of efficient identification of human
behavioral patterns and relationships may improve those even more. In addition to the
fact that users in the same social group are likely to be interested in retrieving or sharing
the same content, the trust in this group is intuitively considered to be higher when
compared to a group of random strangers.
Interestingly, proximity-based communications may even affect external interactions
between the gateway and the surrounding environment. One of the ways to improve
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the establishment of the D2D trust relations from the user perspective is by monitoring
the common contacts (including friend-of-a-friend and other weak ties) by the trusted
authority and thus improving the overall decision-making process. Regrettably, neither
operator nor customers are ready for such steps yet. The main problem behind this is
a lack of value proposition for end users. In our model, a high level of trustworthiness
between users should be met to mitigate the risks of user distrust and rejection (see
Table 4.1).
Table 4.1: Social relationship factors between devices, possible applications, and the associated
trust value: UD – user-driven; DD – device driven.
Relationship Type Description Applications Trust
Human social UD Familiarity degree with Leisure applications, [0–1]
relationship friends, relatives confidential data, eHealth,
and colleagues mission-critical communications
Market pricing UD Cooperative interactions Proximate marketing, 0.2
relationship with services triggered proximity gaming, advertising
by the environment
Ownership device DD Relationship between Personal cloud, 1
relationship devices with the same smart home
owner
Co-location device DD Devices that share Information/data exchange 0.8
relationship personal experiences at social aggregation
(e.g., cohabitation) points (concerts, sports events)
Co-work device DD Devices that share Information/data exchange 0.6
relationship public experiences at work aggregation
(e.g., work) points (e.g., fairs, workshops)
4.2 Relation between Sociality and Proximity-based
Communication
The utilization of social connections between people may significantly improve proximity-
based communication in various applications and services [70, 71]. The utilization of only
‘social links’ without considering physical and technological limitations is not, however,
an option. Researchers must examine the interactions between devices, keeping in mind
any sociality impact. There has already been a study on trustworthiness for the simpler
IoT device perspective, where all logic was already predefined and listed [72]. Therefore,
we can classify the current interactions into two large groups.
The first group represents user-driven interactions. Here, the central activator for
connectivity is a social human being. Human social relationship (HSR) factor is a metric
that defines the degree of interest in data sharing between two individuals. It varies based
on a multitude of connections that could be about family, friendship or between colleagues.
HSR represents the trust and therefore likeliness to be connected with someone. From
another perspective, the market pricing relational (MPR) model could be used to evaluate
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trust between individuals but only between ones willing to achieve some mutual benefit.
As an example, one may consider a flea market, a party, a gaming event, etc.
The second group is related to device-driven sociality, being of high interest in this thesis.
Smart devices can interact with other ones automatically based on the set of predefined
rules by either their owner or the manufacturer. Here, owners are not necessarily required
to interact with their devices when the communication is triggered. To construct this
sociality level, relevant context and mobility patterns can be used to effectively construct
the appropriate forms of social relations [73], i.e., the wearable device could, for example,
trigger the establishment of a link between its gateway and another smart device in
proximity – or even temporarily change its gateway to a neighboring but trusted one.
Another significant challenge for proximity-based communications is the high dynamics
concerning device mobility. Because all the nodes in such a network are highly mobile
due to their portable nature, the dual mobility of any communication entity should be
thus carefully taken into consideration, as to provide extended support for dynamic trust
management that is directly related to the established communication links. Moreover,
since the centralized control node does not know the mobility of the out-of-coverage node,
the established connection should involve additional medium sensing. Further on, we
focus on the following social scenarios.
Trust-based human applications correspond to interactions between humans who have a
strong mutual trust. Here, each user wants to know whom its data is exchanged with.
Primary examples are work-related scenarios including public safety, construction sites,
or cargo handling stuff where safety requirements are stringent and dictated by this level
of trust.
Leisure and entertainment applications correspond to gaming and non-confidential in-
formation exchange. The trust relation, as well as strong social relations between
communicating users/devices, are not critical. Generally, users may be grouped based on
location, interests, or participation in some social group.
The last group is critical M2M applications where human interaction is limited or nonex-
istent at all. Thus, automatic trust management is utilized while establishing connections
between the devices. The most exciting examples, despite conventional gateways’ connec-
tivity, are related to industrial and hazardous robotic operation where devices communicate
with mission-critical data. Here, trust management is defined by a specific set of policies
leading to higher level of optimized communications performance.
4.3 Aspects of Proximity-based Social Interaction
The first aspect of proximity-based communications from a social perspective is indeed
the idea of trust which in this technological context has challenged many minds for more
than half of a century [74, 75]. The following definition has been given in [76], which we
generally agree with: “Trust is the extent to which one party is willing to participate in a
given action with a given partner, considering the risks and incentives involved”.
In the extremely dynamic context of proximity-based communications, developing a trusted
relationship is complicated due to the requirement of anonymity in such scenarios [77].
Overall, one of the properties of wireless communication is a tendency to keep the nodes
depersonalized, therefore achieving a lower level of potential identification by the malicious
user. Keeping the presence of a centralized control node as a base, the author assumes
that such a system can self-learn [78], and that by tracking the activities of the user it can
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develop a high but relatively anonymized level of social trust. Initially, public information
from social networks could be set as a foundation for any potential trustworthiness
prediction [71, 79].
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Figure 4.1: Structure of proximate social networks [2]
Strong social ties can also be evaluated by the categorization of the network elements,
as shown in Figure 4.1. For example, brokering and closure [80] represent the idea of
designing strong ties inside the group of people to gain trusted relationships in addition
to their potential for clusterization. Therefore, we can conclude that degree, betweenness,
and closeness are the essential characteristics of each selected network node. The degree
corresponds to the number of connections per node retrieved from a social network data,
for example. Hence, the higher the degree, the higher the probability of building a
trusted cluster is. Such trust mapping allows for new potential links between less trusted
nodes to be found, i.e., evaluation of second and higher degree level of connections. A
‘friend-of-friend’ concept lies at the basis of all connection opportunities to be used in
future proximity-based networks.
The closeness factor represents how easy it is for the user to build a new connection
to others. The straightforward way in both logical and physical worlds is to evaluate a
potential acquaintance, i.e., the longer the distance, the more significant effort is needed
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Table 4.2: Core simulation parameters [P1]
Parameter Value
Packet size 100 KB
Cell radius 100 m
Inter-arrival time 10 s
Maximum proximity-communications distance 30 m
WiFi-Direct throughput 40 Mbps
LTE throughput 10 Mbps
User transmit power 23 dBm
Smart device transmit power 0 dBm
LTE BS transmit power 46 dBm
D2D link setup time 1 s
Mobility model Levy flight (with parameter 1.5)
Number of UEs [10− 100]
Degree of human-to-human sociality, Hi,j [0− 1]
Degree of device-to-device sociality, Di,j [0.6, 0.8, 1]
to start communication.
An exciting concept of betweenness deserves a mention, representing the potential of the
node to become a ‘social relay’ between users. On the other hand, its presence also stands
for the possibility of enabling or blocking the data flow between network sections in a
worst-case scenario.
4.4 Selected Numerical Results
For validation of the proposed secure clustering framework, we have conducted a simulation
campaign in custom-made WINTERsim environment1. In this assessment, we have
neglected the effects of interference and propagation but instead introduced the full-scale
user mobility. As metrics of interest, we select system throughput, energy efficiency,
and degrees of connectivity, i.e., the proportion of users served by either cellular and
proximity-based links.
For performance evaluation, we consider one 3GPP LTE BS placed in the center of
150× 150 meters square area. The reliable cellular coverage is limited to 70% (we also
have considered other values to understand the impact on connectivity better). The
number of users is randomly deployed within the area of interest. The mobility model
for each user follows the Levy flight pattern [81]. The remaining system parameters are
given in Table 4.2.
1See “WINTERsim – An open simulation platform for the study of wireless systems”, 2018:
http://winter-group.net/downloads/
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In this work, we consider three different connectivity options:
• Cellular (LTE) solution, where the connectivity is only available through cellular
links. There are no proximity-based communication possibilities;
• Simple D2D solution, where only devices with a reliable connection to the cellular
network may establish direct links. The trusted authority is thus located in the
cloud or on the edge and can serve any device with infrastructure connectivity;
• Advanced (social-aware) D2D solution, where the proposed secure clustering allows
for establishing coalitions when a reliable connection to the cloud is not available.
All direct links in areas both with low or no coverage are made trustworthy through
the solution detailed in [64].
Parameter α is the representation of human-only or device-only sociality scenarios. For the
applications, where both human- and device-driven types of sociality are considered, we
set α = 0.5. In particular, the value of Di,j is determined by the relationships between the
humans/devices as reported in Table 4.1. In those cases, where two nodes are connected
by two or more types of social factors, we should consider the strongest tie with the
highest degree.
Further, the weighting term α ∈ [0, 1] is needed to adjust the impact of two contributions
described above, according to a specific application and scenario. Hence, the role played
by α in our view is to augment the model with a weighting factor that may be adjusted
according to the scenario of interest. More specifically, we assign the value of 1 to α when
considering the first case and the value of 0 for the third case.
The rest of this chapter will collate the aggregated data that was transferred under reliable
cellular for ‘simple D2D’ and ‘baseline LTE’ for all users as aggregated system throughput.
In ‘advanced D2D’ case, we also count the data transferred outside the cellular network
coverage.
The aggregate system throughput as a function of the number of deployed devices is given
in Figure 4.2. The proposed methodology of secure communication provided better results
than both baseline LTE and simple D2D cases. In particular, for device-driven sociality
where α = 0 the best results were achieved. It is followed by human-driven sociality
(α = 0.5 and α = 1). Based on the above, the level of interdevice sociality may introduce
significant benefits to the operation if the trust relations are predefined in advance.
Next, the overall proportion of users that could be served in a given area by accounting for
both the simple D2D and the social-aware D2D is given in the left subplot of Figure 4.3.
We observed a higher percentage of served users were reached when we considered a
social layer of awareness among devices and humans. Further, we learn that this positive
effect is higher for lower degrees of LTE coverage. The right subplot of Figure 4.3 reports
the proportion of users with a simple D2D solution and the proposed social-aware D2D
solution. The benefits brought by social D2D are achieved when users established a direct
link instead of downloading content over the LTE infrastructure and also through users
with D2D connections in locations where there was no coverage. Clearly, with network
coverage degradation, the benefits of the utilization of the proposed framework increase.
In summary, the LTE coverage and user connectivity were tightly connected by varying
the area where the LTE infrastructure was present. Different numbers of users were
found to have been served over a cellular link with the LTE BS. In fact, as can be seen
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Figure 4.3: Impact of LTE coverage on the degree of connectivity in the system [P1]
from Figure 4.3, when the LTE coverage is particularly low (i.e., only 50% of the area of
interest) using a legacy LTE approach led to only 40% of users being served.
One of the most significant metrics for mobile devices is energy efficiency. For consistency
with the aggregated system throughput, we measured the aggregated energy efficiency
as well, and the results are displayed in Figure 4.4, based on the transmit power values
per technology stated in Table 4.2. Here, the social-aware D2D approach outperformed
both the considered baseline LTE and the simple D2D options. For α = 0, the proposed
solution reached its highest gain in contrast to the benchmark LTE operation. This is due
to a lower transmit power of small-scale devices (i.e., connected machines) as compared
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Figure 4.4: Impact of social relationships on the user energy efficiency [P1]
to more power-hungry handheld UEs.
Overall, the social ties between humans and their connected devices had a significant
impact on the proposed social-aware methodology, according to the analysis above.
Notably, a higher degree of social relationships delivered higher system throughput
without energy efficiency degradation. The most significant drawback of the proposed
system is the potential increase in latency due to the time it took to establish proximity-
based communication – this should be considered when making the application. In
particular, handheld devices need additional time to complete the security methods
from [64], leading to slightly higher latencies as the number of the communicating entities
grows. However, the implementation efficiency of these security mechanisms can be
optimized further to reduce the computation time, which can be left for subsequent study.
5 Privacy Preserving Strategies for
Wearable Technology
This chapter will elaborate on the future potential and associated challenges in the
collective use of private wearable devices and the possibility of secure content dissemination
for AR/VR equipment during mass events. First, the properties and methodology of the
electronic devices temporary delegation of use are discussed followed by a short description
of protocols that have been developed and that enable delegation when cloud connectivity is
intermittent. These were established with some numerical evaluation. Next, the broadcast
procedure and corresponding authentication scheme for the content dissemination are
discussed. The end of this chapter provides a summary of the cryptographic primitives
and possibilities in their execution for modern smartwatches and smartphones, stating
that modern security requirements could be fulfilled by both groups.
5.1 Authentication Methodology for Collective Smart Device
Usage
As it was noted previously, one of the most promising trends for electronic devices is
collective use. We proposed a set of protocols to enable temporary delegation of device
usage in scenarios when cellular connection, i.e., link to the cloud, may or may not
be available.
In the scenario when a person willing to borrow the device for some time is trusted or
at least known, the solution is rather straightforward and conventional. However, the
legitimate return according to the agreement could not be guaranteed, even in this case.
The protocols developed were based on a Trusted Authority (TA) that is indirectly involved
in lending the device and could provide some level of confidence during the process. For
example, the authority can define a set of basic rules applied for any delegation procedure
and set the process of landing, retrieving, and modifying the lease even if the connection
to the infrastructure network is not continuously available. Being more specific, we assume
that ‘initialization’ of the device after purchase requires connection to the TA. During
the delegation phase, however, this connection is unnecessary, which is exceptionally
beneficial for distant locations or when roaming. The designed set of protocols explicitly
accommodates those requirements. The assumptions about the network architecture in
this chapter are the same as in previous chapters, i.e., the smartphone assumes the role
of a gateway for the wearable under examination.
In Figure 5.1, we show the primary stages of the system operation. Main notations
and constructions are given in Table 5.1. The description and protocols themselves are
presented in paper [P3].
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B)Owner lends device to a friend
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A)Person purchases a new device
Figure 5.1: The lifesycle of a wearable during its delegation [P3]
We place the TA for our system inside the operator’s cloud. The gateway of each user
has its SKA and certificate signcloud(IDA, PKA) with a public key from TA. signcloud
is delivered from TA according to the corresponding signature construct with the secret
key SKCA of the TA. Note, each owner’s main device has certcloud = PKCA (for device
and message verification) and each wearable wi has a unique hardware-locked identifier
IDi and factory-set PIN stored separately.
Each wi has pre-installed necessary libraries so as to support our functionality. At any
time, the device could be rolled back to its trusted factory state [82]. We imply safety
against person-in-the-middle attacks. Next, the user can initially setup a timer tf to
obtain additional resistance against misuse in cases when the device is stolen or lost
signA(tf ). In the following, we show the main protocol components required for full-scale
implementation of the proposed methodology.
• Association phase represents the case when the future owner buys a new ‘factory-clean’
wearable device and is willing to connect it to its smartphone/personal cloud. Here,
new wi device is associated with Alice’s unique identifier (for example, email address or
account) through the cloud, as it is summarized in Algorithm 1.
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Table 5.1: Main delegation protocol suite notations [P3]
Construct Container Explanation
A,B, cloud – Alice (owner), Bob (temporary user), andCloud names.
wi – ith wearable device.
PKA, SKA – Owner’s public and private keys.
signcloud(PKA) –
Definition that PKA is signed by cloud certifi-
cate.
td, tf – Secure timers for delegation and reset periods.
SA –
Owner’s device secret key utilized for commu-
nication with a wearable.
hash(SWi) – Wearable software hash.
certcloud
signcloud(wi, PKA, IDA,
hash(SWi))
Certificate used for data integrity retrieved
from the cloud.
certA signA(certcloud)
The owner’s envelope for storing on the wear-
able side.
m[D]cloud signcloud(m[D]A) TA verified message envelope.
m[D]A
signA(wi, td, IDA, IDB ,
{rules for delegation}) Initialization message.
m[R]B signB(wi, R) Request for the device retrieval.
m[C(SA)]A signA(wi, C[SA])
Message for removal the user secret key from
wearable device.
Algorithm 1 Association while connected to TA
1: A generates SA for wi and transmits it to wi;
2: wi transmits (hash(SWi)) to TA via A;
3: A also transmits PKA and IDA to TA;
4: TA generates certcloud = signcloud(wi, PKA, IDA, hash(SWi));
5: TA transmits certcloud to A;
6: A signs certcloud and generates certA = signA(certcloud);
7: A transmits certA to wi.
• Here, the most significant phase in our suite is Delegation, which can take place under
both reliable and unreliable coverage to the TA. Note, the owner aims to temporarily
delegate the use of its device (i.e., lend) to its friend/colleague/customer with some
limitations. Overall, the delegation process may also be run remotely if both the owner’s
and user’s gateways are connected to the cloud. Delegation under network coverage
requires that both users’ gateways have a stable connection to the TA, which will handle
all the verification processes (see Algorithm 2). Delegation out of network coverage, i.e.,
runs without a stable link to the TA. The steps are summarized in Algorithm 3.
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Algorithm 2 Delegation while connected to TA
1: A transmits m[D]A = signA(wi, td, IDA, IDB , {rules for delegation}) to wi thus
setting the delegation time;
2: A transmits m[D]A to TA;
3: TA verifies m[D]A based on PKA. Process is terminated if the verification fails;
4: TA signs m[D]cloud = signcloud(m[D]A);
5: TA transmits m[D]cloud, certA to B;
6: A removes SA using m[C(SA)]A at wi side;
7: if B does not trust A then
8: wi is reset to factory defaults;
9: B verifiers if hash(SWi) in certA equals current hash(SWi). Process is terminated
if the verification fails.
10: else
11: B obtains a right to use A’s application according to the delegation rules.
12: end if
13: B generates new SB for wi;
14: B transmits SB to wi;
15: B signs signB(wi, SWi) for integrity reasons;
16: if Delegation timer td expires then
17: wi is reset to factory defaults. td could be updated upon re-
quest while wi has the connection to TA and A transmits m[D]A =
signA(wi, td, IDA, IDB , {rules for delegation}) to it via B or directly.
18: end if
Algorithm 3 Delegation while not connected to TA
1: A transmits m[D]A = signA(wi, td, IDA, IDB , {rules for delegation}) to wi thus
setting the delegation time;
2: A transmits certA,m[D]A to B.
3: B verifies if certA and m[D]A are valid by certcloud. Process is terminated if the
verification fails;
4: A removes SA using m[C(SA)]A at wi side;
5: if B does not trust A then
6: wi is reset to factory defaults;
7: B verifiers if hash(SWi) in certA equals current hash(SWi). Process is terminated
if the verification fails.
8: else
9: B obtains a right to use A’s application according to the delegation rules.
10: end if
11: B generates new SB for wi;
12: B transmits SB to wi;
13: B signs signB(wi, SWi) for integrity reasons;
14: if Delegation timer td expires then
15: wi is reset to factory defaults. td could be updated upon re-
quest while wi has the connection to TA and A transmits m[D]A =
signA(wi, td, IDA, IDB , {rules for delegation}) to it via B or directly.
16: end if
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Next, we outline protocols handling the process of device reclaiming by its owner. Similarly
to the delegation, the operation may be under both reliable and unreliable connectivity
constraints.
• Reclaiming under network coverage is executed similarly to delegation (see Algorithm 4).
Algorithm 4 Reclaiming while connected to TA
1: B transmits m[R]B = signB(wi, R) to TA.
2: TA verifies m[R]B based on PKB . Process is terminated if the verification fails;
3: TA signs mcloud = signcloud(m[R]B);
4: TA transmits mcloud to A;
5: B removes SB using m[C(SB)]B at wi side;
6: if A does not trust B then
7: wi is reset to factory defaults;
8: B verifiers if hash(SWi) in certA equals current hash(SWi). Process is terminated
if the verification fails and A should reinitialize the device with the PIN preset by the
factory.
9: else
10: The software data is unchanging and A can continue using local applications after
returning from B.
11: end if
12: A transmits stored SA to wi;
13: A signs signA(wi, SWi) for data integrity reasons. Thus, wi has to store
certA, certcloud now.
• Reclaiming out of network coverage is also similar to delegation (see Algorithm 5).
Algorithm 5 Reclaiming while not connected to TA
1: B transmits m[R]B = signB(wi, R) to A over a direct link;
2: B removes SB using m[C(SB)]B at wi side;
3: A verifies m[R]B by certcloud.
4: if A does not trust B then
5: wi is reset to factory defaults;
6: B verifiers if hash(SWi) in certA equals current hash(SWi). The process is
terminated if the verification fails and A should reinitialize the device with the PIN
preset by the factory.
7: else
8: The software data is unchanging and A can continue using local applications after
returning from B.
9: end if
10: A transmits stored SA to wi;
11: A signs signA(wi, SWi) for data integrity reasons. Thus, wi has to store
certA, certcloud now.
• Another significant phase of the protocol suite is de-association of the wearable device
from the personal cloud if it is sold or disposed of. Therefore, it is necessary to clean
personal data, keys, and certificates from the device that were obtained previously from the
TA. Generally, there are two options for de-association: (i) manual (in case of ‘triggered
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by the owner’ process, see Algorithm 6), and (ii) automatic (if the rental regulations were
not met, the device was lost, damaged, or stolen. Thus, the data should be erased, see
Algorithm 7).
Algorithm 6 Manual de-association
1: A transmits m[F ]A to wi;
2: wi is reset to the factory state with total removal of all the data, the certificate storage
is erased.
3: wi could thus be reinitialized only by the factory PIN and when the new owner has a
connection to the cloud.
Algorithm 7 Automatic de-association
1: The tf is initialized when the device leaves a personal cloud of the user after preset
threshold time interval.
2: if tf expires then
3: wi is reset to the factory state with total removal of all the data, the certificate
storage is erased.
4: wi could thus be reinitialized only by the factory PIN and when the new owner
has a connection to the cloud.
5: end if
Since we found no option to implement the protocol in the wearable devices available on
the market, we numerically assessed the energy consumption on the gateway (in case of
potential implementation) as it would become the most significant limiting factor.
Here, the transmitting conditions are kept static for all network interfaces, and the results
are given in absolute numbers due to heterogeneity concerning potential devices. In
particular, the power consumption data for the cellular interface are reproduced from [83].
We have obtained the results related to power consumption from works [84, 85, 86]. Here,
power consumption for WiFi is set as 720mW, for BLE as 147mW, and for ZigBee as
71.402mW. These values were used as a baseline for our numerical evaluation regarding
transmission overheads while keeping the packet payloads equal.
As the main explanatory example, we summarize relative power consumption for cases of
reliable and intermittent connectivity in Figure 5.2. Indeed, the delegation and association
phases are more power hungry compared to others, and this is due to a higher number
of signaling messages transmitted over the wireless medium. We also show that the
utilization of WiFi for direct connectivity is more energy consuming in comparison with
other studied short-range wireless technologies. Still, power consumption is relatively low
for any technology.
5.2 Broadcast Content Access for Mass Events
So far, we have shown the breadth of what must be considered with wearable technology
and devices, and yet there are even more complex contexts to be found in the field of
entertainment. This area is also profoundly affected by such requirements as privacy,
security, and connectivity. Unfortunately, the market still faces a lack of appropriate
information security enablers.
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Figure 5.2: Power consumption during different operation phases [P3]
In this and the next section, there is a discussion on flexible authentication that has the
potential to be used while accessing broadcast content during the physical attendance to a
sports event, meaning directly during the event (with micro-transactions). A broader list
of applications is as follows: (i) video content retrieval from new sources (players, gates,
drones, etc.); (ii) obtaining team-related information (statistics, history, future games,
etc.); (iii) service and critical information (evacuation plans, alerts, etc.); (iv) advertise-
ment (taxi, fast food, souvenirs, etc.). Despite listed monetization opportunities, the
stadium owner can also acquire more significant statistical data, such as the proportion
and distribution of the occupied seats; spectators interests and requests, and many others.
This statistical data can be used to improve the experience of fans through better planning
of frequent consumables purchases, improving the advertisement content, etc. All this
can positively influence any future event planning.
Generally, Figure 5.3 shows a given scenario depicting the deep penetration of wearable
technology in professional sport, e.g., an ice hockey match with different categories of
users. The numerous wearable devices are expected to be carried by content consumers –
mass spectators. This group of people have purchased their ticket and obtained access
to a personalized AR kit. The next big group is support personnel that include referees,
security, medics, technicians, advertisers, and other specialists who have access to highly
specific and sensitive data. Then, the most significant component is the competing teams
and their coaches. The special requirement for this class is long-term protection against
misuse of context-oriented information regarding their abilities, health, and behavior
during the game – since it could be easily analyzed.
The main pragmatic outcome of the proposed framework is a secure, wearable-aware
data streaming system that opens out new avenues for entertainment and advertisement
efficiency. Since players would wear a multitude of monitoring devices, including those
for heart rate, lung capacity, metabolism, and location [87], the game-oriented data may
be presented to the public in an entirely new way. At the same time, the information
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Figure 5.3: The scenario of wearable utilization during an ice hockey match [P4]
should be carefully classified as sensitive and nonsensitive, and thus divided between
authorized users and spectators. Nonetheless, sensitive data could be further masked and
even delivered to promote third-party services for fans’ AR glasses or home screen [88].
5.3 Anonymized Content Dissemination Methodology
This section is focused on the proposed authentication technique that could be used for
the AR/VR broadcast data, with differentiated access based on a specific subscription.
Overall, current authentication systems mainly rely on symmetric, asymmetric, or hybrid
cryptosystems [89]. Many of these use a hashing process as part of their basis, allowing for
the reconstruction of “shares” into one secret key. Asymmetric PKI from this perspective
allows for serving a high number of users through flexible and an easy to use authentication
procedure.
In the case of access control during a mass event, we combine a set of available secret shares
obtained from a number of unique digital sources, i.e., ticket number, seat number, etc.
Moreover, a user of such a system could be uniquely verified based on their combination,
and thus diversified access could be provided to different users even in the same seat.
One of the solutions to enable such functionality is the so-called hybrid Yoking-Proof
protocol [90].
Further, we discuss a solution that involves interaction with stadium equipment (see [P4]
for details). The central assumptions are: (i) Radio-frequency identification (RFID)
tags are integrated in seats and tickets [91]; (ii) every spectator has an NFC-enabled
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smartphone. In order to verify the user, the system simultaneously checks the ticket
and seat via the stadium wireless communication technology. After that, the actual
authentication code is delivered either via the application’s push notification mechanism
or SMS.
Therefore, the event organizer or owner of the stadium could obtain the seat identifier,
the ticket identifier, and, optionally, the subscription identifiers. Based on this data,
the level of service for the selected user may vary if using the hashing function and the
authentication code together. Note, the user is assumed to have an anonymous ticket for
any third-party.
In other words, the unique composition of the seat number, the provided level of service,
and public key-based signature (stored in the cloud for previous fields verification) could
be considered as the digital subscription ticket. Here, the trusted authority is responsible
for any cloud management. The main scenarios of interest are listed further:
• The service is provided by the event organizer anonymously. We need to achieve
the following in addition to any authentication:
– ID-based scheme should be used instead of conventional PKI-based ones [92, 93];
– Private key generator (PKG) should be used on the trusted authority side;
– The secret key should not have any direct relation to the user. It must be
connected with the ticket, subscription, seat, and additionally connected to
specific event properties such as event name, its date, and time. Therefore,
ID-based key generation would produce SKi with PKG.
• The event organizer would require just ticket and event-related data during the
signature verification process, in turn providing an adequate level of anonymization
of the user.
• This private data could still be obtained, if necessary, upon specific requests in case
of, for example, mass riots.
5.4 Numerical Evaluation of Cryptographic Primitives on
Small-Scale Devices
During his research visit to the Brno University of Technology and after the development
of secure proximity-based clustering framework, the author decided to evaluate the overall
‘executability’ of cryptographic primitives on modern IoWT devices, and the primary
results are provided in [P2]. The focus was given to calculations using a big integer as
multiplication, division, power functions, and classical elliptic curves’ algorithms utilized
for constructing the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman cryptosystem (RSA) signature, hash functions
(Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA1), SHA-256), and block cipher (Advanced Encryption
Standard, AES). This list appeared mainly due to some interoperability challenges on
constrained devices and could be extended as the selected primitives became available for
evaluation. Paper [P2] provides a more in-depth explanation of those also taking into
consideration more complicated cases, such as bilinear pairing and IoT boards, while this
thesis focuses specifically on wearables and widely used functionality.
Note that modern wearable devices can now rival the computational performance of
handheld devices that are a few years old (see [P2] for details). This computational
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functionality and performance have consistently grown across several hardware parameters
and contemporary wearable devices have become able to perform similar computing tasks
to handheld devices or even laptop computers. Thus, we selected a number of those
for our evaluation (see Figure 5.4). Specifically, we used Apple iPhone 6 with iOS 9.1,
Samsung Galaxy S4, and Jiayu S3 Advanced, with Android 4.4.2. In terms of wearables,
we selected Apple Watch with Watch OS 2.0 and Sony Smart Watch 3 with Android
Wear 5.1.1.
Figure 5.4: Cryptographic primitives performance evaluation of small-scale devices [P2]
For the next phase, the security primitives described above were implemented for all
listed platforms, without delegating any computations to more powerful devices. The
applications were developed in Java for Android-based devices and in Objective-C for
those by Apple. All background processes were terminated to make the executions fairer.
The evaluation was executed at each device at least 1000 times, in order to achieve
statistically reliable data.
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Figure 5.5: Evaluation of RSA execution [P2]
Figure 5.5 shows the overheads brought about by utilizing RSA encryption and decryption
procedures. OpenSSL was used to generate private and public keys for 1024 and 2048
bits [94] and default public exponent (3 bytes). We found that a typical smartphone
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Figure 5.6: Evaluation of Hashing and AES execution [P2]
spends around 1 ms for RSA encryption while a smartwatch uses almost three times as
much time to perform the same task. At the same time, decryption time provided a
much worse result; Android required 25 ms on average, while the iPhone needed up to
100 ms. Smartwatches demonstrated similar behavior, the values are 35 ms for Android
and 200 ms for Apple.
The hashing function is another fundamental primitive evaluated in this work. The
measurements of SHA1 and SHA-256 are shown in Figure 5.6. Here, it was concluded that
on most of the devices the execution is optimized and mainly varies because of equipment
differences. The results for AES encryption are also present in Figure 5.6 following the
pattern of PKI operation.
In summary, even smartwatches available on the market today can execute the current
necessary cryptographic primitives. At the same time, the main wearable gateway –
a smartphone – already has the computational power of a three year-old stationary
computer, meaning security requirements need to be met whilst developing secure com-
munications between wearables, their gateways, and cloud.

6 Wearable Technology as a Part of
Multi-Factor Authentication
This chapter examines multi-factor authentication around modern wearable electronics.
Firstly, the main factor providers (sensors) and corresponding challenges are given. The
author then proposes the threshold authentication methodology with cloud assistance
for situations when some of the factors could not be retrieved. Further, some numerical
evaluation of factor grouping is given from the security vs. usability perspective. Future
perspectives of MFA for wearables are given at the end of this chapter.
Historically, the authentication was based on not just a single factor. Less than a decade
ago, it was realized that single-factor authentication could not guarantee adequate protec-
tion due to the ever-growing number of threats [95]. Thus, two-factor authentication [96]
was first proposed by grouping any two factors together through a combination of the
conventional username/password with an extra request to present a physical token, i.e., a
smart card or phone [97, 98].
Generally, the factors currently present on the market can be classified into three main
groups [99]: (i) knowledge; (ii) ownership; and (iii) biometrics/behavior.
Next, MFA was introduced to the public to ensure an even higher level of safety, simul-
taneously employing more than two factors [100]. The key technology behind MFA is
biometrics, which is defined by its continuous recognition of human behavior [101] and
biological characteristics [102]. The use of actual person-related data provided an entirely
new level of security by using someone’s identity as evidence [103].
Today, MFA systems can be classified into the following market groups: Forensic segment –
corpse investigation, missing person search, criminal investigation, etc. [104]; Government
segment – border control, driver license, government ID, etc. [105]; Commercial segment
– account access, e-commerce, physical access control, etc. [106].
6.1 Overview of Enabling Factors and Challenges
Although wearables provide biometric and behavior data, the communication between
devices and smart sensors is also a significant question since the authentication between
and by machines may also take place during the MFA process [107]. Utilization of ‘active’
biometric input also has its drawbacks concerning usability, since humans need to be
educated on how to operate the system [108]. Transparent retrieval of biometric data
from wearables may play a tremendous role in improving system usability in the most
transparent way for any user. As an example, we may consider a fingerprint scanner
that recently achieved a high level of adoption through its usability, mainly due to its
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deep functional integration by smartphone vendors [109]. At the same time, using this
technique as a standalone method is not recommended [110].
One of the biggest and well-studied challenges in biometric authentication systems is
the binary behavior of the decision given from the sensor. There is a broad range of
solutions enabling slight mismatch and control of the sensed data with stored samples.
The most widely adopted strategies involve measuring the False Reject Rate (FRR) –
representing the security, and False Accept Rate (FAR) – representing usability [111].
In a broader sense, MFA systems highly depend on the appropriate selection of FAR
and FRR parameters. Another important metric is Equal Error Rate (EER), which in
literature is referred to as Central Error Rate (CER). It defines the ‘equilibrium’ between
FAR and FRR, i.e., the point where they are equal.
From the perspective of wearable devices, one of the widely utilized methods for MFA
could be accelerometer fingerprinting [112, 113]. The user can be continuously verified
based on their gait or gesture patterns, being almost impossible to replicate by another
person, in a similar way to one’s heart rate. One more option is the analysis of the user’s
lifestyle and behavior [114], i.e., places often visited based on the GPS location, wireless
APs in proximity, or even purchases made [115].
Generally, any factor provider could be analyzed based on a set of specific parameters [116].
The first one is universality or the property of the factor ‘presence’ in each person. Keeping
the fingerprint in mind, an MFA system architect should consider that a person may
lose a limb during an accident and the system should still be useful for him/her. The
second one is uniqueness – to offer differentiation between two persons. The third one is
collectability, representing the ease of data acquisition. The fourth one is performance,
being the accuracy, maximum detection speed, and environmental robustness. After this
comes acceptability, i.e., the degree of potential community adoption. The final parameter
stands for potential spoofing, representing the ease of capturing and spoofing of the data
sample. The list of main factor providers with the corresponding classification is given
in Table 6.1.
From the author’s perspective, acceptability and integration are always the most compli-
cated steps during the technology adoption phase. There exist many other challenges
that could be faced during MFA integration, with the most critical ones summarized in
Figure 6.1 and detailed in [P6].
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Table 6.1: Comparison of suitable factors for MFA [P6]: H–high; M–medium; L– low; n/a–unavailable.
Factor Collectability Uniqueness Performance Spoofing Universality Acceptability
Behavior L H L L H L
Facial M L L M H H
Fingerprint M H H H M M
Hand geometry M M M M M M
Location M L H H n/a M
Ocular-based M H M H H L
Password H L H H n/a H
Thermal image L H M H H H
Token H M H H n/a H
Vein M M M M M M
Voice M L L H M H
MFA Challenges
Security
Data spoofing
Input, transmission security
Social engineering
Privacy
Resistance against known attacks
Investigation of potential attacks
Template protection
Probabilistic behavior
Biometric probabilistic
FAR, FRR, FTE, FTA
Robustness
Resistance against noise
Input device quality
Reliability
Usability
Task efficiency, effectiveness
User preferences
Age, cognitive abilities
Quality of input device
Special disabilities
Integration
New hardware, software
Systems interoperability
Vendor independency
Access to source code
Figure 6.1: Main operational challenges of MFA [P6]
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6.2 Proposed Multi-Factor Authentication Methodology Based
on Reversed Lagrange Polynomial
Users (i.e., humans) have a tendency, however, to forget their keys, passwords, etc. that
may potentially make MFA access impossible. To overcome this issue, the proposed
methodology was based on a well-known Lagrange polynomial, which was required
to collect any l previously distributed shares {SID1 , SID2 , . . . , SIDl} for access. The
corresponding polynomial of the degree n > l is shown in Figure 6.2. Here, we aim to
define the curve S and utilize random coefficients ai for generation of the secret share
Si [117, 118].
That approach, however, is not suitable for modern authentication systems involving
biometrics, since most of the biometric factors do not change over time, i.e., we can
neither modify the existing share nor assign a new Si to a factor. Generally, the user
can constantly change its knowledge-based factors, but this would make the system use
complicated. Here, we need to ‘reverse’ the approach and set SIDi as the already known
factor values Si, i.e., Si values are static per factor per user as {S1, S2, . . . , Sl}. Therefore,
curve S should be not the baseline for generating shares, but vice versa.
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Figure 6.2: Classic Lagrange polynomial-based secret sharing methodology [P6]
To improve the overall usability and keep the level of security relatively high, we base
our MFA system on the reversed Lagrange polynomial with l shares from each individual
factor F . In the following lines, we expand on a tagged legitimate user. Each Fi has
its own secret Si obtained from the sensor. Importantly, the probability of this value
changing over time (for biometric data) is extremely low. Thus, we can write these
combinations as: F1 : S1;F2 : S2; . . . ;Fl : SL;Fl+1 : T , where Fl+1 stands for a timestamp
at time moment T .
To keep user-sensitive biometric samples even more well-hidden from the TA, we define
that Si are directly retrieved from the sensors and S is actually the polynomial main secret
(see Figure 6.2). The proposed system, in contrast, generates the main secret S based
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on results collected from the sensors Si instead of assigning ones to factors. The main
secret required to access the service or device S may be reconstructed from previously
distributed l shares. The improvements must satisfy the uniqueness requirements of the
collected data, together with the timestamp, as in Figure 6.3, as these measures give
robustness to counteract incidences when the collected shares do not change over time.
x=0 F1 F2 Fl FT
Se
cr
et
 v
al
ue S
S1
S2
Sl
ST
ST
1
ST
2
T
T1
T2
Time factor
Figure 6.3: Proposed reversed methodology [P6]
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Figure 6.4: Possibility of the cloud assistance in the proposed methodology [P6]
With the system proposed here, one of the main benefits is that when the cloud connection
is available, the user can be supplied with additional shares by the cloud. This may
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happen if secret components have been forgotten, lost or mismatched. The cloud-provided
shares could be delivered when, for example, the second channel is used for identity
verification. Here, the TA may be requested to supplement the necessary number of
temporary shares (see Figure 6.4).
Consider a case when the user could not provide a few factors to the system for verification,
such as F1 and F2. The cloud could generate two temporary shares in order for the main
secret to be reconstructed as SΦ1 = f(Φ1) and SΦ2 = f(Φ2). The shares are sent to the user
via a secure channel and as F1 : S1;F2 : S2; . . . ;Fl : SL;Fl+1 : T ; Φ1 : SΦ1 ; Φ2 : SΦ2 [119].
By this means, the access to the device or service would be granted.
6.3 Proposed Intelligent Factor Grouping for Multi-Factor
Authentication
In conventional authentication systems based on knowledge and ownership factors, the
decisions always either pass or fail based on how accurate the input data is. At the
very moment biometric data is captured, any sensor is subject to mistakes during the
sample capture process. Therefore, the interoperability of binary decision factors and
probabilistic ones is an exciting task to focus on.
Conventionally, statistically collected FAR/FRR properties of the sensors are provided by
the vendor. To evaluate the MFA framework, we assume two typical decisions that could
take place during the authentication phase (see Figure 6.5). The first one represents the
illegitimate user authentication (H0) and the second stands for legitimate (H1). Therefore,
those two decisions form a sample space of P (H0)+P (H1) = 1. The MFA system architect
then sets the distributions of P (H0) and P (H1) and also tunes the system according to
chosen parameters.
MFA engine DecisionFactor providers
Accept
Reject
Sensor 1
Sensor 12
Sensor 1n
z1, FAR1, FRR1
z2, FAR2, FRR2
TH
zn, FARn, FRRn
Estimator
P(H0), P(H1), P
Input
...
Figure 6.5: MFA system mode with selected threshold [P6]
Here, the user input data could be collected from n biometric sensors. Each sensor
sample from the set Z = {z1, . . . , zn} is within [0, 1]. The corresponding capture could
be analyzed further based on two different strategies.
The first strategy is called the Strict Decision Method. Here, all sensors (including
biometric ones) return either accept or reject by preprocessing the data on the sensor side.
The results are later combined and provide a group decision based on the resulting vector
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or results. Therefore, the threshold could be used for the final MFA decision. Basically,
each sensor returns value zi, zi = [0; 1]. Next, conditional probabilities P (zi |H0 ) and
P (zi |H1 ) are defined by FARi and FRRi values.
The second strategy is called the Probabilistic Decision Method. Here, the sensor does
not provide a binary decision but uses a probabilistic feature instead. Next, the data is
processed in the MFA system. The results are complemented with the sample comparison
as a match score of zi (0 ≤ zi ≤ 1). Thus, the conditional probability P (zi |H0 ) is
estimated based on the FARi values for each zi. We base the calculation of the conditional
probability P (zi |H1 ) on FRRi values at zi. Generally, the first strategy could be
considered as a simplified version of the second one if FARi and FRRi are given only at
one point.
Consider an example of knowledge-based authentication. Here, FAR represents the
probability of guessing the secret and FRR stands for the possibility of entering the data
wrong. At the same time, FAR and FRR also define cases of stealing the secret knowledge
and correspondingly forgetting it. This also applies in the case of ownership factors, and
therefore most of the binary decision factors could be represented in a unified output
format and supplemented with proper FAR/FRR values.
Despite that, the use of several individual factors together does not offer any immediate
advantage since it is still unclear how to combine them effectively. As a straightforward
solution, one can end up with two different strategies: a user should successfully pass all
the checks to get access (All) and a user should successfully pass any of the checks to get
access (Any). However, those strategies have their own advantages and weaknesses. To
prove that, we present a numerical example comparing the corresponding weaknesses in
addition to showing the importance of intelligent factor combination. For this evaluation,
we assume a set of factors with the corresponding FAR and FRR values. Following the
self-explanatory plot, we assume all the FARs be equal to 0.03% whereas all the FRRs
are equal to 2%. The Law of Total Probability then derives the resultant values for
FAR/FRR.
The numerical example results are summarized in Figure 6.6. Here, the All approach has
the lowest FAR for any number of factors combined thus offering the highest security
level. At the same time, this approach shows the highest FRR, proving that such a
system is extremely uncomfortable to use since the user has to input all the requested
data successfully. Based on the above, we conclude that its application for the daily basis,
i.e., while accessing the services on-the-fly, is not an effective option.
In contrast, FAR is increasing at the expense of much better FRR for the Any approach.
Therefore, the system stays insecure (since there is a need to hijack the weakest factor
to obtain access) but very easy to use, which is also not acceptable for everyday use.
Consequently, none of the trivial MFA combinations are directly usable in the challenging
A-IoT scenarios.
Therefore, we propose a novel Balanced approach. Here, a user should successfully
pass some of the checks to obtain access to the system thus representing a compromise
between usability and security for the modern MFA system by decreasing both FAR and
FRR values. The quantitative gains highly depend on the input parameters and reach
104 vs. 108 when 7 factors are combined. This example also highlights the importance
of threshold value selection, since incorrect combining may often result in rapid system
performance degradation [P6]. The same holds true for any other values of FAR/FRR,
even though they may actually vary for different factors.
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Figure 6.6: Comparing alternative factor combining approaches [P7]
6.4 Future Perspectives
Most of the conventional ICT systems typically utilize a binary authentication strategy
based on a set of explicitly defined steps that must be followed in order to gain access to
the system. Considering the highly dynamic world of tomorrow, the main authentication
phases should be complemented with additional verification taking place before or after
the actual authentication of the user. The MFA system may vastly benefit from both
the surrounding environment of the user, i.e., Smart City, Intelligent Transportation
Systems (ITS), Surveillance Cameras, and Smart devices around, as well as from the
user’s personal cloud, in this way seamlessly monitoring user biometrics and behavior.
Therefore, the entire process could be divided into three main phases:
• Preauthentication could be described as the most dynamic and unpredictable phase
when the user is approaching the target, for example, a vehicle. This case is one of
the most critical ones, and the use of surrounding ecosystem may significantly improve
the authentication procedure by ‘observing’ the user biometrics/behavior that could
be delivered by wearables worn by the subject, devices they are carrying, and other
vehicles/infrastructure.
• Active authentication is the authentication we know today, i.e., the user is forced to
execute some actions with the system directly. This phase is the most conventional one
and can use any type of authentication factor but commonly relies on prior knowledge
and ownership.
• Continuous authentication of the user, meaning they remain legitimate to operate the
system even after the previous phases are completed successfully. From the author’s
perspective, it becomes possible to monitor and analyze the user by the personal cloud,
the smart vehicle, surrounding infrastructure, and other cars. Consider a case where the
driver has provided all of the tokens, passed all of the biometric tests but faces a seizure
during a highway trip. In this case, the vehicle may automatically overtake the control,
connect with neighboring cars, and safely stop by the wayside. As an example, recent
works confirm that it is necessary to monitor the driver for just under 2.5 minutes in
order to validate the behavior with 95% accuracy [120].
7 Conclusions and Future Perspective
The conclusion will be a summary of the work presented in this thesis, beginning with
outlining the overall research goals achieved:
• The evolution of the wearable electronics concept was analyzed, together with
existing consumer and enterprise applications, as well as communication paradigms
and architectures.
• The impact of social user connections on establishing secure direct links between
wearable gateways for intermittent connectivity to the cloud was analyzed. The
solution to enable functionality was proposed and evaluated, representing the
corresponding communication benefits.
In the future, the developed solution may be used together with an underlying
social networks layer to enable efficient content dissemination between users/devices
in proximity.
• A protocol suite that enabled privacy to be preserved with a temporary delegation
of wearable usage, when there was both reliable and unreliable connectivity to the
cloud, was proposed and evaluated.
Perspectively, the developed set of protocols may be integrated as part of modern
smart wearable ecosystem thus creating a flexible environment for enabling shared
or temporary use of the devices.
• The main strategy of combination factors for MFA system from the biometric data
perspective was evaluated, taking into consideration both security and usability.
An intelligent methodology for this combination was proposed showing its benefits
compared to conventional solutions.
In prospect, the use of the proposed methodology together with the wearable devices
data may facilitate the daily access procedure.
In the course of this work, our research group also developed several frameworks for
assessing information security primitives on modern wearable devices, as well as modules
for system-level modeling in our custom simulation tool.
Generally, the development of wearable technology and its mass adoption would have a
substantial impact on modern communication paradigms. The discussed in this work
enablers may be used as a solid foundation for the development of enabling technology
components, including actual direct communications both under and outside of cellular
network coverage and corresponding security-related tasks. The utilization of the devel-
oped components would allow enabling distributed secure data exchange among groups
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of humans (and/or associated wearable devices) communicating over short-range and
infrastructure links, possibly without a connection to the centralized trusted authority.
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8.1 Publications Description
The main publications used in this thesis are referred to as [P1]-[P7]. The publications
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scientific journals. Publication [P2] is the conference paper. None of the publications
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and Sociality Realms,” IEEE Wireless Communications, vol. 23(4), pp. 103-111.
Aug. 2016.
Description
In [P1], we argue on the widespread adoption of the direct communications paradigm
being very unlikely without embracing the concepts of trust and social-aware
cooperation concerning both aspects of user-operators and user-devices. We first
elaborate on the state-of-the-art market and the corresponding effects. Next, we
focus on the user adoption, trust-related challenges, and potential incentives for
its improvement. We provide a vision that sociality has the potential to become a
core incentive across proximate users. We show that sociality could be considered
from different perspectives, mainly: user-driven and device-driven. Further, we
propose a social-aware framework aimed at enabling trusted D2D-centric data
delivery for proximate users in mobile environments to free the licensed operator
spectrum. We evaluate the proposed framework by comparing it to conventional
direct communication and show the corresponding benefits concerning throughput,
number of served users, and energy efficiency. Finally, we show a standardization
perspective.
This paper is a collaborative work of the author and his supervisor with Dr. Dmitri
Moltchanov and Asst. Prof. Sergey Andreev from the same research group in
Tampere University of Technology (Finland), Ekaterina Olshannikova and As-
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with Ericsson Research (Finland).
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In [P2], we elaborate on the information security primitives and cryptosystems
currently utilized for delivering the level of data privacy and security required for
modern constrained and wearable devices. Next, we develop a testbed framework
allowing us to evaluate some of the devices on the market from different vendors.
We analyze the real-life execution time of symmetric/asymmetric cryptography,
hashing functions, and elliptic curve-based cryptography. The main conclusions of
this paper are so that market-available wearable and constrained devices already
have enough computational power to execute modern crypto primitives.
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pere University of Technology (Finland), Dr. Pavel Masek, Dr. Lukas Malina,
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Description
In [P3], we continue the discussion related to the penetration of wearable devices
in the everyday lives of the humanity. We discuss a paradigm shift from the
Internet of Things to the Internet of Wearable Things, which in turn brings along a
truly personalized user experience by capitalizing on the rich contextual information
followed by new data privacy challenges. Next, we develop a set of protocols enabling
the authentication of wearable devices when the presence of a reliable infrastructure
link is missing. By this means, we develop a solution for temporary device delegation
in cases of intermittent cellular connectivity that allow for collective use fulfilling
data privacy. The paper also provides potential attacks on the developed protocol
and corresponding countermeasures. We also show the power consumption based
on the utilized short-range technology for communication between the wearable
device and the corresponding gateway.
This paper is a collaborative work of the author and his supervisor with Asst.
Prof. Sergey Andreev from the same research group in Tampere University of
Technology (Finland), Joona Kannisto and Prof. Jarmo Harju were also with
Tampere University of Technology, and Prof. Sergey Bezzateev was with Saint-
Petersburg University of Aerospace Instrumentation (Russia).
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8.1. Publications Description 51
Description
In [P4], we first provide a historical and then a future vision of wearables usage
on a mass event by both content providers (players, coaches, etc.) and consumers
(fans, operators, medics, etc.). We provide the main characteristics of the scenario
and the corresponding limitations. From the communications perspective, we
evaluate the data delivery broadcast for the target scenario based on a real hockey
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IEEE 802.11ac at 5 GHz, and IEEE 802.11ad at 60 GHz) with the help of custom
developed by our team Ray-Launcher software. Finally, we propose a multi-factor
authentication methodology suitable for utilization at the stadium by a ticket holder
and the corresponding set of attacks.
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Technology (Finland), Assoc. Prof. Thomas Olsson and Prof. Jarmo Harju were
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In [P5], we propose a programming model and an associated secure-connectivity
framework for leveraging safe, coordinated device proximity as an additional degree
of freedom between the remote cloud and the safety-critical network edge, espe-
cially under uncertain environment constraints. We first elaborate on conventional
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propose the use of the so-called ‘liquid software’ paradigm allowing more flexible
executions, and provide an overview of our dynamic clustering mechanism allowing
for efficient communication at the network peripheral.
This paper is a collaborative work of the author and his supervisor with Asst.
Prof. Sergey Andreev from the same research group in Tampere University of Tech-
nology (Finland), Joona Kannisto was also with Tampere University of Technology,
and Dr. Niko Mäkitalo and Prof. Tommi Mikkonen were with University of Helsinki
(Finland).
[P6] Aleksandr Ometov, Sergey Bezzateev, Niko Mäkitalo, Sergey Andreev, Tommi
Mikkonen, Yevgeni Koucheryavy, “Multi-Factor Authentication: A Survey,” MDPI
Cryptography, vol. 2(1). pp. 1-31. Jan. 2018.
Description
In [P6], we provide a survey of the multi-factor authentication concept for modern
devices. We first overview factor types and the corresponding evolution from
single- to multi-factor authentication methodology. Next, we focus on the currently
available factor provider techniques/sensors and compare the most suitable for MFA
factors. Next, we list the MFA integration, security, privacy, and usability challenges
and perspective on the flexible MFA operation, based on ‘reversed’ Lagrange secret
sharing methodology. Finally, we develop a methodology for the MFA systems’
evaluation allowing to combine knowledge and biometric factors.
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This paper is a collaborative work of the author and his supervisor with Asst.
Prof. Sergey Andreev from the same research group in Tampere University of
Technology (Finland), Prof. Sergey Bezzateev was with ITMO University (Russia),
and Dr. Niko Mäkitalo and Prof. Tommi Mikkonen were with University of Helsinki
(Finland).
[P7] Aleksandr Ometov, Vitaly Petrov, Sergey Bezzateev, Sergey Andreev, Yevgeni
Koucheryavy, Mario Gerla, “Challenges of Multi-Factor Authentication for Securing
Advanced IoT (A-IoT) Applications,” accepted with minor revision, IEEE Network,
Jun. 2018.
Description
Work [P7] is a logical continuation of [P6]. First, we analyze the main challenges of
ownership determination in advanced IoT. Next, we compare existing factors from
a usability perspective keeping in mind that usability always goes as a trade-off to
security. Next, we propose to intelligently use ‘weighted’ factors for MFA instead
of binary ones and compare those from both usability and security perspectives.
Finally, we lay out a future vision on how to dynamically improve the authentication
experience by switching from active authentication, i.e., when a user is asked for
some input, to preliminary and continuous authentication where environmental
sensory devices directly communicate with the target user devices.
This paper is a collaborative work of the author and his supervisor with Asst.
Prof. Sergey Andreev and Vitaly Petrov from the same research group in Tampere
University of Technology (Finland), Prof. Sergey Bezzateev was with ITMO Univer-
sity (Russia), and Prof. Mario Gerla was with University of California, Los Angeles
(USA).
8.2 Author’s Contribution
The core listed publications were completed at the Laboratory of Electronics and Com-
munications Engineering, Tampere University of Technology (TUT), Finland.
In addition to this, the author was on a visit to Brno University of Technology (Czech
Republic), where he completed part of the simulation and prototype development-related
assignments. The author of this thesis is the first author and primary contributor to [P1] –
[P4] and [P6]– [P7]. The author’s thesis-related research was guided by his supervisor,
Prof. Evgeny Kucheryavy, and instructor, Asst. Prof. Sergey Andreev. Historically, the
author is in strong collaboration with Prof. Sergey Bezzateev who guided him while
working on information security-related tasks. The main results summarized in this thesis
were obtained collaborating with colleagues at TUT and international co-authors from
BUT and UNIRC. The following text provides the author’s contribution in all included
publications, [P1]– [P7].
In [P1], the author was responsible for providing state-of-the-art on all aspects except for
sociality and incentives. He was also involved in designing the scenarios and numerical
performance evaluation. In [P2], the author was responsible for executing the literature
review, determination of the requirements, selection of the most significant primitives,
main development of the evaluation software-based framework, and partially for the actual
testing. In [P3], the author was responsible for proposing the most important scenarios,
main development of the protocol, numerical evaluation, and partially for determination
of attacks together with corresponding recommendations. In [P4], the author was
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responsible for the formulation of the research hypothesis, principally for the development
and execution of the experiment. He was the main developer of the authentication
methodology. In [P5], the author’s contribution was dedicated to developing the concept of
secure coalition formation methodology and classification of the communication paradigms.
In [P6], the author is a primary contributor responsible for providing an extensive literature
review, analyzing suitable factors, distinguishing potential ones, and developing the MFA
methodology based on ‘reversed’ Lagrange polynomial. Finally, in [P7], the author is a
primary contributor developing the evaluation methodology, the vision of the utilization
of dynamic MFA in the world of tomorrow, and recommendations on how to group the
obtained factors.
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Toward Trusted, Social-Aware D2D Connectivity:
Bridging Across the Technology and
Sociality Realms
Aleksandr Ometov†, Antonino Orsino, Leonardo Militano, Dmitri Moltchanov,
Giuseppe Araniti, Ekaterina Olshannikova, Gabor Fodor, Sergey Andreev, Thomas Olsson,
Antonio Iera, Johan Torsner, Yevgeni Koucheryavy, and Tommi Mikkonen
Abstract—Driven by the unprecedented increase of mobile
data traffic, device-to-device (D2D) communications technology
is rapidly moving into the mainstream of fifth-generation (5G)
networking landscape. While D2D connectivity has originally
emerged as a technology enabler for public safety services,
it is likely to remain in the heart of the 5G ecosystem by
spawning a wide diversity of proximate applications and services.
In this work, we argue that the widespread adoption of the
direct communications paradigm is unlikely without embracing
the concepts of trust and social-aware cooperation between end
users and network operators. However, such adoption remains
conditional on identifying adequate incentives that engage hu-
mans and their connected devices into a plethora of collective
activities. To this end, the mission of our research is to advance
the vision of social-aware and trusted D2D connectivity, as well
as to facilitate its further adoption. We begin by reviewing the
various types of underlying incentives with the emphasis on
sociality and trust, discuss these factors specifically for humans
and for networked devices (machines), as well as propose a novel
framework allowing to construct the much needed incentive-
aware D2D applications. Our supportive system-level perfor-
mance evaluations suggest that trusted and social-aware direct
connectivity has the potential to decisively augment the network
performance. We conclude by outlining the future perspectives
of its development across research and standardization sectors.
I. INTRODUCTION AND RATIONALE
In recent years, we have been witnessing an increased
proliferation of bandwidth-hungry user applications, which
are becoming ubiquitous in the form of multimedia services,
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interactive games, and social networking solutions. To effec-
tively cope with the resulting avalanche of mobile traffic,
fifth generation (5G) networks demand innovative technologies
capable of supporting the ambitious system requirements. To
this end, unprecedentedly high targets were set for the 5G
system design, such as seamless wide-area coverage (with 100
Mbps user rate) and extremely high-capacity hot-spot access
(1 to around 10 Gbps user rate). Among the candidate 5G
technologies, direct device-to-device (D2D) communications
attracts an increased research attention [1] as it promises to
deliver improved throughputs, provide more efficient spatial
reuse, lead to extended network coverage, and enhance user
energy efficiency. Broadly, D2D communications refers to a
radio technology that enables devices to communicate directly
with each other, that is, without routing the data paths through
a network infrastructure.
With the widespread adoption of D2D communications, we
expect the user devices to take a more active part in 5G service
provisioning and, in some cases (e.g., in partial coverage
situations), even assume some of the roles of the network
infrastructure. In particular, they can aid in providing wire-
less connectivity such as offering D2D-based data relaying,
proximity gaming, content distribution and caching, as well
as other forms of cooperative communications. This paradigm
shift from the conventional cellular model is driven by the
natural progress in communications technologies: the user
devices are decisively augmenting their capabilities, whereas
the base stations (BSs) are becoming smaller as a result of the
ongoing network densification [2]. Consequently, the original
functional disparity between these key components of the
maturing 5G ecosystem – the user equipment (UE) and the
BS infrastructure – is gradually becoming blurred.
However, there remains a fundamental difference between
the UE and the BS, which is rooted in the ownership rights of
the corresponding equipment. Hence, cellular operators may
become interested in employing user devices as an important
asset in their networks, to benefit from their improved compu-
tational power, storage and caching capacity, wireless access
and sensing capability, as well as efficient support for proxim-
ity services. Accordingly, adequate sources of motivation that
facilitate the end-user decisions to lend their personal devices
for the collective tasks need to be involved. In return, to
compensate for the corresponding reduction in the networking
and computation power actually available to the individual
user, more capable network assistance protocols will have to
be developed – guiding the UE toward the best opportunities
to receive its desired service (e.g., user-in-the-loop [3] and
similar concepts). This rationale brings into focus the role that
social relations and interactions between an individual human
user and its proximate neighbors may play in supporting the
maturing D2D communications paradigm.
In the past, community-centric incentives were exploited
frequently, which means agreeing to engage into direct con-
nectivity to cooperate with other like-minded individuals in
certain well-defined scenarios (such as a conference, concert,
sports event, etc.). However, in order for this solution to
scale to network-wide applications, operator-driven incentive
mechanisms are strongly demanded, such as dynamic pricing
technique in [4]. Indeed, recent D2D-centric studies are al-
ready exploring benefits from the integration between social
and communications domains [5], but most existing work
implicitly assumes that all the users are equally likely to
cooperate and share data. However, this is not the case in
practice as users acquire and own digital content based on
their individual interests and may not be willing to expose it
unless trust is established with a potential D2D partner. As a
result, our main motivation behind this research is a possibility
to construct a trustworthy 5G-grade D2D connectivity environ-
ment (see Fig. 1) featuring both the offline human interactions
(i.e., driven by the user encounter patterns) as well as the
online human interactions (i.e., driven by social applications
similar to Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn).
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Fig. 1. Urban network-assisted D2D applications.
In this work, we concentrate on introducing a novel layer of
social awareness, which empowers the communicating devices
to become the autonomously deciding entities. Our main
objective is thus to explore how the two domains – the human
social awareness and the D2D-enabled proximate connectivity
– may interplay to improve the resulting communications
performance (in terms of better system throughput) as well
as achieve higher levels of service quality (in terms of better
connectivity). These attractive improvements, together with the
resulting growth in the UE energy efficiency, may therefore
constitute the much needed incentives for the eventual user
adoption of the promising D2D paradigm.
II. D2D MARKET AND USER ADOPTION
Presently, the 5G market is still at its developing stage in-
dicating the projected compound annual growth rate (CAGR)
of 58.2% during 2013-2020 [6]. In particular, future cellular
networks are expected to be employed across a variety of
market segments, including the proximity-based applications
and multimedia services, along the avenues of public safety,
social networking, and Internet of Things (IoT). As net-
work operators have near-exclusive opportunities to handle
the transmitted data, device location (proximity), and other
user ecosystem information, we may expect the advent of a
new generation of mobile services based on such context and
proximity knowledge. However, direct connectivity is inher-
ently constrained by certain real-life factors (such as contact
time, location, duration of connectivity, user preferences, etc.),
which makes it challenging to reach the critical mass of D2D
users in today’s networks [7].
With appropriate user adoption mechanisms, we envision
the rapid proliferation of D2D communications scenarios,
which would include not only public safety and emergency sit-
uations together with vehicle-to-vehicle information exchange
for enhanced traffic safety, but also embrace commercially
available pre-standard products that enable social networking
and peer-to-peer communications outside of infrastructure
coverage or in case of congestion. Although in these examples
social awareness and the level of trust between communicating
parties are markedly different, direct communications capa-
bility remains useful in terms of reducing latency, ensuring
connectivity without infrastructure, improving reliability, and,
ultimately, augmenting user experience.
To reach this vision, relevant contextual elements may
be utilized to identify the typical behavioral patterns and
stable interpersonal relationships of humans, thus aiding in
matchmaking and timely formation of trusted user groups. For
example, trust can be based on social media connections, since
users within such networks are more likely to acquire similar
content and share it with each other. However, important
questions then emerge as to what would happen in larger het-
erogeneous coalitions consisting of both friends and strangers.
In particular, to what extent the trust is transitive (trust to a
friend of a friend) and does A trusts B and B trusts C imply
A trusts C (similarly, does A trusts B and A trusts C imply
B trusts C)?
In turn, D2D connectivity may impact the user-initiated
activities as well as provoke or encourage external inter-
actions (e.g., a service advertisement triggered from within
the proximity range). Therefore, a key challenge behind the
user adoption of D2D communications lies in understanding
individual trust and privacy relationships, as proximity-based
connectivity may generally lead to a lack of anonymity and
confidence. Interestingly, user location history (e.g., in a form
of joint movement patterns) may assist in determining social
ties between the communicating users to establish the level of
trust between them [8] (e.g., if users meet and travel together
repeatedly, they are more likely to be familiar).
In summary, by monitoring the common contacts (including
friend-of-a-friend and other weak ties), the system can aug-
ment its legacy trust establishment solutions. Yet, even these
advanced approaches do not seem to completely satisfy the
needs of 5G-grade trust-based D2D applications. To effectively
stimulate user adoption, there has to be a meaningful value
proposition for end customers. However, the existing market-
ing campaigns behind the next-generation D2D technology
are primarily targeting operators/industry and thus do not
appeal as much to masses of people. Therefore, the main
question emerges: How can user adoption of D2D technology
be incentivized effectively? Along these lines, we identify
three possible levels of user incentives that may apply to
specific D2D scenarios:
• Pragmatic incentives: typical user behavior is to remain
egoistic, which means that the ultimate interest in using
D2D technology should be proportional to the corre-
sponding improvements in throughput, energy savings,
and latency;
• Indirect incentives: D2D service providers potentially
benefiting from the enhanced network performance may
adopt new business models, where economic incentives
(e.g., user’s data plan discounts) are considered as re-
wards offered to users for lending the resources of their
personal devices;
• Social incentives: the key motivation that can make
the user drift from its egoistic behavior to altruism or
reciprocity is sociality, where users lend their resources
in order to assist friends, relatives, or other relevant peers.
Here, the fundamental human needs of e.g., belonging,
social reputation, and social usefulness could be consid-
ered to develop novel models of creating incentives.
Importantly, to mitigate the risks of user distrust and re-
jection, our envisioned ”social D2D” paradigm has to main-
tain high degrees of trustworthiness in data delivery among
the connected D2D-capable UEs. This is particularly crucial
whenever direct communications is utilized to extend the
cellular coverage in cases when network connectivity becomes
temporarily unavailable to the users (due to mobility, obstacles,
disruptions, etc.). In what follows, we comprehensively outline
how the above objectives can be achieved by the proposed
social D2D paradigm. Then, we conduct a supportive system-
level performance analysis of characteristic D2D applications,
mindful of their trust requirements, that strongly emphasize
the concepts of human and device sociality in the respective
mobile data delivery process.
III. BRIDGING ACROSS TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIALITY
We firmly believe that sociality has the potential to become
a core incentive across a wide range of applications and
services wherein D2D communications may demonstrate non-
incremental benefits. However, the social domain should not
be considered as a standalone enabling factor for proximate
connectivity (see Fig. 1). By contrast, it needs to carefully
match the respective technology constraints and features of
the physical communications domain (such as the utilized
spectrum, radio technology, battery/power resources, etc.). In
this regard, our vision is in that not only human users and
their social interactions are to be accounted for, but also the
associated interactions between the user devices with their spe-
cific notion of sociality. This expectation is well supported by
the recent research developments within the IoT community,
which target to embrace the social networking concepts [9]
to build trustworthy relationships among the devices [8]. In
our present research (see Table I), we thus consider the two
distinct types of sociality as described below.
• User-driven sociality: in this case, humans are willing to
interact and are directly controlling their social activities.
The degree of how much two users are interested in
exchanging data is characterized by a so-called human
social relationship (HSR) factor, which may be linked
to a social media tie, a family tie, etc. This measure
is directly related to the level of familiarity and trust,
according to which friends, relatives, or colleagues are
likely to connect and share their content more frequently
than the unfamiliar users. Within the same class of
sociality, we may also consider the relationships based on
the market pricing relational (MPR) model. The founding
principle behind the MPR model is proportionality, as
well as knowledge of how the relevant interactions are
organized with respect to a common scale of values. In
other words, the relationships established among people
are driven by their willingness to interact or cooperate
only in the light of achieving mutual benefits. In the
literature, there are several examples that focus on smart
surrounding scenarios for context-aware applications. For
instance, triggers from the environment may invite and
motivate people to socialize and/or cooperate, and thus
take advantage of services within coverage (proximity
market, gaming, advertising, etc.).
• Device-driven sociality: in this case, devices may au-
tonomously interact according to the specific rules preset
by the device owners and manufacturers – without an
explicit user intervention during such interaction. Social
relationships among the device owners are not necessarily
required to foster this type of cooperation. To con-
struct this sociality level, mobility patterns and relevant
context can be considered to configure the appropriate
forms of socialization [9]. Among these, the so-called
co-location object relationships (C-LOR) and co-work
object relationships (C-WOR) are established between
devices in a similar manner as among humans, when
they share personal (e.g., cohabitation) or public (e.g.,
work) experiences. Another type of relationships may be
defined for the objects owned by a single user, which is
named ownership object relationship (OOR) and may be
of interest, for instance, when a number of devices belong
to the same personal cloud.
Bridging across the realm of social-awareness and real-
world D2D-based implementations, a factor of particular im-
portance is dual mobility of the communicating entities. D2D
application developers need to extend support for trust and
TABLE I
SOCIAL RELATIONSHIP FACTORS BETWEEN DEVICES, POSSIBLE APPLICATIONS, AND THE ASSOCIATED TRUST VALUE.
Relationship Typology Description Applications Trust value
Human social User-driven Familiarity degree with Leisure applications, confidential data, [0-1]
relationship (HSR) friends/relatives/colleagues eHealth, mission-critical communications
Market pricing User-driven Cooperative interactions with services Proximate marketing, 0.2
relationship (MPR) triggered by the environment proximity gaming, advertising
Ownership object Device-driven Relationship between objects Personal cloud, 1
relationship (OOR) owned by the same person smart home
Co-location object Device-driven Objects sharing personal Information/data exchange at social 0.8
relationship (C-LOR) experiences (e.g., cohabitation) aggregation points (concerts, sports events)
Co-work object Device-driven Objects sharing public Information/data exchange at work 0.6
relationship (C-WOR) experiences (e.g., work) aggregation points (e.g., fairs, workshops)
confidence management to ultimately enable secure proximate
communications that are aware of unrestricted human/device
mobility. In this regard, the most challenging use cases are
those, in which the out-of-coverage cellular devices are also
becoming involved into the network-assisted D2D data ex-
change in the absence of a reliable link to the central trusted
authority (residing e.g., in the operator cloud). In order to
effectively address this and other aforementioned scenarios,
our study investigates how human- and device-centric social
relationships can achieve trusted connectivity in relevant D2D
groups under realistic mobility as well as, possibly, partial
cellular network coverage. In particular, we focus on three
insightful study cases:
• Trust-based human applications (Case A). Interactions
among humans with tight trust requirements are included
here. In these study cases, the end-user is willing to reli-
ably know which person the data are exchanged with. To
this end, user-driven sociality is of paramount importance
and sometimes even becomes the only acceptable enabler.
Examples of such applications are found in work-related
environments, such as construction sites as well as trans-
port and cargo handling facilities in harbors or airports,
where stringent safety regulations dictate increased levels
of trust. Other applications may include confidential and
mission-critical data collection, such as that for eHealth
and safety applications.
• Leisure and entertainment applications (Case B). Con-
nectivity between proximate devices supports applica-
tions for users at leisure, such as entertainment and
gaming, non-confidential information sharing, and similar
non-critical services (e.g., map sharing for intelligent
transportation systems). These applications do not neces-
sarily need an explicit social relation between the device
owners, and trusted communications may rather be driven
by the sociality of devices. Typical scenarios of interest
in this category may consider users distributed in a
certain area and sharing similar interests, such as content
dissemination in a stadium, a university campus, or a
pub, where matching people (in terms of interests, age,
familiarity, etc.) interact by employing their devices.
• Critical machine-to-machine (M2M) applications (Case
C). In the situations where, by definition, there is no
(or, very limited) human intervention, automated device
connectivity may still benefit from some form of so-
cial awareness. One may consider hazardous working
environments, such as those often met in industrial au-
tomation scenarios, where large numbers of machines,
sensors, actuators, or robots communicate mission-critical
data. To facilitate such information exchange, trust can
be delivered by operator-enforced incentives and policies,
leading to optimized communications performance with
higher degrees of security.
IV. SOCIAL-AWARE FRAMEWORK FOR TRUSTED D2D
Our proposed social-aware framework aims at enabling
trusted D2D-centric data delivery for proximate users in mo-
bile environments. In these situations, direct links may (tem-
porarily) extend or substitute cellular network connections,
when the operator services become unavailable to (some of)
the customers. Relevant clustering of the D2D devices can
be conveniently modeled as a non-transferable utility (NTU)
coalitional game (N ,V), where N is a set of N players and
V is a function, such that for every coalition S ⊆ N , V(S)
is a closed convex subset of R|S|. The latter contains the
payoff vectors that the players in S can achieve, and |S| is
the number of members in the coalition S. The objective for
the players in this NTU game is to maximize the value of
the coalition they belong to. In the proposed framework, the
utility for a coalition is defined as the degree of proximity and
the strength of social relationships for the corresponding D2D-
based cluster. To this aim, we define an NTU game, where for
any coalition S ⊆ N the value vi(S) associated with each
player i ∈ S is determined as:
vi(S) =
|S|∑
j=1
si,j · pi,j/|S|, (1)
where si,j → [0, 1] is a function measuring the level of social
relationships (or friendship) between a pair of communicating
entities, whereas the second term pi,j is a binary function
taking the value of 0 if the users i and j are not in proximity,
and taking the value of 1 otherwise (by construction, we set
pi,i = 1). The resulting product of these two functions is then
averaged across the players in a given coalition S, thus always
yielding a value within the range of [0, 1].
The actual definition of the social relationships level be-
tween the devices si,j needs to allow for appropriate weighting
of the contributions coming from human relationships and
device sociality. Therefore, it may be defined as a weighted
function si,j = α·Hi,j+(1−α)·Di,j , where Hi,j ∈ [0, 1] is the
degree of human-to-human sociality and Di,j ∈ [0, 1] is the
degree of device-to-device sociality. The social relationships
between humans and devices are modeled based on the values
shown in Table I, where the ”Typology” field identifies which
class the social relationships belong to. The ”user-driven”
option corresponds to relationships that are being used to
determine the value of Hi,j ; the HSR and MPR relationships
belong to this class. In contrast, the ”device-driven” option
identifies relationships that are used to determine the value of
Di,j ; the OOR, C-LOR, and C-WOR relationships belong here.
Whenever two entities can be associated to more types
of relationships of the same class, we select the strongest
tie having the highest value [8]. The motivation for this is
that stronger social relationships lead to higher probability of
”trusted” connection, thus providing improved performance.
Further, the weighting term α ∈ [0, 1] is introduced into our
model to adjust the respective contributions coming from the
Di,j and Hi,j terms according to a specific application and/or
scenario. To this end, the two extreme cases with α equal
either to one or to zero, are representative of only human- and
only device-driven sociality scenarios, respectively, as holds
for the applications discussed under study cases A (i.e., trust-
based human-to-human scenario) and C (i.e., critical machine-
to-machine scenario).
In summary, the study cases A and B discussed in the
article represent two illustrative examples of the extreme
situations with only human- and only device-driven sociality.
In the third investigated scenario, study case B, the focus is
on applications for users at leisure, where both human- and
device-driven types of sociality are considered. In this case,
the importance of the human- and device-driven sociality is
assumed to be equal-weighted, which motivates the choice
of α = 0.5. However, other values of α may also be
considered based on the scenario under consideration and the
application in question. While a more thorough analysis of
all possible scenarios remains out of the scope of this article,
here we aim at proposing a powerful model that allows to
explore how the human social awareness and the D2D-enabled
proximate connectivity may interact to improve the resulting
communications performance and service quality.
We can now define the value of v(S) for a coalition S as
the average degree of proximity and strength of social rela-
tionships for the users in the cluster: v(S) =∑|S|i=1 vi(S)/|S|.
Importantly, the highest possible value associated with a
certain coalition v(S) = 1 is achieved if all of the devices are
located in their mutual D2D coverage, as well as all of them
enjoy the maximum level of friendship. In practice, the latter
seldom happens in the grand coalition incorporating all the
networked devices, and thus independent and disjoint coali-
tions are typically formed. To control the resulting stability
problems, existing solutions proposed in recent literature can
be adopted [10]. For instance, an iterative application of the
merge and split rules enables the much needed convergence
to a stable coalitional structure of the network.
Once stable D2D-clusters are formed, the D2D connectivity
within them should be secured both in the cases of full
and partial cellular coverage. Whenever connected reliably to
the centralized network infrastructure, the D2D clusters can
establish their information security rules by employing the
conventional methods, hence relying on the operator infras-
tructure acting as a trusted authority. However, when cellular
connection becomes unavailable, secure associations between
D2D partners may benefit from solutions in [11] and [8],
which enforce trustworthiness of human- and device-driven
interactions, respectively.
V. OUR PERFORMANCE EVALUATION CAMPAIGN
To validate the envisioned D2D framework and quantify
the benefits of the proposed social-aware, secure clustering
solution, a supportive system-level performance assessment
has been conducted by utilizing our custom-made simula-
tion environment, named WINTERsim1. Due to the need of
modeling full-scale user mobility and application-level traffic,
the underlying system-level evaluation methodology had to be
streamlined, by simplifying the propagation and interference
conditions, and thus employing the parameters summarized in
Table II. The output metrics of interest are aggregate effective
throughput and corresponding device energy efficiency, as well
as degree of connectivity, which indicates the proportion of
users covered by cellular and/or direct links.
Our reference scenario features a tagged cellular BS (run-
ning the contemporary 3GPP LTE technology) deployed
within a [150m×150m] area of interest, and having the
coverage range of 100m, resulting in around 70% of reliable
cellular coverage available to the users. For the sake of com-
pleteness, we later consider several alternative values for the
LTE coverage range – in order to understand the effects that it
has on the degree of connectivity. Further, our communicating
entities (humans and their connected devices) are allowed to
freely move across the considered area of interest according
to the characteristic ”Levy flight” mobility pattern [12]. More
specifically, we investigate the performance of a multimedia
application with the packet size of 100 KB and the packet
inter-arrival time of 10 s (e.g., video dissemination, eHealth,
etc.). As for the D2D communications technology, discovery
and connection setup functions are managed directly by the
LTE BS with the appropriate network assistance protocols,
whereas the actual direct data transmission is performed out-
of-band (e.g., over WiFi-Direct links that can operate in
parallel with LTE assistance, as they utilize the unlicensed
spectrum).
The following alternative communications options are com-
pared in our system-level study:
• Cellular (LTE) solution. A benchmark setup, where
the connectivity is available only over the conventional
cellular links, without any D2D-based transmission or
coverage extension possibilities;
• Simple D2D solution. Only mobile devices under the
reliable cellular network coverage may connect directly
to form the D2D pairs according to the shortest distance
between them. The BS is acting as the conventional
1WINTERsim system-level simulator: http://winter-group.net/downloads/
TABLE II
CORE SIMULATION PARAMETERS.
Application parameter Value
Packet size 100 KB
Inter-arrival time 10 s
System parameter Value
Cell radius 100 m
Maximum D2D range 30 m
WiFi-Direct target data rate 40 Mbps
LTE target data rate 10 Mbps
LTE BS Tx power 46 dBm
UE Tx power 23 dBm
Machine Tx power 0 dBm
D2D link setup time 1 s
Mobility model Levy flight (with parameter 1.5 [12])
Number of UEs [10-100]
Hi,j [0-1]
Di,j [0.6,0.8,1]
trusted authority by guaranteeing trustworthy connectivity
for all in-coverage D2D partners;
• Advanced (social-aware) D2D solution. Users may clus-
ter together according to the proposed social-aware D2D
framework. This may also happen under partial cellular
network coverage, thus leading to D2D-based coverage
extension. All connectivity (including the out-of-coverage
links) is made trusted by taking advantage of the dis-
tributed information-security solution without a central
trusted authority [11]. To further visualize the effects of
both human- and device-driven sociality, we consider the
three reference study cases and the associated α values
as defined in Section IV: 1, 0.5, and 0 for study cases A,
B, and C, respectively.
To ease further exposition, for the baseline LTE solution
and the simple D2D scheme we only account for the portion
of data transmitted by the users within the reliable cellular
network coverage (by aggregating these effective values across
individual users). In case of the advanced D2D solution,
we additionally consider traffic of the out-of-coverage users
enabled by our trusted, social-aware framework.
First, Fig. 2 indicates the achievable aggregate effective
throughput as a function of the number of networked devices.
Hence, we learn that at all times the proposed social-aware
D2D solution outperforms the LTE-only alternative considered
in this study, as well as the simple D2D solution. In particular,
the case of α = 0 (study case C, when only device-
driven sociality is considered) achieves the best performance,
followed by the cases when α = 0.5 and α = 1 (study
case A, when only human-driven sociality is considered).
This result suggests that the interactions based on the second
level of sociality – those accounting for the relationships
between the devices – may introduce significant benefits to
the system operation, whenever the trust requirements of a
running application allow for this.
Further, Fig. 3 illustrates the degrees of connectivity offered
within our area of interest, when a varying percentage of
such area is covered by the LTE BS (eNodeB). In particular,
the considered scenario corresponds to study case B (i.e.,
α = 0.5), with 100 devices residing in the system. To this end,
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Fig. 2. Impact of social relationships on the system throughput.
we measure the proportion of devices being served with the
proposed social-aware D2D solution and compare it against
the corresponding figure as achieved with the simple D2D
scheme. As observed in the left subplot of Fig. 3, the proposed
approach always demonstrates higher percentage of served
users, with the benefits increased even further in the face of
reduced LTE coverage. In particular, the proportion of served
devices more than doubles with our social-aware operation,
when the LTE coverage is only available over a half of the
area of interest.
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Fig. 3. Impact of LTE coverage on the degree of connectivity in the system.
Further, in the right subplot of Fig. 3 we report on the
proportion of users served with a simple D2D link (i.e., in case
of simple D2D solution) or a D2D cluster (i.e., considering the
proposed social-aware D2D solution). Clearly, this is a subset
of the entire set of served users as it represents the share of
users that either (i) prefer to establish a direct link instead
of downloading the content over the LTE infrastructure, or
(ii) can only be served over D2D connections in the locations
where there is no LTE coverage. As we learn from this plot,
when the available cellular coverage area is particularly small,
in case of simple D2D solution the number of users that
establish a D2D connection is low. This is due to the fact
that under-coverage users reside in proximity to the BS and
thus receive higher channel quality comparing to that on the
D2D link. As a consequence, a higher number of users may
be served through the infrastructure links with the LTE BS.
On the contrary, the percentage of users served via D2D
connections is three times higher for the proposed social-
aware D2D solution. The explanation of this result is in that
our solution is able to provide connectivity also to those users
that are outside of the cellular coverage (i.e., within D2D
clusters). Note that this important outcome is achieved owing
to the operation of our social-based, secure cluster formation
scheme.
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Fig. 4. Impact of social relationships on the user energy efficiency.
Finally, performance results for the aggregate energy effi-
ciency of user data transmissions are reported in Fig. 4. This
metric has been evaluated by taking into account the relevant
transmission power for each network node (refer to the values
reported in Table II). Again, the social-aware D2D approach
outperforms both the considered baseline LTE and the simple
D2D alternatives. In particular, for the case of α = 0 our
proposed solution reaches its highest gain by contrast to the
benchmark LTE operation. This is due to lower transmit power
of small-scale devices (i.e., connected machines) as compared
to more power-hungry handheld UEs.
To conclude, our analysis indicates that social ties among
both humans and their connected devices impact the ultimate
performance of the proposed social-aware scheme that enables
the trusted D2D clusters. In particular, with higher levels of
social relationships, the resulting effective throughput grows,
also yielding positive effects on the energy consumption of the
devices and their degrees of connectivity. The key reason is
that having better social relationships plays in favor of having
larger coalitions between proximal humans/devices, even in
the cases of partial cellular network coverage. Clearly, the
improved throughput performance of our social-aware D2D
solution is achieved at the cost of somewhat increased latency,
as compared to the simple D2D scheme. Indeed, to deliver
reliable connectivity to proximate humans/devices, especially
outside of LTE coverage, more time-consuming security pro-
cedures are required to be executed in the UE. For instance,
handheld devices need additional time to complete the security
methods from [11], which leads to slightly higher latencies
with the growing number of communicating entities. However,
the implementation efficiency of said security mechanisms can
be optimized further to reduce the computation time, which
we leave for our subsequent study.
VI. STANDARDIZATION ASPECTS AND OUTLOOK
Historically, D2D communications capabilities and respec-
tive support for proximity services were first introduced in
Release 12 of the 3GPP protocol suite [13]. Correspondingly,
the main targeted use cases and associated system require-
ments are well-captured in the feasibility report (see 3GPP TR
22.803 document). It thus serves as a solid foundation for the
development of enabling technology components, including
device synchronization, service and device discovery, as well
as actual direct communications – both under and outside of
cellular network coverage. A direct consequence of the emerg-
ing D2D interface, the so-called sidelink, is the need to ensure
interoperability of the devices produced by different vendors
and, possibly, served by various cellular operators. Therefore,
the appearance of the sidelink is a major advancement in the
3GPP architecture, affecting physical layer procedures, higher
layers, and non-access stratum protocols alike2.
While the initially considered set of D2D-related scenarios
and requirements has been sub-divided into public safety
and general commercial use cases, Release 14 LTE networks
are being prepared to additionally accommodate vehicle-to-
vehicle and vehicle-to-infrastructure communications services
(see 3GPP TR 22.885 document). We thus expect that as
application developers, service providers, and user equipment
manufacturers experiment with the rich capabilities offered by
the D2D connectivity, further use cases will become attrac-
tive, including D2D-powered machine-type communications.
Therefore, in 5G networks, we envision that the distinction be-
tween public safety and commercial applications will become
blurred, thus making technology development (in the form
of its components and end solutions) increasingly meaningful
for in-coverage, partial network coverage, and out-of-coverage
situations. In this context, our proposed D2D paradigm – en-
hanced with the involvement of social relationships established
not only among familiar humans but also among familiar
devices – will decisively contribute to the delivery of novel
types of services over proximate links.
Among the many examples appearing on this scene, [14] al-
ready implements the discussed concepts for intelligent trans-
portation systems by exploiting the aforementioned vehicle-to-
vehicle and vehicle-to-infrastructure communications services.
Complementary to the research literature on the topic, there is
currently a strong need for a broader standardization campaign.
This may address such issues as, for example, (i) definition of
categories for inter-device social relationships as well as rules
for their triggering, (ii) common social-oriented interfaces
and interaction models for users in pervasive D2D scenarios,
(iii) distributed methodologies to enable secure data exchange
among groups of humans/devices communicating over D2D
2For details, see the following 3GPP specifications: TS 36.213, TS 36.300,
TS 23.303, and TS 24.301.
links, possibly without a reliable connection to the centralized
trusted authority, etc.
In summary, we are about to embrace the D2D commu-
nications as one of the key technologies within the rapidly
maturing 5G ecosystem. It will broadly enable both the owners
of advanced wireless devices as well as the smart and social
IoT objects across diverse, pervasive platforms to effectively
become a part of the cellular landscape. This, in turn, will
pave the way to improved cellular service provisioning by
e.g., offering D2D-based data relaying, content distribution
and caching, or other forms of cooperative communications
to augment the existing spectrum usage and device energy
efficiency [15]. Another exciting research direction is to de-
velop new mechanisms that take advantage of the unique
position of cellular operators – with their well-developed
infrastructure and pricing methods – to create incentives, win-
win collaborative strategies, and ultimately raise social aware-
ness among spectrum owners, network operators, and wireless
device users. For 3GPP networks, the basic building blocks,
associated protocol structures, and physical layer procedures
are already being defined, while the creation of corresponding
incentives and social awareness schemes that engage users as
part of the service provisioning effort remains in strong need
of further research.
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Abstract—The Internet of Things (IoT) employs smart devices
as its building blocks for developing a ubiquitous communication
framework. It thus supports a wide variety of application do-
mains, including public safety, healthcare, education, and public
transportation. While offering a novel communication paradigm,
IoT finds its requirements closely connected to the security issues.
The role of security following the fact that a new type of devices
known as wearables constitute an emerging area. This paper de-
livers an applicability study of the state-of-the-art cryptographic
primitives for wearable IoT devices, including the pairing-
based cryptography. Pairing-based schemes are well-recognized
as fundamental enablers for many advanced cryptographic
applications, such as privacy protection and identity-based en-
cryption. To deliver a comprehensive view on the computational
power of modern wearable devices (smart phones, watches, and
embedded devices), we perform an evaluation of a variety of
them utilizing bilinear pairing for real-time communication. In
order to deliver a complete picture, the obtained bilinear pairing
results are complemented with performance figures for classical
cryptography (such as block ciphers, digital signatures, and hash
functions). Our findings show that wearable devices of today have
the needed potential to efficiently operate with cryptographic
primitives in real time. Therefore, we believe that the data
provided during this research would shed light on what devices
are more suitable for certain cryptographic operations.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) creates the means for intercon-
nection of highly heterogeneous entities and networks bringing
a variety of communication patterns, including Human-to-
Human (H2H), Human-to-Machine (H2M), and Machine-to-
Machine (M2M) communications. IoT in general and wearable
technology in particular empower the industry to develop
new technology in almost unlimited numbers. Today, the
term wearables stands for connected devices that collect data,
track activities and improve user experience across different
application domains. From the IoT point of view, wearables
could be characterized as networked ”smart devices” equipped
with microchips (System on the Chip, SoC), sensors, and
wireless communications interfaces deployed in the immediate
vicinity of their owner [1] (see also Fig. 1 indicating the
devices used in everyday life of tomorrow).
New findings from the leading telecommunication players,
such as Juniper [2] and Cisco [3], reveal that global retail
revenue from smart wearable devices will treble by 2016,
therefore reaching $53.2 billion by 2019, compared to the
$4.5 billion at the end of 2015. The market over the following
five years is expected to be substantially driven by the sales
of smart watches and smart glasses. As it is common for
new and highly innovative digital technologies, wearables will
also challenge existing social and legal norms. In particular,
wearable technologies raise a variety of privacy and safety con-
cerns, which should be addressed immediately. Without strong
security frameworks capable of being executed directly on
wearable devices, attacks and malfunctions might overshadow
any of the expected benefits.
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Fig. 1. Future secure smart home / IoT environment
Wearable devices can be secured by means of the public
key cryptography, i.e., digital signature schemes providing user
authentication and protecting data during their transmission
over the medium. Information security specialists are targeting
to design digital signature schemes that are (i) secure, (ii)
computationally efficient, and (iii) have small communication
overheads. Conventional digital signature schemes use stan-
dard operations and are based on mathematical assumptions,
such as the discrete logarithm problem, the RSA problem, or
integer factorization [4]. These conventional methods provide
standard security properties, including authenticity, integrity,
and non-repudiation.
In this paper, we expand our vision not only on clas-
sical cryptography but also on pairing-based algorithms by
evaluating their usability for wearables and other constrained
IoT devices (smart watches, smart phones, and embedded
devices, see Section II-4). In particular, pairing-based cryp-
tography is often used in modern solutions to implement
privacy-enhancing features that are difficult to achieve with
conventional asymmetric cryptography. Using bilinear pairing
operations, it is possible to design schemes like group signa-
tures [5], [6], anonymous attribute -based credentials [7], [8],
or identity-based encryption [9]. Some of those mechanisms
are particularly important for the IoT system operation, such
as efficient revocation of invalid devices based on dynamic
accumulators [10] and identification of attackers. These would
be difficult to construct without pairing-based cryptography.
Inspired by that, we analyze and evaluate the most common
personal / wearable devices – starting from the conventional
smartphones (Samsung Galaxy S4, Apple iPhone 6, etc.) to
the embedded devices (Intelr Edison, Raspberry Pi 1 Model
B, Raspberry Pi 2 Model B) to smart watches (Sony Smart
Watch 3, Apple Watch) – with a particular focus on their
ability to execute both standard and advanced cryptographic
operations. As pairing-based cryptography primitives have not
been rigorously evaluated on these devices so far, we also
address this type of security functionality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II pro-
vides the description of related work dealing with the classical
cryptography and pairing-based cryptography. Further, in Sec-
tion II-4 we discuss the selected devices for our test scenarios
that are employed and characterized in Section IV. Finally, the
lessons learned and conclusions are summarized in Section V.
II. CLASSICAL AND PAIRING-BASED CRYPTOGRAPHY
In our work, we consider the classical cryptographic primi-
tives (calculations using big integer as multiplication, division,
power functions and schemes for classical elliptic curves) for
constructing the RSA signature, hash functions (SHA1, SHA-
256), and block cipher (AES). These are well-known and well-
analyzed construction blocks and we target to assess their
execution time on low-power and constrained IoT devices.
A thorough overview is given in [11], where implementation
of 12 lightweight and standard block ciphers in ATMEL
AVR ATtiny45 has been described. Further, in [12], the
authors focus on benchmarking the modern hash functions,
where 15 hashes were evaluated on 8-bit micro-controllers.
However, there has been very limited work documenting
classical cryptography implemented on modern wearable de-
vices e.g., smart watches.
To construct novel cryptographic primitives with advanced
security properties, Pairing-Based Cryptography (PBC) has
been developed. PBC-based solutions have exploded since
2000, when Joux [13] presented the three-party one-round
Diffie-Hellman protocol based on bilinear pairings. The bi-
linear pairings enable efficient design of many protocols with
enhanced properties, such as one-round three-party key agree-
ment, identity-based encryption, and group signatures [5].
1) Bilinear Pairing Operations: A bilinear pairing function
maps two elements of groups G1 and G2 onto the third
cryptographic group GT , i.e., e : G1×G2 → GT . The pairing
function e must be computable, non-degenerative and bilinear.
The pairing operations work with pairing-friendly Elliptic
Curves (EC), including MNT curves (Miyaji-Nakabayashi-
Takano) [14], BN curves (Barreto-Naehrig) [15]. The pairing
operations can be symmetric (G1 = G2) or asymmetric
(G1 6= G2). Symmetric and/or asymmetric bilinear pairing
operations can be computed by pairing algorithms, such as
Weil, Tate, Ate, Eta, or O-Ate. Symmetric pairings are usually
more computationally efficient than asymmetric pairings [16].
2) Pairing-Based Cryptographic Schemes: In general, pair-
ing functions can reduce a problem that is in one group by
solving it in a different group where the problem is easier
to solve. This property enables to design new cryptographic
schemes such as identity and attribute encryption, group
signatures or three-party key establishment. In addition, the
use of elliptic curves allows some pairing-based signature
schemes to produce shorter signatures than the conventional
digital signature schemes like RSA [17]. For example, the
pairing-based short signature scheme BLS [18] employing the
Weil pairing [19] produces 20 B only signatures. Due to space
limitations, only a short overview is provided in this section;
for more information related to pairing-based cryptography,
please follow [20], [21].
3) Optimization of Pairing-Based Cryptographic Schemes:
There are only few studies addressing the pairing-based cryp-
tography on smartphones. For example, the work in [22]
presents several ways for the efficient implementation of
pairing-based cryptographic protocols on restricted devices.
The BBS04 scheme that requires one online bilinear pairing
during the signing phase is used to illustrate the below
optimization approaches. The paper presents the pros and cons
behind the approaches applied to the BBS04 scheme. The first
approach uses the ”Shamir’s trick” [23], which reduces the
time complexity of scalar multiplication (or modular expo-
nentiation). The second method replaces an expensive pairing
operation by less complex operations. The pre-computation of
pairing operations is utilized, but the final efficiency depends
on the number of components in the multi-exponentiations.
The third approach delegates the computation of bilinear
pairings to a more computationally stronger entity. Only the
public parameters can be delegated and the communication
between a constrained device and said entity must be fast.
The work in [24] presents the first Java wrapper of a pairing-
based cryptography library. The authors implement jPBC that
is a Java port of the PBC library written in C. As an example,
the implementation of the BLS signature scheme [18] is de-
scribed. The paper contains benchmarks of bilinear symmetric
pairings and exponentiation operations for two devices (Sam-
sung I9000 Galaxy S and a PC machine). However, the paper
does not offer any performance results for asymmetric pairing
operations that are required by many PBC signature schemes.
The challenge of PBC scheme optimization conventionally
refers to decreasing the number of pairing operations. Opti-
mization techniques, such as a pairing precipitation and pairing
collapsing, can thus be applied to the PBC mechanisms. In
addition, the verification phase of signature and group signa-
ture schemes can be optimized by using a batch verification
trick [25]. The batch verification method can be used only
in the case, when a verifier is able to verify more signatures
in one batch. Some PBC schemes on constrained devices are
able to delegate expensive pairing operations to more powerful
nodes. But, this trick can only be done if the pairing operation
does not map secret and private parameters as inputs. More
about the optimization tricks can be found in [4].
4) Performance Requirements of Pairing-Based Crypto-
graphic Schemes: The bilinear pairing operations are consid-
ered to be more computationally expensive than other mod-
ular arithmetic operations, such as scalar multiplication and
modular exponentiation. The computation time of a pairing
operation depends on the type of a pairing algorithm, the
type and the length of EC parameters, the implementation
of the PBC methods, as well as on the hardware and soft-
ware specifications of a device. For example, according to
MIRACL benchmarks, one 512-bit pairing operation by the
Tate algorithm takes 20 ms and one modular exponentiation
with 1024-bit numbers takes 8.8 ms [26]. Unfortunately, some
devices, such as smartphones and smart cards, need more time
for computing a single pairing operation. For example, the
results in [24] indicate that one symmetric pairing operation
takes about 254 ms on smartphone (Samsung I9000 Galaxy S).
Moreover, the results in [4] show that asymmetric pairing oper-
ations are more time consuming and require around 3 seconds
on current Android smartphones. However, no similar study
is presently available for general public in the area of wear-
able devices.
III. SELECTED WEARABLE DEVICES
Broadly, terms “wearable technology”, “wearable devices”,
and “wearables” all refer to electronic technologies or comput-
ers that are incorporated into items of clothing and accessories,
which can be worn on the body [1]. Following the fact that the
computational performance is constantly growing (see Table
I for a comparison of hardware parameters), contemporary
wearable devices are becoming able to perform similar com-
puting tasks as handheld devices or even laptop computers.
For the purposes of our research work, we have selected
today’s pioneers as well as already widely used devices from
three main categories: (i) smartphones, (ii) smart watches, and
(iii) embedded devices, see Fig. 2.
As representatives of the first group, we chose devices
built on two main mobile platforms: Android and iOS. More
specifically, we used Samsung Galaxy S4 (SGH-I337) and
Jiayu S3 Advanced (JY-S3), both running Android 4.4.2,
Apple iPhone 4s (MD128CS/A) running the iOS 7.1.2, and
Apple iPhone 6 (MG4F2CN/A) with the latest iOS 9.1.
To provide a comprehensive evaluation at par with the
selected smartphones, we also employed smart watches run-
ning Android Wear and Apple WatchOS. The utilized devices
are correspondingly Sony Smart Watch 3 (SWR-50) with
Android Wear 5.1.1 and Apple Watch 42mm Sport edition
with WatchOS 2.0.
Following the fact that most of today’s embedded devices
(often named the IoT development boards) are intended to be
used also as wearables, we decided to additionally evaluate
the well-known examples from this class: Intelr Edison [27],
Raspberry Pi 1 (Model B), and Raspberry Pi 2 (Model B).
Both Raspberry Pi devices run the latest version of Raspbian
OS (Jessie, v 8.0) together with the latest version of Oracle
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Fig. 2. Wearable devices used in our performance evaluation.
JDK (1.8.0-b132). Edison features a Ubilinux 3.10.17-yocto-
standard-r2 build equipped with JDK (1.8.0 66-b17)1. In more
detail, Edison is a small-sized computing module aiming to
enable the next generation of wearables and IoT devices,
where size and power consumption are extremely important
factors. In addition, Edison may be attached to a number of
different extension boards, for example, to enable Arduino
compatibility. Hence, Edison empowers a range of different
use cases, whereas Raspberry Pi might be more suitable for
graphics and multimedia related applications and products.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
To adequately evaluate the performance of the devices listed
in Table I, we decided to implement the above described
security primitives in a unified framework. For Raspberry Pi,
Android, and Android Wear devices, it has been executed
as a standalone Java application. To run the framework on
Apple devices (iPhone 4s, iPhone 6, and Apple Watch), we
have ported the logic and created a standalone application
written in Objective-C programming language. To make our
assessment conditions even more equivalent, we terminated all
unnecessary background processes and enabled the flight mode
whenever possible. To execute our application on the restricted
Intelr Edison board, we followed the manual [28] to prepare
a Linux build equipped with JRE. Further, an executable jar
file was designed, deployed, and executed on the device.
We split all of the tested devices based on their performance
metrics into two groups: Smart devices and IoT boards. As
the main evaluation criteria to characterize this equipment, we
have selected the security primitive execution time. This is
due to the unification and well-acceptance of this approach
in addition to the fact that some of the devices are hardware
restricted and, therefore, could not provide any other valuable
1Ubilinux stands for embedded Linux distribution based on Debian Wheezy
and enables to run JVM / JDK. The targeted application domain for those
platforms is embedded devices with limited memory and storage capacity;
the image is currently available for Intelr Galileo Gen 1 / Gen2 and Edison.
TABLE I
SELECTED DEVICES WITH THEIR CORRESPONDING SPECIFICATIONS
Device Type SoC Processor RAM
Apple Watch Smart Watch APL0778 520 MHz Single-core Cortex-A7 512 MB
Sony SmartWatch 3 SWR50 Smart Watch BCM47531 1.2 GHz Quad-Core ARM A7 512 MB
Apple iPhone 4s Smartphone APL A5 800 MHz Dual-Core Cortex A9 64bit 512 MB
Apple iPhone 6 Smartphone APL A9 1.5 GHz Dual-Core Cortex A57 64bit 1 GB
Samsung I9500 Galaxy S4 Smartphone APQ8064T 1.6 GHz Dual-Core Cortex-A15 2 GB
Jiayu S3 Advanced Smartphone MT6752 1.7 GHz Octa-Core 64bit Cortex A53 3 GB
Intelr Edison IoT Development Board Atom + Quark 500 MHz Dual-Core Intelr AtomTM CPU, 100 Mhz MCU 1 GB
Raspberry Pi 1 model B IoT Development Board BCM2835 700 MHz Single-Core ARM Cortex-A6 512 MB
Raspberry Pi 2 model B IoT Development Board BCM2836 900 MHz Quad-Core ARM Cortex-A7 1 GB
and unified evaluation metric. Further, we compared the clas-
sical cryptographic primitives and the bilinear pairing on both
Intelr Edison development board and “off-the-shelf” devices
available on today’s market. The following results have been
obtained as an average of 1000 executions for each operation
to achieve statistically-reliable data.
A. Classical Cryptographic Primitives Evaluation
First, Fig. 3 indicates the average time overhead for en-
cryption and decryption operations of the conventional non-
optimized RSA schemes with correspondence to different
decimal digits. Public and Private keys were generated using
OpenSSL with default parameters. Adopting a security value
of 1024 or 2048 bits and default public exponent (3 bytes)
(which is reasonable for the constrained wireless devices [29]),
the RSA Encryption operation remains under 1 ms on a typical
Android smartphone, around 2.5 ms for a Smart Watch, and
less than 12 ms on Intelr Edison and Raspberry Pi 2.
Decryption time looks less optimistic and, therefore, for an
Android phone it takes around 25 ms, but up to 100 ms for
an iPhone. Similar behavior is observed for Android Wear
and Apple Watch – here, the values are 35 ms and 200 ms
correspondingly. On the IoT boards, the execution may take up
to half a second, which may still be feasible for delay-tolerant
applications. Concerning smart devices, we can state that Sony
Watch is demonstrating high performance even though it is not
classified as a standalone device. Interestingly, here and further
on, iPhone 4s is sometimes showing better results than iPhone
6 or Apple Watch, which may be due to the lack of the power
consumption optimization feature on the version of iOS that
was introduced only starting 9.0.1. Hence, CPU utilization is
able to approach 90 %, while for the latest models it remains
well below 50 %.
Taking into account such basic operation as Hashing func-
tion, we evaluate the execution of SHA1 and SHA2 (SHA-
256) on all of the devices. The corresponding results are
summarized in Fig. 4. We can conclude that for all of our
test devices SHA1 and SHA2 are hardware optimized and
mainly depend on the utilized equipment. As an example of the
data encryption, we used AES 128 cipher. The corresponding
results still follow the execution time pattern of public-key
cryptosystems and hashing functions for all of our devices.
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B. Pairing-based Primitives Evaluation
Further, we present the results for bilinear pairing opera-
tions. The curve types A and D (175) are assessed utilizing
jPBC-benchmark framework [24]. To this end, Fig. 5 shows
one pairing operation with curve A. The most efficient device
here is Intel Edison with JDK 1.8.0 that computes a single
pairing operation in 580 ms. At the same time, Intel Edison
needs over 8 seconds for the pairing initialization. Moreover,
the modular exponentiation (EC point addition) operation takes
about 4x more time than that on Android devices. EC multipli-
cation follows a similar pattern. Our results confirm that some
curve operations on smartphones and smart watches are more
efficient than on the single-board computers (Raspberry Pi 1/2
B). Further, Fig. 6 depicts the results of the PBC operations
with D curves. Interestingly, Android devices with a more
powerful CPU take as much time for one pairing operation as
the less powerful devices (Intel Edison, Raspberry Pi). Hence,
JRE seems to be more efficient than the Android platform.
Our results indicate that optimized PBC schemes with only
few pairing operations (i.e. < 2), several exponentiation,
and scalar multiplications can be deployed in the security
layers of non-real time IoT applications that run on current
smartphones and wearables.
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Fig. 5. Execution time – Curve A.
To provide a clear viewpoint of testing, Table II contains the
information of which devices best match which cryptographic
operations – with respect to HW parameters in Table I.
V. LESSONS LEARNED AND CONCLUSIONS
In this section, we discuss the important aspects that we
faced during the implementation of our experimental frame-
work, as well as outline our conclusions and future steps. In the
process of developing the said framework, we have addressed a
number of challenges regarding the very different requirements
by the selected operating systems (i.e., Android, iOS, Android
Wear, Apple WatchOS).
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TABLE II
SUITABILITY OF WEARABLES FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATIONS OVER
RELATIVELY ACCEPTABLE TIME
Device Cryptographic operations
Apple Watch SHA 1 / 2; Curve operations
Sony SmartWatch 3 RSA 1024, 2048 E / D; Curve operations
Intelr Edison RSA 2048 E / D; AES; SHA 2
Raspberry Pi 1 model B RSA 1024 E / D
Raspberry Pi 2 model B RSA 1024, 2048 E / D; AES; SHA 1
In particular, we had to adapt the jPBC library to run not
only on smartphones but also on wearable devices. After the
actual implementation, we learned that the same cryptographic
primitives (i.e., the same application) may be optimized in
completely different ways on similar devices. Further, a deeper
study in the area of Apple development brought us to a number
implementation challenges. For example, due to the lack of
integrated information security libraries, we developed most
of the primitives from scratch, thus solving many platform-
dependent issues. However, as our future step, we plan to
develop a pairing-based framework in Objective-C, that is, to
enable its operation on iOS devices as well. Also the question
of power consumption (CPU and memory) which is superfi-
cially mentioned in literature will be covered in further results.
Our main and the most essential learning while working
with the pairing-based solutions is such that pairings consume
from several hundreds of milliseconds to few seconds on
current handheld and IoT devices. We identified the most
resource-consuming operation of pairing-based cryptography,
that is, the bilinear pairing operation. The time necessary to
compute this operation is several orders longer than that for the
other operations on the elliptic curve. Therefore, in practical
implementation, we highly recommend using cryptographic
schemes [30], [31], in which an IoT device executes only basic
operations on the curve and offloads the pairing operations
to some central device with more computation power. On
the other hand, some smartphone applications that send data
in real-time and must secure data integrity and authenticity
(e.g. for remote control systems) should avoid using the PBC
schemes. These applications need to be secured by classical
cryptographic primitives (SHA2, AES, RSA) that take only
several milliseconds.
Finally, we can conclude that modern wearable electronics
has already reached the computational power of a two-year-
old smartphone and, thus, IoT world fulfills the security
requirements of today. Constrained but powerful IoT devices,
like Intel Edison, are designed so that the energy consumption
is minimized. Due to that fact, the computational power is
somewhat lowered, but this class of devices appears to be
an attractive enabler for the required levels of information
security. Importantly, the Raspberry Pi board, which is often
nicknamed “a tiny and affordable computer” is demonstrating
more modest performance results comparing to a small Edison
chip designed specifically for the IoT-centric use cases.
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Facilitating the Delegation of Use for Private
Devices in the Era of the Internet
of Wearable Things
Aleksandr Ometov, Sergey V. Bezzateev, Joona Kannisto, Jarmo Harju, Sergey Andreev,
and Yevgeni Koucheryavy
Abstract—The Internet undergoes a fundamental
transformation as billions of connected “things” surround
us and embed themselves into the fabric of our everyday lives.
However, this is only the beginning of true convergence between
the realm of humans and that of machines, which materializes
with the advent of connected machines worn by humans, or
wearables. The resulting shift from the Internet of Things to
the Internet of Wearable Things (IoWT) brings along a truly
personalized user experience by capitalizing on the rich contex-
tual information, which wearables produce more than any other
today’s technology. The abundance of personally identifiable
information handled by wearables creates an unprecedented
risk of its unauthorized exposure by the IoWT devices, which
fuels novel privacy challenges. In this paper, after reviewing
the relevant contemporary background, we propose efficient
means for the delegation of use applicable to a wide variety
of constrained wearable devices, so that to guarantee privacy
and integrity of their data. Our efficient solutions facilitate
contexts when one would like to offer their personal device for
temporary use (delegate it) to another person in a secure and
reliable manner. In connection to the proposed protocol suite
for the delegation of use, we also review the possible attack
surfaces related to advanced wearables.
Index Terms—Attack surfaces, delegation of use, Internet of
Wearable Things (IoWT), personally identifiable information,
privacy challenges, unauthorized exposure, wearables.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE INTERNET as we know it today has undergone afundamental transformation over the last several decades
(see Fig. 1). Back in the early 1990s, it was a fixed network
of computers that allowed the first million of Internet users to
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Fig. 1. Internet evolution: from places and people to things and wearables.
communicate via e-mail. The Internet access points in people’s
homes and public spaces were, in essence, connected places,
which offered limited connectivity supply outnumbered by the
population of potential users. This has changed as of 2000s—
driven by the proliferation of mobile phones and tablets—with
a possibility to connect several billion more wireless Internet
users. Engaged into rich social media opportunities, these
connected people did not suffer anymore from a lack of avail-
able connectivity. It is then when we started to also connect
various machines, objects, and devices to the Internet infras-
tructure. This ongoing phenomenon, known as the Internet of
Things (IoT) [1], [2], promises to add another several tens of
billion or more connected items by 2020 and beyond.1
Employing a plethora of wireless access technologies [3],
billions of connected “things” (such as sensors, actuators,
smart meters, and robots) surround us and embed them-
selves into the fabric of our everyday lives. However, this
is only the beginning of true convergence between the realm
of humans and that of machines. Beyond that, an exciting
innovation develops that promises to revolutionize our society
thus opening a new Internet era. Connected machines worn
by humans, or wearables, produce countless opportunities
for their users, by helping them manage their personal lives,
1Cisco visual networking index: global mobile data traffic forecast, 2016.
health, and safety. The rapid advent of wearables, with global
sales already exceeding 20 million per quarter according to
the International Data Corporation, brings along an avalanche
of personal devices with new feature sets and functionali-
ties that can be worn on a person. As worldwide wearables
market soars, we are standing on the brink of another deci-
sive Internet transformation—from the IoT to the Internet of
Wearable Things (IoWT).
While today’s first-generation wearables are still rather lim-
ited in what they can do, the emerging IoWT devices promise
to deliver a truly personalized user experience by capitalizing
on the rich contextual information [4]. Complementing con-
temporary smart watches, fitness trackers, wristbands, on-body
cameras, and eyewear, future wearable technology comprises
innovative textiles, smart clothes, augmented and virtual reality
gear, as well as enterprise wearable equipment. Early adopters
of the next-generation wearables are envisioned to focus on
self-quantification, and in fact a recent survey by Ericsson
revealed that over 70% of respondents had the same level of
interest in self-quantification as in wearables.2 Obtaining the
individual’s health and wellness information is now increas-
ingly simple with a wide variety of dedicated wearables, from
heart rate monitoring rings, digital health networks, and pos-
ture sensors, to commuting ecometers, clean air bracelets,
water quality checkers, and city microclimate monitors. All in
all, modern IoWT technology already provides a range of use-
ful functions, features, and services to its users, from simple
fitness tracking to smartphone-like experience.
However, despite their promising potential, wearable
devices have inherent constraints and limitations. First, owing
to their slim form-factors, power efficiency is more impor-
tant to wearables than to any other product. Second, the very
high numbers of interconnected body-worn devices and the
resultant personal user networks give rise to system scalability
issues [5]. Third, it is still not common for a wearable device
to interact with any nearby devices since they are operated in
various platforms especially when devices are manufactured
by different vendors. Indeed, wearables have the capability
to connect and communicate to the IoWT infrastructure either
directly through embedded cellular connectivity or via another
device, primarily a smartphone, by using short-range wireless
technology (see Fig. 2). Here, the relevant contextual infor-
mation may be stored and processed on the device locally
or forwarded via a gateway (i.e., the user’s smartphone) to a
remote IoWT server. In the latter case, the gateway may not
have a continuous (reliable) connection to the network due
to obstacles, difficult propagation conditions (in tunnels, lifts,
etc.), and unpredictable user mobility.
The above wearable-specific constraints—and primarily
their limited computation power and intermittent network
connectivity—accentuate the need to rethink the conventional
approaches to maintaining data security, integrity, and reli-
ability [6]. This is further aggravated by the fact that the
information that wearable devices are targeting to store and
2See “Wellness and the Internet” by Ericsson ConsumerLab, 2015.
[Online]. Available: http://ericsson.com/res/docs/2015/consumerlab/wellness-
and-the-internet-4x3a.pdf
Fig. 2. Example personal user network as part of the IoWT vision.
process is highly sensitive, while the devices themselves are
naturally more exposed to public compared to the hand-
held user equipment. Indeed, with the increasing adoption of
advanced wearables, we may end up “wearing” some of the
most personal aspects of ourselves, including our conversa-
tions, relationships, and even health. To this end, wearables
uniquely become both the most private and the most pub-
lic devices, and protecting the personal user information they
handle becomes a growing concern. This is particularly true
for any medical data and those likely to adopt wellness ser-
vices early on value the integrity of that information more than
others.
Given that wearables sense, process, and transmit data about
their users, they generate more personally identifiable infor-
mation than any other today’s technology. That data includes,
but is not limited to wearer’s location, activity, movement, and
vital signs. Therefore, the biggest security risk associated with
wearables becomes the unauthorized exposure of the person-
ally identifiable information associated with them. According
to [7], the information privacy is guaranteed if “the data can
only be accessed by the people who have authorization to view
and use it.” Presently, a traditional enabler to achieve data pri-
vacy is secure authentication [8]. However, such approaches
are complex to apply in large-scale distributed scenarios [9],
especially when storing and sending the sensitive data occurs
across a heterogeneous environment [10] not only via direct
connections, but also remotely.
More broadly, privacy involves control over one’s data,
which incorporates privacy by design and contractual pri-
vacy that, in turn, implies trust. Secure authentication naturally
touches upon the notion of trust [11], that is, ensures that the
communications partners are actually who they claim to be.
This concept of trust, together with the respective tools to
manage it, have also been evolving alongside with the trans-
formation of the Internet shown in Fig. 1. Initially, while the
Internet mostly consisted of the terminal computers, these were
able to authenticate their users with local accounts. Since then,
the Internet has grown to connect people with one another by
taking advantage of centralized remote services. Most recently,
the IoT and thus the IoWT promise to connect our sur-
roundings with each other and with us. The accompanying
information security protocols have also traveled a long path
to reach the current state of their evolution.
1) In the early Internet era, access to the desired resources
was granted to a particular computer/human based on
the corresponding authentication procedure. In contrast,
now each device has to complete such a procedure and,
additionally, prove its association with its owner so that
the data privacy could be guaranteed.
2) Early Internet was based on the assumption that access
to the target resource could only be granted based on
the resource owner decision, that is, by providing a cer-
tificate or a password to the end user. Today, there is
a need to provide such a certificate for each connected
device explicitly by its owner, and the private data is
often stored distributedly across several devices.
In light of the above transformative changes, this paper tar-
gets to propose efficient means for the delegation of use [12]
applicable to a variety of constrained wearable devices, so that
to guarantee privacy and integrity of their data. Accordingly,
since most wearables are inherently limited, our specific
solutions are mindful of their restricted computation and
communication budget. In particular, we target to facilitate
temporary exchange of the IoWT devices belonging to differ-
ent persons, groups, organizations, or companies in a secure
and reliable manner to protect the contextual and personalized
information they handle. The rest of this paper is structured
as follows. Section II surveys the related work in the target
area and establishes that a comprehensive solution for the del-
egation of use is not yet available in the existing literature. To
this end, Section III proposes a novel protocol suite to facil-
itate such delegation in various contexts, while Section IV
details the actual protocols that comprise it. In connection to
that, Section V reviews the available attack surfaces related to
wearables in general and the proposed solutions in particular.
Section VI concludes this paper with useful numerical results
and an accompanying discussion.
II. STATE-OF-THE-ART AND RELATED WORK OVERVIEW
The existing literature is still rather scarce on the topic of
the delegation of use for resource-constrained devices and
services. Most of the available papers focus primarily on
the challenges related to authentication between the user and
an unfamiliar service/data, while having a connection to the
trusted authority. Other works propose information security
primitives to solve the task at hand, but do not offer effective
protocols employing the out-of-the-box structures on the con-
strained devices. In what follows, we summarize our literature
review moving all the way down the protocol stack and then
toward more conceptual approaches.
A broad overview on security-centric challenges in IP-based
networks for the IoT could be found in [13]. Here, the authors
survey the key IoT-specific architecture and network deploy-
ment issues by focusing on a superdense IoT scenario, as well
as address the technical limitations of the conventional pro-
tocols. The main conclusion is that IPv6 has the potential to
solve the identification and transport challenges, thus facil-
itating communication between the devices, but somewhat
downgrading user’s privacy. The paper in question also intro-
duces an automation control center, which acts as a trusted
authority and network assistance unit by monitoring the lifecy-
cle of the involved IoT devices. Finally, the authors speculate
on the pros and cons behind distributed versus centralized
architectures and the corresponding systems operation.
Another study in [14] concerns IP-based scenarios for the
IoT devices with a particular emphasis on the offloading of
the delegation-related traffic to the remote server in the cloud
(assuming its uninterrupted availability) [15]. Here, the initial
connection initialization procedure is separated from the data
protection itself by utilizing DTLS protocol [16]. This is in
addition to the usage of a public handshake while establishing
a connection between the devices. Further, Hummen et al. [17]
reduced the protocol operation overheads by offloading the
handshake procedure to a more powerful device and thus
arrived at the protocol that is applicable for resource-
constrained devices. Complementing this, Seitz et al. [18]
discussed a framework that enables simple authorization and
access control procedures for resource-constrained equipment.
The main focus of said paper is to evaluate the impact of using
the public key infrastructure (PKI) cryptography on the RAM
and ROM utilization. The authors claim that their approach
is suitable for communication between the application server
and the constrained IP-based end device.
With regards to the access controls schemes, the work
in [19] surveys distributed privacy-preserving access arbitra-
tion mechanisms for sensor networks. The respective protocol
implementation assumes that the users have to be provided
with tokens by the device owner (e.g., factory) in order to
access the needed data from a device. The main focus of
this research is on protecting the privacy of a user toward
the device and hence preventing from the reuse of specific
tokens. Another access rights delegation platform in [20] rep-
resents a complete framework based on the premise that the
users in the IoT use cases are allowed to manage the access
control system to their services and information, therefore
contributing an authorization model employing the capability-
based security [21]. The result in question is suitable for
anonymous services using the individual’s token to access
any of the owned information. Similar approaches could be
found in [22] and [23].
The work in [24] offers a set of cryptographic primitives
for the PKI-based encryption taking advantage of the time-
release cryptography. The authors elaborate on a solution that
allows to encrypt a message in such a way that the receiver
cannot decrypt the ciphertext until a certain target time in
the future. Correspondingly, privacy of the user can be main-
tained. Then, the paper in [7] considers privacy in the medical
body area networks, from the viewpoint of the distributed data
storage utilization. This research outlines an important set of
requirements for distributed data storage systems as well as
reviews possible attacks on the body area networks. Hence, the
discussed publication reiterates on the need for fine-grained
data access control that follows the concept of preset rights
management, but relies on a role-based model [25].
Finally, Morchon and Baldus [26] as well as
Garcia-Morchon and Wehrle [27] detailed the secret key
cryptography-based schemes capable of solving a distributed
access control task in wireless medical sensor networks. The
proposed approach utilizes a Blundo’s key predistribution
method to support the role-based access control. Owing to
the pregenerated and distributed polynomial key shares, the
user can easily establish a pairwise key with any authorized
entity, and then encrypt a copy of sensitive data utilizing the
corresponding key for the target entity. Even though patients
can exert individual control over the exact access rights of
the communicating entities, they would need to know the
actual set of authorized users when distributing the data,
and thus encrypt one copy for each user in the set, which is
hardly practical.
In summary, we establish that the challenge of the dele-
gation of use remains a sound research problem for already
more than a decade. A lack of corresponding procedures for
wearable devices in current academic research is profound,
with only a handful of primitives and a few generic solu-
tions. At the same time, the market predictions reviewed in the
previous section and the use cases discussed in what follows
corroborate the prompt need for having efficient enablers to
facilitate the delegation of use for wearable devices. We bridge
the indicated gap in the rest of this paper by outlining our own
comprehensive protocol suite to support such operation.
III. PROTOCOL SUITE FOR THE DELEGATION OF USE
In this section, we begin with discussing the attractive prac-
tical scenarios for the application of our proposed protocol
suite followed by its general description as well as the relevant
underlying assumptions.
A. Use Cases and Market Overview
Today, there are two highly contrasting opportunities in case
one would like to offer their personal device for temporary
use (that is, delegate it) to another person. First, there is a for-
mal process requiring interaction with, e.g., a notary officer
often followed by expensive, cumbersome, and time consum-
ing paperwork. However, in this case the owner is guaranteed
that the concerned device is delegated according to the word of
law and will be returned after use. Second, a more widespread
case is when one is willing to lend a device to a familiar
person, but without any confirmed guarantee that it will be
returned except for natural human trust. In this paper, we
propose and advocate for a novel solution that extends the
notion of “casual” delegation of use (case 2) to offer certain
guarantees on the device return (similar to case 1).
In fact, a recent survey established that over a half of
those who buy a wearable will stop utilizing it after only
six months [28]. In connection to this, there already exist
companies offering more advanced IoWT devices for a “try-
before-buy” period. For example, Lumoid introduces this
opportunity: for $20, anyone can try out as many as five differ-
ent wearables for seven days.3 By the end of the trial period,
3See “Lumoid’s try before you buy wearable program helps you choose
the right fitness band” by Digital Trends, 2015. [Online]. Available:
http://digitaltrends.com/wearables/lumoid-wearable-rental-program/
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customers can either buy the wearables of their choosing, or
return all of them to the company. While a week is not partic-
ularly long of a trial period, it could in principle be extended
for as long as there is no business need for the wearables being
tested by their current users.
Another company, named ByeBuy, adopts a “pay-as-you-
go,” on-demand model for the gadgets they offer, which
effectively means that the user does not actually need to pur-
chase the latest tech products.4 Available first to the customers
in Germany and the U.K., the initial lineup of available high-
end products for rental includes the Xbox One, Apple Watch,
and the Parrot Bebop Drone. Interestingly, ByeBuy manage-
ment maintains that there will be neither up-front payments
nor minimum contract periods in their business model.
To this end, we see that the IoWT market is just at the
beginning of a long journey, with a rapidly growing list of
possible scenarios for (sub-)renting high-end wearable devices
by the owner to the temporary user. Hence, security, privacy,
and user experience aspects in this new type of context have
to be carefully evaluated and Table I gives a quick overview of
the candidate use cases that are both attractive and challenging
for future IoWT rental business. Summarizing these, the pay-
as-you-go model may soon take off rapidly in the wearables
market. The bigger picture behind this thinking is that many
Americans already prefer to access information and things
through Netflix, Spotify, Uber, and other means rather than
actually own them [29]. In this regard, we believe that many
more objects and services may eventually adopt the flexible
all-subscription model.
4See “ByeBuy offers alternative to gadget ownership with on-demand,
pay-as-you-go model” by Crunch Network, 2015. [Online]. Available:
http://techcrunch.com/2015/06/24/byebuy/
Despite bringing forth more flexible usage models, all of the
device renting companies in our survey utilize conventional
notary-like solutions when offering temporary access to wear-
ables. Moreover, a user may have difficulty to receive timely
digital support in situations when the Internet connection to
the company servers is not available. From the communica-
tions perspective, remote connectivity with the rented IoWT
device could be arranged via a gateway (user’s smartphone)
whenever possible. In cases of a guaranteed stable connection
to the owner, simpler solutions including secure time and/or
hash chains may become useful to control the devices [30].
However, these may be challenged to provide all of the desired
functionality for advanced devices that require dynamic feed-
back (e.g., for policy updates as well as to extend the lease
time on-demand). This problem becomes particularly involved
when the rented wearables do not have a reliable Internet con-
nection to the owner while only maintaining access to the
gateway over a direct link outside of the cellular network
coverage.
Our novel protocol suite detailed below offers this much
needed functionality.
B. General Description of This Paper
Whenever a person or a company is willing to provide the
use of a device to a “trusted” or known person, the respective
solution is rather straightforward. However, there is no con-
firmed guarantee that the device in question will be returned
on time. Our proposed solution employs a trusted authority
that is involved into the process of lending the device and
thus can provide guarantees on its successful return. In partic-
ular, said authority may be made responsible for controlling
the duration of the temporary device delegation as well as
for the corresponding interactions between the owner and a
temporary user.
More specifically, we assume that people and their personal
wearable devices proceed through the initialization phase
while connected to the trusted authority. Further, they may
invoke the actual delegation phase at a later time, even with-
out a reliable connection to the authority, which is especially
convenient in cases of intermittent or unavailable Internet con-
nectivity. The developed model and the corresponding set
of protocols (named here the protocol suite) are specifically
designed in such a way that they can accommodate most of
the constrained wearable devices without imposing significant
computation or transmission overheads.
Further in this paper, we concentrate on the following sys-
tem structure, where the overall IoWT system may comprise
the distributed data storage in the cloud, the local wire-
less networks for communication with remote servers, and
the personal IoT networks of individual users (see Fig. 2).
A personal user network within the IoWT consists of the
following components.
1) The primary data aggregation gateway represented by,
e.g., the user’s smartphone (or a smart gateway in
home networks, etc. [31])—the most essential required
features of such a gateway are superior to wearables
computation power and energy resource.
2) The actual constrained IoWT wearables that have less
resources than the gateway.
3) Various other devices that can store, process, and transfer
data, but are neither a part of the personal IoWT network
nor that of the remote cloud.
In this paper, we also assume that all the wireless commu-
nications channels are secure, and thus the aspects related to
the corresponding well-known attacks on them are not dis-
cussed. Further, the proposed protocols could be instantiated
with the specific cryptographic primitives (encryption, hashing
functions, signatures, etc.) according to the effective system
specifications and based on certain target requirements, as well
as the particular IoWT devices in question and their limita-
tions. For instance, as a hashing function we may utilize any of
the existing alternatives [32]: SHA-2, SHA-3, BLAKE2 [33],
etc. For the certificate authority operation (in the PKI case),
we may use the conventional primitives, such as: 1) RSA (fac-
torization) [34] and 2) ElGamal/Diffie-Hellman [35] or elliptic
curve cryptography [36].
Given our assumption on secure communications medium,
it is possible to utilize the classic Diffie-Hellman [37] or ellip-
tic curve Diffie-Hellman [38] protocols. This is because using
the PKI-based solutions for gateway-to-wearable connections
is computationally-hungry and hence should be avoided. As a
widely-used contemporary alternative, we may employ sym-
metric solutions, where additional (e.g., visual) channels are
utilized to establish a secure link. In this case, the required
entropy (128 or 256 bits) needs either a QR code or a shorter
symmetric token matched with a password-authenticated key
exchange utilizing asymmetric cryptography [39].
The issues related to the actual delegation rules, including
environment, biometry, positioning, etc., are not considered
in this paper either. Therefore, the main focus in what fol-
lows remains on the composition and operation of the user’s
personal network, that is, data aggregation gateway and the
associated wearable devices. The main goals of our protocol
suite are to provide continuous possibility for: 1) authentica-
tion between the users and their wearable devices; 2) software
and/or hardware integrity; and 3) data security.
C. Protocol Suite Assumptions and Composition
We further assume that the IoWT network features a certifi-
cate authority employing trusted relations in accordance with
the “trusted tree” principles.10 Every user gateway (i.e., smart-
phone) has a pregenerated secret key SKA and a certificate
signcloud(IDA, PKA) on its public key received from the IoWT
certificate authority in the cloud. Here, signcloud is obtained
by using any appropriate cryptographic signature primitives
with the secret key SKCA of the IoWT certificate authori-
ties. Each gateway has a certificate certcloud = PKCA obtained
from the IoWT certificate authority, while each wearable
device (wi) has a unique hardware-locked serial number (IDi)
and a factory-preset PIN (can be changed manually by using
10See “The ICSI SSL notary: CA certificates” by International
Computer Science Institute, 2016. [Online]. Available: https://notary.icsi.
berkeley.edu/trust-tree/
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the serial number). Clearly, the PIN in question should be
stored separately by the user.
Further, every “out-of-the-box” wearable device wi already
has the necessary factory software preinstalled. At a later time,
the current state of this software can be reset back to the
“factory default” state, that is, the trusted image provided by
the manufacturer [40]. The communication between wi and
the gateway is carried out over a secure channel. As men-
tioned above, we assume that network connectivity is already
protected against any possible malicious or “person-in-the-
middle” attacks. The gateway, in turn, has a pregenerated SKA
and a certificate signcloud(PKA) on its public key received from
the IoWT certificate authority. Finally, each user additionally
has the IoWT authority certificate certcloud to verify the trans-
mitted data as well as the validity of the devices. In case of a
lost or stolen device, the user may setup a reset timer signA(tf ),
which is also assumed secure.
In summary, we provide a complete list of constructs
employed for the composition of our proposed protocol suite in
Table II. We continue in the following section with a detailed
description of the protocols comprising this suite.
IV. PROTOCOL DESCRIPTIONS WITHIN PROPOSED SUITE
In this section, we offer a detailed description of the individ-
ual protocols comprising the proposed suite, which has been
introduced in the previous section. To this end, Table III out-
lines the state machine corresponding to our solution from the
viewpoint of the wearable device to be delegated. Here, a user
is represented as a personal network with a data aggregation
gateway (smartphone). Names Alice and Bob refer to the two
users. The main phases of operation to be discussed further
on are presented in Fig. 3. Please note that numbering of the
protocol iterations is according to the algorithm description
and may be not in incremental order.
A. Association (State 1 → State 2)
Here, Alice purchases a completely new wearable device
from the manufacturer and is willing to add it to her personal
IoWT network. In other words, we describe the procedure of
adding a wearable device wi to the personal network of the
owner Alice. As the device belongs to Alice, it is associated
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Fig. 3. Example wearable device lifecycle while delegating the use.
with her by utilizing the unique ID (alice@address.com) with
the assistance from the application center in the IoWT cloud.
The key steps of the proposed association protocol are summa-
rized in Fig. 4 and Algorithm 1. In practice, this construction
may take advantage of already existing transport layer security
primitives [41], [42].
B. Delegation (State 2 → State 3)
Here, Alice is willing to lend her wearable device to
Bob for some time, that is, the device owner is delegating
a wearable device to another temporary user. Importantly,
we differentiate between two main scenarios: 1) when both
Alice and Bob have a reliable wireless connection to the
Fig. 4. Wearable device association protocol: connection to the cloud is
required.
Fig. 5. Wearable device delegation protocol. (a) Reliable connection to the
cloud. (b) No reliable connection to the cloud.
Algorithm 1 Wearable Device Association Protocol
1: Alice generates SA for the wearable wi and sends it to wi
securely
2: wi sends the hash of the factory software to the cloud
(hash(SWi))
3: Alice also sends her PKA and IDA to the cloud
4: Cloud generates the certificate certcloud =
signcloud(wi, PKA, IDA, hash(SWi))
5: Cloud sends certcloud to Alice
6: Alice signs certcloud and obtains certA = signA(certcloud)
7: Alice sends certA to wi
IoWT cloud and 2) when at least one of them does not
have it. Conveniently, our delegation procedure may in prin-
ciple be executed even in situations when Alice and Bob are
not geographically close to each other (in case of the door
lock access delegation, for example). The key steps of the
proposed delegation protocol are summarized in Fig. 5 and
Algorithms 2 and 3.
1) Both Alice and Bob Have Reliable Network Connection:
This scenario requires that the gateway has a reliable wireless
connection to the certificate authority, so that it could validate
all the involved operational procedures.
Algorithm 2 Wearable Device Delegation Protocol: Reliable
Connection to the Cloud
1: Alice sets delegation timer td on wi using a message
m[D]A = signA(wi, td, IDA, IDB, {delegation rules}).
2: Alice sends m[D]A to the cloud.
3: Cloud checks the validity of m[D]A by using PKA. If it is
not valid → exit.
4: Cloud signs m[D]cloud = signcloud(m[D]A).
5: Cloud sends m[D]cloud and certA to Bob.
6: Alice deletes SA on wi using m[C(SA)]A.
7: if Bob does not trust Alice then
8: Device is reset keeping the original certificate stored
and Bob checks the hash(SWi) from the certA and hash
calculated from the wi-th software directly. If both are
equal – we may proceed; otherwise, the wi is considered
malicious → exit. In this case, wi may not be used by
Bob (factory software was modified by the owner, i.e.,
it is not the same as the default). Importantly, reseting to
factory defaults in this case keeps the certificate storage
and the trusted timer unchanged.
9: else
10: All the applications are kept unchanged and Bob may
use the software of user Alice that is free or has been
previously owned by Bob.
11: end if
12: Bob generates new SB for the wi.
13: Bob sends SB to wi securely.
14: To ensure software integrity, Bob signs signB(wi, SWi).
15: if the delegation time is expired then
16: Device is reset to factory default state saving the orig-
inal certificate. The timer can be reset while connected
to the cloud over Bob’s gateway, but it requires inter-
action with the original owner Alice as m[D]A =
signA(wi, td, IDA, IDB, {delegation rules}). This could
also be done via a direct connection.
17: end if
2) Both Alice and Bob Do Not Have Reliable Network
Connection: This scenario does not require that the gateway
has a reliable wireless connection to the certificate author-
ity (in/on tunnels, boats, mountains, etc.). Alternatively, the
user(s) may decide to block their wireless connection inten-
tionally.
C. Reclaiming (State 3 → State 2)
Here, the temporary user Bob returns the previously rented
wearable device to its original owner, Alice. The key steps
of the proposed reclaiming protocol are summarized in Fig. 6
and Algorithms 4 and 5.
1) Both Alice and Bob Have Reliable Network
Connection: See Algorithm 4 for details.
2) Both Alice and Bob Do Not Have Reliable Network
Connection: See Algorithm 5 for details.
D. De-Association (State 2 or 3 → State 1)
1) Manual De-Association (Disposal or Sale): Here, the
owner Alice is willing to sell or dispose of her wearable
Fig. 6. Wearable device reclaiming protocol. (a) Reliable connection to the
cloud. (b) No reliable connection to the cloud.
Algorithm 3 Wearable Device Delegation Protocol: No
Reliable Connection to the Cloud
1: Alice sets delegation timer td on wi using a message
m[D]A = signA(wi, td, IDA, IDB, {delegation rules}).
2: Alice sends certA, m[D]A to Bob securely.
3: Bob checks if certA and m[D]A are valid by certcloud.
4: Alice deletes SA on wi using m[C(SA)]A.
5: if Bob does not trust Alice then
6: Device is reset keeping the original certificate stored
and Bob checks the hash(SWi) from the certA and hash
calculated from the wi-th software directly. If both are
equal – we may proceed; otherwise, the wi is considered
malicious → exit. In this case, wi may not be used by
Bob (factory software was modified by the owner, i.e.,
it is not the same as the default).
7: else
8: All the applications are kept unchanged and Bob may
use the software of user Alice that is free or has been
previously owned by Bob.
9: end if
10: Bob generates new SB for the wi.
11: Bob sends SB to the wi securely.
12: To ensure software integrity, Bob signs signB(wi, SWi).
13: if the delegation time is expired then
14: Device is reset to factory default state saving the orig-
inal certificate. The timer can be reset while connected
to the cloud over Bob’s gateway, but it requires inter-
action with the original owner Alice as m[D]A =
signA(wi, td, IDA, IDB, {delegation rules}). This could
also be done via a direct connection.
15: end if
device, that is, she wants to remove all the personal data from
the device including any keys and certificates. The main steps
of the corresponding de-association protocol are summarized
in Algorithm 6.
Algorithm 4 Wearable Device Reclaiming Protocol: Reliable
Connection to the Cloud
1: Bob generates a message m[R]B = signB(wi, R).
2: Bob sends m[R]B to the cloud.
3: Cloud checks the validity of m[R]B by using PKB. If it is
not valid → exit.
4: Cloud signs mcloud = signcloud(m[R]B).
5: Cloud sends mcloud to Alice.
6: Bob deletes SB on wi using m[C(SB)]B.
7: if Alice does not trust Bob then
8: Device is reset keeping the original certificate stored
and Alice checks the hash(SWi) from the certA and hash
calculated from the wi-th software directly. If both are
equal – we may proceed; otherwise, the wi is considered
malicious → exit. The owner Alice should reset her
device using the factory PIN.
9: else
10: All the applications are kept unchanged and Alice may
use new software of the previous user Bob which is free
or has been purchased by Alice while Bob was using
the device.
11: end if
12: Alice sends generated during the association SA to wi.
13: To ensure software integrity, Alice signs signA(wi, SWi).
As a result, now wi has only certA, certcloud.
Algorithm 5 Wearable Device Reclaiming Protocol: No
Reliable Connection to the Cloud
1: Bob generates a message m[R]B = signB(wi, R).
2: Bob sends m[R]B to Alice over a direct link.
3: Bob deletes SB on wi using m[C(SB)]B.
4: Alice checks if m[R]B is valid by certcloud.
5: if Alice does not trust Bob then
6: Device is reset keeping the original certificate stored
and Alice checks the hash(SWi) from the certA and hash
calculated from the wi-th software directly. If both are
equal – we may proceed; otherwise, the wi is considered
malicious → exit. The owner Alice should reset her
device using the factory PIN.
7: else
8: All the applications are kept unchanged and Alice may
use new software of the previous user Bob which is free
or has been purchased by Alice while Bob was using
the device.
9: end if
10: Alice sends generated during the association SA to wi.
11: To ensure software integrity, Alice signs signA(wi, SWi).
As a result, now wi has only certA, certcloud.
2) Automatic De-Association (Loss or Damage): Here, we
consider the situation when the wearable device in question
is lost, damaged, or stolen, that is, any private data should be
removed to prevent a potential third party from accessing it.
The main steps of the corresponding de-association protocol
are summarized in Algorithm 7. Note that this construction is
similar to the case of manual de-association above, but device
reset in this case is triggered based on the preset timer value.
Algorithm 6 Manual Wearable Device De-Association
Protocol
1: Owner Alice sends a signaling message to wi: m[F]A.
2: wi is reset to the factory defaults thus removing all data,
including the certificate storage.
3: Device can be restored by only using factory (or modified)
PIN, and the connection to the cloud is required according
to the association phase.
Algorithm 7 Automatic Wearable Device De-Association
Protocol
1: If wi leaves the personal network coverage of its current
user, the timer tf is initialized.
2: If reset timer tf expires, wi is automatically reset to the
factory defaults thus removing all data, including the
certificate storage.
3: Device can be restored by only using factory (or modified)
PIN, and the connection to the cloud is required according
to the association phase.
Capitalizing on the proposed protocol suite accommodating
the delegation of use for private wearable devices, we proceed
with a thorough review of possible attacks on and threats to
wearables. This aims at offering a complete and systematic
perspective on utilizing this new type of user equipment in
the emerging IoWT era.
V. POSSIBLE ATTACKS ON WEARABLE DEVICES
As a further evolution of the IoT, the IoWT and its wearable
devices are susceptible to similar threats as the machine-type
equipment, which served an attractive target for “hackers”
for decades [43]. Contrary to the IoT devices, as we dis-
cussed in Section I, wearables are additionally vulnerable
to unauthorized exposure of the personally identifiable infor-
mation associated with them. Therefore, attackers could be
after the physical assets of the users (i.e., the wearable
devices themselves) or they could attempt to access the user’s
data directly on a wearable device. In addition, an attacker
could be interested in the metadata about the user, which
would mean, for example, any information about past device
delegations.
According to the USA Federal Trade Commission,11 a com-
prehensive classification of the attack surfaces for wearables
is illustrated in Fig. 7. Hence, we learn that the conventional
attack areas are somewhere between the gateway and the net-
work cloud. These are well researched upon already, whereas
wearable-specific attacks call for a more detailed discussion.
In the rest of this paper, we review possible wearable-specific
attacks and compare those against the existing alternatives.
This information should help protect the actual instantiations
of the proposed protocol suite with the practical primitives,
when implemented.
11See “Careful connections: building security in the IoT” by
Federal Trade Commission, 2015. [Online]. Available: http://
ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/pdf0199-carefulconnections-
buildingsecurityinternetofthings.pdf
Fig. 7. Classification of the attack surfaces for wearables (according to the
U.S. Federal Trade Commission).
A. Privacy
Protocols that employ signatures, including the one pro-
posed above, are particularly vulnerable in terms of privacy,
since they typically also enable nonrepudiation. This important
property means that the user cannot at a later time deny the
fact of the delegation or assertion. More specifically, noninter-
active protocols rely on this property for their security, which
causes a conflict between the security and the privacy [44].
B. Phishing
Phishing attacks target to exploit the weak bindings between
the digital and the physical identities [45]. For example, Eve
masquerading as Bob initiates a delegation from Alice to Bob,
but then presents her own identity. If Alice cannot verify
that Bob is IDB instead of IDE, a phishing attack succeeds.
Opportunities for phishing are aggravated by the intrinsic prop-
erties of wearables, including the one that they often have
small or no displays. Phishing cannot usually be prevented
completely (residual error and finite user effort), but it can be
controlled to a desired extent (i.e., how small differences in
authenticity a human user has to notice). Finally, resistance to
phishing may also be in contradiction with privacy, i.e., more
attributes make users more recognizable, but leak information
about them.
C. Relay Attacks
It also includes the conventional person-in-the-middle
attacks [46]. Here, Eve asks m[D]A for Bob (IDB) from Alice,
and later on introduces herself as Alice to Bob, also offering
the m[D]A to Bob at that time. Alice cannot use the wearable
device herself, but can observe delegations, and may convince
Bob to believe that she is in fact IDA.
D. Downgrade
As actually employed signature primitives are not discussed
as part of the proposed protocol, the general problem of
“downgrade” concerns mostly the key distribution stage [47].
TABLE IV
POWER CONSUMPTION OF DIFFERENT RADIO INTERFACES
Fig. 8. Relative transmit power consumption of the proposed protocol suite.
Accordingly, if a user has multiple public keys, they all need
to withstand prolonged attacks against them. Another less
severe downgrade attack happens when communication with
the cloud is prevented by a malicious party, or reachability of
the cloud is not verified by one of the parties in advance.
E. Malicious Wearable
After observing a valid protocol message m[D]A for the
wearable device wk from Alice to Bob, Eve crafts a mali-
cious wearable device that reports the identity wk and the
integrity hash(SWk). Then, the wearable in question can, for
example, log Bob’s activity. This attack looks similar to any
malicious device attack, but—due to the fact that most wear-
ables are constrained devices—can be performed mostly on
the factory side.
F. Wearable Device Compromising
The devices in a personal user network are subjected to
compromising [48], as they are relatively easy to be lost,
stolen, or forgotten. If the entire piece of sensitive data is
directly encrypted and stored inside a wearable device together
with its encryption key, the compromise of this device will lead
to the disclosure of data.
G. Network Dynamics Threats
Naturally, a user operating the aggregation gateway (smart-
phone) along with the personal wearable devices is mobile
throughout the day. Due to accidental failures or malicious
activities, wearable devices may join or leave the network
frequently [49]. This may also happen due to the battery con-
strains. To this end, attackers may attempt to place fake sensors
in order to masquerade the authentic devices, and can then
acquire legitimate devices deliberately. The important user-
related data, if not well-kept in more than one device, could
be lost accordingly as a result of high network dynamics.
VI. CONCLUSION
As we discover in the previous section, one of the likely
attacks on the proposed wearable-specific device delegation
protocol is phishing, where Eve masquerades herself as Bob.
If Alice does not trust Bob’s certificate issued by the IoWT
certificate authority (or Eve’s certificate in case of an attack),
we may utilize the following procedure. Accordingly, Alice
sends a symmetric delegation key to Bob encrypted with
Bob’s public key. The delegation key for Bob can be, for
instance, challenge||KDF(KA, challenge), which the wearable
device can verify during Bob’s communication attempt. Then,
the wearable device does not have to employ public key cryp-
tography to associate the user. Here, the challenge has to have
structure, which binds it to the actual delegation. Also, it is
desirable to change the key SA : wi, which is the symmetric
key between Alice and the device wi.
Further, we assess the power consumption performance of
our proposed protocol suite, as this should become a major
limiting factor in its ultimate practical operation. This discus-
sion is not presented in absolute numbers due to the fact that
the transmission overheads depend on the practical networking
scenario, the interference picture, and other unpredictable fac-
tors. Therefore, we analyze the case where network conditions
remain similar for all the underlying wireless technologies.
More specifically, the power consumption figures for the cel-
lular interface are taken from [50]. For the power consumption
of short-range wireless technologies, we refer to [51]–[53].
Based on the obtained numerical results, we estimate the trans-
mission overheads when using our proposed protocol suite for
different phases, while having equal data packet payloads.
In Fig. 8, the comparison of relative communication over-
heads for both in- and out-of-coverage cases is presented,
whereas the calculations are based on Table IV. We learn that
the association and the delegation phases of the proposed pro-
tocol suite consume the most power, as they generally involve
more signaling messages to travel between a wearable device
and the network. At the same time, the reclaiming phase is rel-
atively more lightweight. In addition, we observe that running
the protocols over short-range WiFi radios consumes more
power than executing them over less power-hungry Bluetooth
low energy (BLE) and ZigBee technologies.
In summary, this paper has comprehensively outlined a
number of important aspects related to privacy of advanced
wearables within the IoWT ecosystem that they construct. To
this end, we started with a thorough review of contempo-
rary trends behind the evolution of next-generation wearables,
surveyed the corresponding security research background,
reviewed the emerging device rental market, as well as offered
a comprehensive overview of potential use cases. Further, we
outlined a complete protocol suite enabling the delegation of
use for wearable devices, whenever their owner is willing to
lend a device for temporary use.
The proposed solutions are described at length, both when
the personal user network has a reliable wireless connection
to the IoWT infrastructure, as well as when such connection is
not available. Finally, we have analyzed the associated attacks
on wearable devices themselves, as well as our designed
protocols, and discussed some of the important practical
implications, including protection from phishing and relative
power consumption. We believe that the proposed protocol
suite and the accompanying discussion will become a useful
consideration facilitating the delegation of wearables across
multiple casual and business IoWT scenarios.
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Abstract: Presently, smart and connected wearable systems, such as on-body sensors and
head-mounted displays, as well as other small form factor but powerful personal computers are
rapidly pervading all areas of our life. Motivated by the opportunities that next-generation wearable
intelligence is expected to provide, the goal of this work is to build a comprehensive understanding
around some of the user-centric security and trust aspects of the emerging wearable and close-to-body
wireless systems operating in mass events and under heterogeneous conditions. The paper thus
intends to bring the attention of the research community to this emerging paradigm and discuss the
pressing security and connectivity challenges within a popular consumer context. Our selected target
scenario is that of a sports match, where wearable-equipped users may receive their preferred data
over various radio access protocols. We also propose an authentication framework that allows for
delivery of the desired content securely within the considered ecosystem.
Keywords: wearables; security; authentication; WiGig; mass event; wireless; challenges
1. Introduction and Scope
Today, smart and connected wearable systems, such as on-body sensors, head-mounted displays
and other small form factor capable personal computers are rapidly pervading all areas of our life as
a more personal part of the Internet of Things (IoT) paradigm [1,2]. Such emerging wearables open
new avenues for fundamentally different forms of both user-centric contextual services and interactive
multi-user applications based on sharing data and resources locally [3]. This trend provides immense
opportunities but, on the other hand, constitutes a vast unexplored area, riddled with numerous
research challenges for both academia and industry [4]. One of the key challenges relates to the ‘big
three’: security, privacy, and trust [5], i.e., how to ensure that wearable-specific information is produced and
consumed appropriately by a multitude of devices and users [6].
Wearables are developing rapidly to become the next major information and communications
technology paradigm, while manifesting ubiquitous computing and intelligent information technology
on the most personal level [7]. Wearable devices are the pinnacle of miniaturized computation
and communication technology for tracking, storing, processing, and reporting important human
activity, such as physiological parameters, social interactions, and events [8]. They enable the next
generation of wearable intelligence, where the communications chain may interconnect not only the
user smartphones (acting as gateways) but also a wide range of new services (see Figure 1).
Particularly in urban environments, the proliferation of mobile wearable technology [9], as well
as the rise of smart and automated cities are opening up new opportunities for improved public
safety and security [10]. Even though there has been significant deployment experience of diverse IoT
systems, the understanding behind these systems and the corresponding implications in the context of
safety and security have only just scratched the surface [11].
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Figure 1. User-centric applications and services enabled by next-generation wearable intelligence.
1.1. Applications of Wearables
Wearables have become a decisive innovation offered by a plethora of accessories and clothes
(smart glasses, smart watches, fitness bands, augmented reality glasses, cameras, gadget gloves, etc.),
which dramatically augment human capabilities [12]. Underpinning the topicality of this area, large
international business around wearables is now in turbulence, which is evident from, for example,
recent acquisitions of corresponding start-ups by larger companies like Intel (Recon Instruments,
Replay Technologies, etc.) as well as fascinating new releases, such as Samsung brainBAND [13], to
measure specific health aspects in mass sports events. As a result, wearable devices are already
taking over the market with an increase in shipments of over 40% in 2016 as compared to the
previous year, while the total shipments are expected to exceed 200 million units by 2019 [14]. While
wearable technology clearly demonstrates much promise for novel exciting innovations, a lot remains
to be studied and understood before the full potential of large-scale wearable ecosystems can be
harnessed beyond individual user applications [15]. The key challenges to address relate to information
management within the device ecosystem, as well as the user-centric security, privacy, and trust aspects
therein [16]. The rapid adoption rate of the paradigmatically new wearable technology poses multiple
novel challenges along the lines of its security and privacy [17]. The sheer diversity of the devices
leads to increased dynamics and complexity in terms of user management of the access rights and
accentuates the need for wireless 5G-grade connectivity within the user’s “personal cloud” [18].
The breadth of the kinds of wearable devices available to an individual person is steadily
increasing, which calls for new solutions for managing the “personal cloud” security [19]. The
wearable devices of one user being in physical proximity to each other creates opportunities for
establishing trusted networks between smart devices and building meta-level intelligent services
based on multiple devices operated by different users [20]. Additionally, the constraints of wearables
in terms of, for example, their battery life, connectivity range, and computation power increase
the complexity of management as the user’s personal ecosystem remains constantly in a state of
change [21]. To date, these aspects of future wearables have remained largely unexplored from the
end user perspective. As most security threats are difficult for a consumer to understand or even
identify, and the users should be allowed to focus on their desired activities in the real world, it is
unclear how the management of security and, for example, access to information in the personal cloud
should occur [22]. In what follows, we provide a concrete example of what the ecosystem of intelligent
wearables could look like and what kind of security and privacy challenges the aspects of proximity,
dynamics, and constraints of wearables bring about in this vision.
Considering the use cases of wearables, much of the prior research has focused on facilitating
automation, healthcare, and other applications with pragmatic business prospects [23] and a clear
return-on-investment [24]. From the research viewpoint, such contexts can often be readily modeled
and controlled, since the tasks as well as the contextual factors are often well-understood, whereas
handling mass contexts remains challenging to predict due to their behavior. This can lead to solutions
that function satisfactorily in a specific context but cannot be generalized or transferred to other
contexts, like Augmented and Virtual Reality (AR/VR) cases [25].
In stark contrast, the focus of this paper is on highly dynamic and complex contexts related
to mass consumer applications in the leisurely use of wearables [26,27]. This emerging area sets
unprecedentedly high requirements to: (1) understand the privacy- and security-related threats; and
(2) develop scalable connectivity solutions that are acceptable for mass consumer markets. Indeed,
consumers are particularly interested in knowing that their communicated data are protected and
privacy is maintained. As of today, the information security ecosystem for such a wide range of
intelligent wearables has not yet been established.
1.2. Structure of This Manuscript
The structure of this work is as follows. The future of wearable devices in the context of a mass
event is discussed in the next section. A survey on possible market-available and next-generation
wireless technologies with respect to AR/VR limitations is offered in Section 3. Further, our developed
simulation framework allowing for improvement of the connectivity planning and security assessment,
including the focus on the use of higher communication frequencies (such as 60 GHz bands), is outlined
in Section 4. The produced results based on ray-based pass loss modeling within the characteristic
scenario of a hockey match are given in Section 5. Further, in Section 6 we propose an authentication
framework that secures the mass content delivery in the target scenario, and conduct a brief security
analysis of the framework. The last section concludes the manuscript.
2. Background and Motivation
2.1. Related Historical Overview
For years now, sports players have been wearing tracking devices in training, so that the coaches
could see who is in adequate condition and who has been “burning the candle at both ends” [28].
So far, such devices have not been allowed during competitive play [29]. In football, the only wearable
that is permitted as of today is the referee’s watch that buzzes to let them know whenever a goal has
been scored [30].
At the same time, hockey is one of the most dynamic global sports [31]. However, it still has not
caught on to the technology boom that is changing the ways that teams track the progress of their
players (like in football). The hockey teams are thus not yet producing the data to be processed and,
therefore, the mass consumer cannot obtain them through the conventional channels (TVs, radio, etc.)
nor with the next-generation AR/VR equipment. However, this may soon change as new wearable
devices have been in the development process for a long time [32–34] and are currently being released
into the market [35].
In the “2015 All Star game”, the National Hockey League (NHL) placed tracking devices on the
players’ jerseys and inside the puck [36]. Putting technology on ice allowed coaches and players alike
to focus on the game-play performance. Some teams are also considering various hockey stick add-ons
that measure the power and the speed of slap shots, or the amplitude and execution speed of each
swing [37]. With these advancements, it is not expected to be long until we see comprehensive tracking
technology enter the NHL, providing the mass consumers with a completely new level of experience.
Technology has profoundly altered the way we do sports by capturing the attention of spectators
for hours. With today’s technology, we are now able to make grounded conclusions on the team’s
performance based on statistics made available to the audience through broadcasting [38]. Today, the
data obtained from players, coaches, etc., are only available to a very limited circle of people. However,
in the world of tomorrow, a hockey match spectator may enjoy a range of different services based e.g.,
on the type (level) of the purchased ticket, fan club membership, and/or the place on the tribune [39].
2.2. Market-Available Professional Products
Since wearable technology is becoming increasingly integrated into professional sports, various
metrics can now be taken into account and utilized throughout training, thus allowing for real-time
decisions to be made subsequently. Many known tech and clothing companies are attempting to bridge
the gap between the state-of-the-art technology and the pace of the evolution. We hence list some of
the professional wearable equipment already employed in sports training:
Adidas miCoach [40] is an ecosystem of connected wireless sensors with gear or apparel that is
capable of quantifying athletic performance, including acceleration, speed, distance, power, heart rate,
etc. After collection, all of the essential data are sent to the coach instantly, so that the performance of
an individual could be monitored to make conclusions on potential concussions and injuries.
Viper Pod is a device widely utilized in the sports world by more than 10 globally-known teams,
such as the football teams of Barcelona, Arsenal, and Manchester United, as well as the rugby team
England National [41]. With a weight of under 50 g, this chest-mounted device is equipped with a
Global Positioning System (GPS) module, accelerometer, gyroscope, digital compass, and heart rate
monitor. The corresponding metrics are then transferred to other devices, thus enabling the coach to
conduct real-time analysis depending on the team performance. Similarly to football, the National
Hockey League (NHL) has embarked onto the Viper Pod with teams such as the Chicago Bulls, the
Cincinnati Bengals, and the Carolina Panthers, all making use of this innovative technology.
Catapult OptimEye G5 is a piece of equipment suitable for goalkeepers [42]. The device in
question allows the coach to track goalkeeper’s movements together with a host of other statistics [43].
It is equipped with a set of sensitive accelerometers, a heart rate monitor, and a wireless module, thus
providing close to real-time bio-mechanical and tactical analysis. The lifetime of the device is 5 h
and the post-game analysis is also available as one of the features. The company also offers a variety
of devices for the NHL, National Basketball Association (NBA), and National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA).
The E39 performance shirt by Armour is a high-tech T-shirt equipped with a removable computer
that features a triaxial accelerometer, processor, and 2 GB of storage supplied with additional monitors
to measure the wearer’s heart rate and breathing [44].
ShotTracker is a basketball wearable consisting of the wrist and net sensors, which intends to
improve the statistics of the players during the game [45]. This device was the first to be adopted by
the basketball league with increasing intensity.
These are but a few of the professional sports wearables used by the leagues and the international
teams across the globe. Some of the monitoring devices were also developed not for the public market
but for the professional-targeted training, including the ones presented in [46–48]. The use of wearable
technology is undeniably a major game-changer, while increased adoption of professional sports
wearables during the games becomes another testament of this effective technology.
2.3. Proposed Model
Our envisioned service could be included with the initial game ticket and/or enabled by utilizing
micro-transactions during the match itself. We further provide a non-exhaustive list of possible
applications within this context:
• Obtaining video content made available by the proprietary sources (team players, opponents,
referees, hockey gates, main cameras, etc.);
• Accessing general information related to the club (history, events, players, etc.);
• Monitoring critical information (warnings, evacuation plans, etc.);
• Advertisements and promotions (closest fast-food venue, order of a drink, taxi, etc.).
Complementing the above avenues of available monetization opportunities, the game organizers
(owners of the stadium) may also acquire anonymized data related to the actual number of seats
taken, distribution of spectators, amount of specific requests, and necessary feedback. The collected
statistics could be utilized e.g., to improve the general levels of physical security as well as increase
the effectiveness of future event planning. To this end, Figure 2 details our characteristic scenario
depicting a wearable-enhanced ice hockeymatch, where we can differentiate between the following
categories of participants (named here ‘roles’):
• Mass spectators (purchased their personal ticket; have access to a personalized set of AR-based
services; are main producers and consumers of data; have the possibility for on-demand content
acquisition; engage into direct interactions);
• Support personnel (broadly includes technical, medical, maintenance, advertising, and other
specialists with access to their specific and AR-based data; access detailed information on
players/spectators);
• Competing teams (including players and coaches with data possibly affecting tactics and strategy
of the team; the requirement of long-term protection against misuse of such more dynamic and
context-oriented information).
Summarizing, the main target here is to benefit the following stakeholders: regular audience
(spectators, fans, etc.), event venue (e.g., sports stadium), competing teams (coalitions) or their
owners/sponsors, first responders and maintenance personnel, and other services (advertising
companies, wearable equipment vendors, etc.).
The pragmatic example output that we assume when considering the ice hockey business setting
is a secure, wearable-aware data streaming system. As players carry around multiple wearable devices
and sensors, such as heart rate monitors, lung capacity, metabolism, and location monitors, collision
sensors and cameras [49], this equipment streams relevant data, where more sensitive information is
only delivered to the authorized nodes, while game-oriented data is made available to the mass public.
Moreover, we may consider an “intelligent puck” system that tracks the puck location in the ring and
communicates it to e.g., the ice hockey arena’s public node.
The league organizing the games may have its own dedicated node and, depending on
the agreement between the team and the league, the data might be aggregated and abstracted
away before delivery by means of masking [50,51]. This can therefore fuel third-party services
running on the spectator’s smart display [52] (AR glasses or mobile on-demand TV screen).
In this context, specific security demands arise for: (1) signatures to prove the origin and the
authenticity of all data; (2) encryption for improved confidentiality while accessing the parts of data in
transit; (3) randomized inspection protocols for data validity assessment; (4) restricted Application
Programming Interfaces (APIs) to develop applications that perform computations over private data,
where the application owner does not have the actual data but only the result; and (5) mechanisms to
prevent from covert channels or to limit their bandwidth. The following section sheds light on the
scenario-related security concerns.
Figure 2. Representative scenario: a wearable-enhanced ice hockey match. AR: Augmented Reality;
VR: Virtual Reality.
3. Security Context in Public Events with Wearable Intelligence
In this section, we bring the reader’s attention to the key dimensions that we argue as
underpinning the most crucial challenges pertaining to the security aspects of wearable intelligence:
• The notion of close proximity between several wearable and carriable devices, which can bemobile;
• Higher dynamics of personal user environment, where the components in the user “personal
cloud” depend on the situation and where particular devices may often (de-)associate in real time;
• Tighter constraints on the available processing capabilities and energy supply of contemporary
wearables as a result of their reduced form-factor and functionality.
These dimensions comprise a solid foundation that allows for a rapid advancement toward
next-generation wearable intelligence, which has to be made secure, privacy-friendly, and trustworthy.
3.1. Proximity
The rapidly diversifying ecosystem of wearable devices that reside geographically close to each
other–either belonging to one or to several users–opens new opportunities for developing secure
connectivity solutions based on physical proximity [53,54]. For example, in the aforementioned
scenario, proximity-based networking can be used to form data dissemination channels that are only
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available at the mass event. Additionally, wearable technology could be utilized by other users as a
neighboring resource: various sensors on a user’s smart jacket could provide him/her with customized
and personalized service, while they could also accommodate other people nearby (proximate users),
possibly with limited quality of service.
However, there are critical challenges that are required to be resolved before these applications
can truly take off. The utilization of proximity as a security feature is vulnerable to some extent against
attackers using specialized equipment [55]. Attackers can also spoof their presence using sybil attacks,
particularly if radio resources or other physical resources are not attested [56]. However, whenever
proximity can be guaranteed through the use of distance-bounding protocols [57], it could also be
utilized to set-up security sensitive boundaries. Furthermore, the possible social and collective use
of “personal clouds” of the neighboring users broadens these challenges from an individual user’s
perspective to that involving several users.
3.2. Dynamics
This dimension relates to unpredictable mobility of human users in real time as well as the
highly-dynamic composition of their respective personal networks even though the actual movement
could generally be tracked [58]. The research field is suffering from a significant lack of activities in the
area of dynamic privacy and trust management. Earlier research focused on industrial solutions for
hospitals [59] or controlled body-area networks (BANs) [60], where devices are assumed to always
have stable connectivity to the control unit. Many new challenges arise in light of mobility, where
privacy of the device location is one of the important requirements [61].
Besides the issues in defining initial trust anchors, trust relationships evolve continuously [62].
Hence, trust management could become a burden for the end-user equipment unless these tasks can
be largely automated through the use of authorization protocols. Changes in device management
transform physical device ownership more toward a responsibility and a liability, rather than absolute
control over the device. This means that an understandable security model is needed for distributed
management functions, in order to, for example, maintain dynamic user privacy. Furthermore,
trust decisions of humans as well as relations between physical devices and their hosts have to be
supported in verifiable ways. This requires identity management frameworks that support identities
beyond these of only users and wearable devices (e.g., virtualization and sandboxing).
3.3. Constraints
Limitations of small form-factor and battery-powered wearable devices constitute one more,
“internal” dimension, which imposes constrains on the respective complexity of cryptographic protocols
suitable for next-generation wearables [63]. First, constraints in the device’s user interfaces create
challenges for the provisioning of the devices and communicating the security status together with the
current trust relationships. In addition to verifying the configuration of wearable devices, detection
of potentially malicious applications and actors in the “personal cloud” environment needs to be
supported. Second, the coordination takes place on the lower levels of hardware. Hence, the real
challenge is how to coordinate the actual hardware resources of each platform.
Developers require new programming frameworks and open-source platforms that help “get
the most out of” hardware. Moreover, the corresponding security procedures are not standardized
for the connectivity between the device and the gateway, and should be studied in more detail [64].
Further, the challenges of authenticating and authorizing wearable devices become pronounced, as
their average densities around a user grow. Mutual authentication of wearables becomes therefore
a glaring problem, including the risk of mismatch (accidental or premeditated). Finally, most of the
wearables of today are optimized based on their energy consumption [65]. To this end, utilizing the
conventional RSA-like information security solutions may be unacceptable for battery-constrained
devices and thus new lightweight primitives should be proposed and developed.
4. Implementation of the Target Scenario
This section details the mass sports event within our selected target scenario, together with
the delivery method (AR/VR) application requirements, potential wireless solutions, and the
corresponding setup implementation. We have chosen the 20,000-seat hockey stadium as our reference
design case. As with any high-density venue, specific deployments may have slightly different
requirements. However, the principles outlined here are generally applicable for the venue of
any size. The application type is mainly downlink data (video) streaming to the mass consumers.
The goodput of the studied wireless technologies is not considered in this manuscript due to the static
broadcast-like behavior. We base our research on the assumptions adopted from the industrial works
by Ericsson [66,67]. Our custom simulator utilized in this work was previously calibrated with the
real-life measurements in [68].
4.1. General Application Requirements
First, consider the data delivery though the smart glasses or portable televisions, where AR adds
(computer-generated) supplemental elements to the user’s viewpoint, whereas solid VR recreates the
entire scene that the user sees based on multiple sensory sources (e.g., cameras and other sensors).
Both technologies operate in real time, and the main requirements of these applications are throughput
(up to 1.5 Gbps total or 6 Mbps per stream), latency that ranges from the sub-millisecond level to tens
of milliseconds, and jitter of below 1 ms [69]. Importantly, in our scenario the challenges of mobility
are not discussed due to nearly static behavior of spectators. The application range is limited by the
dimensions of the arena. Power consumption requirements do not appear to be a major issue, since
the deployment scenarios allow the equipment to be either powered or recharged in a timely manner
due to the limited duration of the event.
One of the major issues in our scenario is, however, scalability [21]. Both capturing and viewing
equipment are deployed at high density, and the actual numbers will depend on the complexity
of the scene e.g., the size of population as well as the numbers of cameras/sensors in order to
acquire/transmit all aspects of the match. At the same time, recent academic activity demonstrates
that the actual user density within the stadium scenario is 200,000 users/km2 on average [70]. In this
work, we solve the scalability challenge by applying a solution from the field of information security,
which allows for dynamic and secure content delivery. The proposed technique is discussed in the
latter part of this manuscript.
The following subsection overviews the potential solutions that satisfy the requirements of the
mass content delivery scenario.
4.2. Candidate Connectivity Solutions
Today, communications technology researchers and vendors are competing to fulfill the
requirements of efficiency, flexibility, and simplicity of coexistence [71]. This subsection briefly surveys
a number of widely adopted wireless protocols that are suitable for the utilization in cases of a highly
dense environment.
We first focus on the market-available solutions that satisfy the above listed requirements.
The most adopted and widespread technology is represented by Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 protocols, or WiFi. As a prominent example, IEEE 802.11ac-based devices are
offering high data rates acceptable for the AR connectivity of today. A conventional WiFi medium
access protocol (MAC) was designed to efficiently support up to around 25 nodes communicating
their bursty content simultaneously, due to its characteristic operation based on the random channel
access i.e., the binary exponential backoff (BEB) protocol. Ultimately, it can offer up to 90% of spectral
efficiency for as many as 5–10 devices [72]. In the scope of this research, conventional operation of WiFi
does not fulfill the requirement of a high number of nodes from the efficiency or from the interference
points of view [73].
Since we focus primarily on the AR/VR as a demanding wearable-based application, one
of the key performance requirements is to provide at least tens of Mbps per client. Hence,
Bluetooth (up to 20 Mbps, 15 m, and 8 clients per host) and WiFi technologies (up to 400 Mbps
for IEEE 802.11ac, 50 m, and 15 clients per host), which are currently deployed on most consumer
devices, need to scale by several orders of magnitude. As one of the possible market-ready
options, a solution by Wireless Gigabit Alliance (WiGig) may be utilized to employ the specifics
of millimeter-wave (mmWave) communications [74].
Practically, conventional radio technologies that serve up to 25 demanding devices have a
considerable probability of receiving low quality of service (QoS) levels, while doubling this number
may degrade the performance altogether. The reasoning behind this is that WiFi has been designed for
private indoor use, where the number of served users per access point varies below 10. Any increase
in this number would dramatically impact the collision probability. However, the standards do not
specify the exact BEB parameters and such a setup is left entirely at the discretion of vendors, which
may cause faulty operation of the devices. Similar situations could be observed for the upcoming
generation of short-range wireless technologies [75].
The second group of connectivity solutions considered here can be referred to as “the next
generation”. Today, a large portion of wireless research and development is targeting the use of
extremely high frequency bands in the range of 60 GHz. A brief overview of such technologies
is given below.
The first considered solution was presented in 2008 and named Wireless HD [76]. Its target
utilization is in home theaters and media centers. The main feature brought along by this standard is
the use of both random and scheduled channel access, where one controller has a complete picture of
the served nodes in its coverage. The main issue here is the lack of knowledge between the neighboring
networks, which brings challenges of uncontrollable interference and hidden node problems [77] that
primarily affect scheduled transmissions.
The second step made by the wireless industry is IEEE 802.11ad standard, widely known as
WiGig [78]. Themain requirement here is to enable the throughputs of at least 1 Gbps on top of theMAC
layer. It offers a number of flexible protocol solutions, especially for low-cost devices. The scheduling
is implemented similarly to that in Wireless HD, thus bringing along the same interference and
management issues–the number of possible networks that may coexist in space and time is four.
Another solution is ECMA 387 [79], which provides mobility support by dynamically resolving the
cross-cloud collisions with a novel approach: soft channel switch and coordination. Basically, whenever
a collision is detected, the communication channel is switched, hence reducing the subsequent collision
probability. If there are no free channels left to utilize, the beaconing time is reassigned by keeping
the networks operational, so that the beacons of neighboring clusters would be transmitted one after
another. Unfortunately, there are no vendors supporting this standard as of today.
Summarizing, we can conclude that the best practical option to be utilized today is WiGig
technology due to its desirable properties and market support. The general challenge here is radio
propagation due to the inability of 60 GHz wireless signals to penetrate almost any material at such
high frequencies. On the other hand, this construction allows to assume that the receivers are mounted
as part of the AR/VR heads-on devices [80] and thus the line-of-sight communication is delivered.
An inherent feature of the 60-GHz solution is to adopt beam-forming that increases e.g., the levels of
security while delivering the user-specific content at high rates. Further in Section 5, we compare the
results of its utilization with the conventional IEEE 802.11n and .11ac operation.
4.3. Scenario Details and Simulation Description
To study wireless propagation in our characteristic scenario, we consider a 3D stadium grid
presented in Figure 3a. A large number of receiving nodes (RXs) are located on the tribunes according to
the mass user positions. This considered layout is common for any large sports event [81]. In this work,
we first assess the conventional WiFi-like solutions provided, for example, by Cisco and then extend
the evaluation to embrace the next-generation mmWave technology. The geometrical parameters of
the scenario in question are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1. Geometrical properties of the scenario.
Parameter Value
Overall scenario size 200 m ⇥ 160 m
Scenario height 40 m
Ice ring size 61 m ⇥ 37 m
Number of receivers 515
Number of transmitters 1–3
The site-specific deterministic Ray-Launcher (RL) tool was utilized in this work, which models the
multi-path propagation of a wavefront within the wireless medium [82]. This principle is implemented
in the geometrical engine of the RL tool, which is based on the ray-casting methods, where the
continuous wavefront is replaced with the discrete one. Multiple 3D rays (or beams) outgoing from
the transmitting (TX) node propagate to the RX through the line-of-sight links and on the reflected
paths. At the same time, the physical engine of the RL tool is based on the geometrical optics (GO) and
the uniform theory of diffraction (UTD) techniques [83].
In this work, we concentrate on a first-order evaluation and thus disregard the relatively small
objects due to several reasons. First, simulation of a highly detailed scenario requires powerful
computing resources and significant computation time. Second, diffuse scattering produced by the
objects that are electrically small with respect to the wavelength does not offer a considerable impact in
terms of power. Based on that, only bulky and electrically large objects feature in our 3D reconstruction
of the stadium, which are presented in Figure 3. Here, Figure 3a is an original model with the high
level of details, while Figure 3b is a preprocessed and simplified model acceptable for the purposes of
our intended evaluation. The 3D simplification utilized in our work is to reduce the number of vertices
on a mesh by lowering the maximum angle to 15 .
Further, the RXs are carefully positioned to cover the entire area of interest. As the RXs are located
around the hockey arena, an empirical consideration to place the TX below the tableau was applied.
We then assumed that the TX and the wearable devices (i.e., RXs) of the spectators are vertically
polarized, that is, the polarization mismatch is insufficient. To avoid additional complexity at the
MAC-layer, an isotropic radiator was selected as the reference antenna design for both the TX and
RX, which has a uniform gain in the spherical coordinate system. Thereby, each RX observes the
signal combined by summing up different rays that propagate on the various paths and with different
power levels.
In this paper, we study three representative broadcast scenarios: (1) one TX placed in the middle
of the stadium below the tableau; (2) two TXs on the opposite sides of the stadium; and (3) a combined
scenario with all three TXs, whereas the locations are marked in Figure 3a.
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Figure 3. Model utilized for calculation.
4.4. Key Performance Metrics
In this study, we evaluate to what extent the utilization of different wireless technologies could
support the broadcast data delivery during a mass event (e.g., a hockey match). More specifically,
we focus on the coverage optimization target [84]; hence, our mainmetric of interest is the path loss (PL).
It can be obtained as follows:
PL = PTX   PRX , (1)
where PTX is the radiated power from the TX and PRX is the total received power at the RX.
In this work, each of the RXs collects its own portion of power after multi-path radio propagation.
Taking into account the carrier frequency, which leads to the corresponding attenuation per distance,
each PRX must be different at 2.4 GHz, 5 GHz, and 60 GHz.
5. Selected Numerical Results
Evaluating the most widely utilized radio technologies that operate in unlicensed spectrum
(IEEE 802.11n at 2.4 GHz and IEEE 802.11ac at 5 GHz bands), we also address the benefits brought
along by the potential use of mmWave communications technology (IEEE 802.11ad or WiGig at
60 GHz). We emphasize that both the RXs and TXs have zero antenna gains. The calculation error at
the RX side is within the  3dB range, while the calculation time for our model with 8000 faces takes
approximately 4 h with 1 GB RAM. The resulting PL maps are collected in Figure 4.
In order to validate our simulation results, we also compared these with the free-space PL model
at each frequency:
FSPL = 20log10(d) + 20log10( f ) + 20log10
✓
4p
c
◆
  Gt   Gr, (2)
where d is the average distance from the TX to RX, f is the frequency, c is the speed of light, and
Gt, Gr are the RX and TX gains that are set to 0, respectively. All of the simulation data fell within
the acceptable bounds of +/  5% compared to the analytical results across the three scenarios of
interest. Reporting on the results of our evaluation in Figure 4, we provide the average theoretical
Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) values for all the scenarios: (a) for 2.4 GHz this is 72.0854 dB; (b) for 5 GHz
this is 78.4606 dB; and (c) for 60 GHz this is 100.0442 dB. It could be observed in the color map of the
plots that the theoretical values fit well within the bounds of the simulated results. The main thinking
behind the utilization of the RL techniques for our study is the fact that the pseudo-random paths
of rays would provide similar picture independently of the frequency. However, the received power
figure should vary based on the TX, as can be seen in the plots, for example, by considering a set of
Figure 4a. This allows us to utilize our custom framework for the analysis of different scenarios by
consuming less time and fewer computation resources.
Importantly, from the information security perspective, these obtained results offer useful
functionality by aiming to avoid a number of threats. We further list some of the applications to
be considered during the mass event at the network planning phase:
• The PL map allows for predicting the levels of transmit power required for the path-based
denial-of-service attacks, such as jamming [85]. By doing so, the detection of potential malicious
activity becomes more straightforward.
• The users with the lowest RX power are also vulnerable to the distributed denial-of-service attack.
The PL value allows for deriving a lower bound on the throughput, which can compromise such
(edge) nodes [86].
• Even though general mobility levels in this mass system are considered to remain low, the PL
map allows for addressing the moments of a possible handover between the access points, thus
outlining the risk zone of rogue access points [87].
Figure 4. Receiving node (RX) path loss for the selected technologies: (1) Transmitting node (TX) placed
in the middle; (2) Two TXs on the opposite sides; (3) Three TXs: one in the middle, and two on the
opposite sides.
In summary, the utilized RL technique may be employed at the network planning phase, thus
allowing for not only solving the conventional scenario-related connectivity challenges but also
understanding the security issues pertaining to it.
6. Authentication Methods for Massive Content Delivery
In the previous section, we modeled the broadcast system operation suitable for content delivery
at a mass event of a hockey match e.g., when the spectators are willing to access information encoded
as the broadcast data stream. Typically, users attending such an event segregate not only based on the
teams that they follow, but also subject to the ticket price, which directly transforms into the event
observation quality, that is, better experience at higher price. Based on this fact, we further propose an
authentication mechanism that may be utilized to offer the next-generation services that incorporate
the AR/VR content delivery based on the subscription, which could be resolved with a dynamic
authentication mechanism.
Generally, authentication protocols may be classified into three main groups [88]: (1) based on
symmetric cryptosystems; (2) based on asymmetric cryptosystems; and (3) hybrid. The majority of
those utilize hash functions as their basis, thus allowing to combine the secret information “shares”
into one specific secret key. As the most trivial and well-known example, we may recall the exclusive
disjunction (XOR) function that makes it possible to group a set of identifiers IDi:
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ID = ID1   ID2   · · ·  IDn. (3)
The possible utilization of the public key infrastructure (PKI) is an example of applying the
asymmetric cryptosystems [89]. It allows for implementation of flexible authentication frameworks
suitable for serving higher numbers of active users with a variety of access control mechanisms
and features.
For our target scenario, the first requirement of the appropriate authentication protocol is to
consider a set of simultaneously available secret shares i.e., unique identifiers that depend on the seat
number, ticket number, etc. The second important requirement is the association of the secret/public
keys with each specific content-consuming user that could thus be verified. The simultaneous provision
of the set of required shares within a specified time interval is a solution to prevent reuse of the same
identifiers by different users. One of the well-known solutions that enables such a functionality is the
hybrid Yoking–Proof protocol [90,91]. Our proposed example is given in what follows.
6.1. Proposed Authentication Method for the Mass Event
We propose an adequate technological solution based on the stadium equipment availability:
(1) both seats and tickets are supplied with the radio-frequency identification (RFID) tags [92]; (2) the
spectator has a smartphone equipped with the near field communication (NFC) technology. The
required identification data are obtained based on the simultaneous verification of both the ticket and
the seat by utilizing the broadband access deployed at the stadium.
In order to provide with the needed functionality, the following requirements are to be satisfied:
(1) each seat is numbered (equipped with a one-time sticker containing its unique identifier), all of
the tickets have the corresponding unique identifier; and (2) each spectator has a smartphone. In this
simple setup, the authentication code may be delivered through a trusted cellular network via the
SMS code.
By doing so, the company responsible for the event in question has an opportunity to obtain the
following information from each attendee: (1) the seat identifier (ID(s)k); (2) the main ticket identifier
(ID(t)i); and (3) an additional subscription identifier (ID(a)j). The level of service (Si) provided to
the ith user could thus be estimated based on the received information. The system would need to
provide a unique result of the hashing function:
h = H(ID(s)k||ID(t)i||ID(a)j||...||ID(a)m||Ac), (4)
where k, i, j are the counters for different components, m is the maximum value for the counter j,
and Ac is the authentication code. The result is further signed with the unique user’s (IDi) secret
key (SKi) as:
sv = sign(hz, SKi), (5)
where h is obtained by the Equation (4) corresponding to zth result of the function, and SKi is a unique
user’s secret key.
Therefore, each vth subscription level acquires the corresponding unique pair of the secret SKi
and the public PKi keys. Hence, each user has an anonymized (from the third-party perspective) ticket,
ti = (i||hz||sv), (6)
where hz is produced by the Equation (4) and sv is given by the Equation (5).
Based on the above, each ticket is composed of a unique sequence including the specific seat, the
level of service provided, and the signature that allows to validate the previous fields based on the
public key stored in the service provider cloud. The event-organizing company is assumed to act as a
trusted certificate authority. In our scenario, there may be two cases of interest:
• The organizer provides its services to the customers in an anonymized way. To achieve anonymity
in relation to the service provider (stadium administration), the following addition to the
authentication protocol could be utilized:
– Conventional PKI authentication and integrity protocols need to be replaced with ID-based
formulations [93,94];
– Certificate authority in the modified scheme is represented by the private key generator (PKG);
– The secret key SKi is not directly “connected” to a unique user IDi, but rather links with the
ticket number and/or the seat number, and the event parameters (name, date, time, etc.). The
SKi is to be obtained by the PKG with the use of any ID-based key generation protocol.
• At the signature verification stage sv, the event-organizing company requires only the ticket
number and the event parameters. Therefore, it is not necessary for a user to provide any personal
information (for realizing the verification procedure) directly to the event organizers. However,
the authority may still obtain these data if necessary.
• In cases of, for example, Public Protection and Disaster Relief (PPDR) [95] or mass riots during the
event, the administration has an opportunity to acquire the data on each user and forward it to
the dedicated security units.
6.2. Framework Security Analysis
The main challenge behind the proposed solution lies in the very structure of the Yoking–Proof
protocol and is related to the timeouts [96]. Generally, during simultaneous verification, the main
device utilizes a preset timer to enable the said check. This is mainly due to the inability of scanning
two or more sources at the exact same time. Therefore, a threshold value is defined and an attack could
be executed if it provides, for example, a too-long validation interval not related to the actual source
reading times.
Further, we briefly elaborate on the security analysis of the proposed solution. In our framework,
security is based on the RSA assumptions, similarly to [97]. It utilizes primitive arithmetic operations
at the user equipment (UE) side, such as the Add function, XOR operation, random number generator,
and hash function. Therefore, the container data can be XOR-ed with the random values to prevent
private data leakage.
Tag anonymity in the proposed solution is not considered by this work, since the tags
are distributed across a publicly available area and thus could be temporarily accessed by an
eavesdropping user. The IDs are accessible in plaintext and each of them is associated with the
corresponding secret key on the owner’s side to perform meaningful computation. Note that the
plain IDs can be eavesdropped but the security robustness of the meaningful data in the transmitted
messages will not be compromised, and thus confidentiality can be guaranteed [98].
Another important issue to solve for the Yoking–Proof protocol is a replay attack [99]. At the
stage of querying the smartphone tags, each of them responds with its corresponding message.
An attacker can eavesdrop on the transmitted information over an insecure channel and store the
messages locally. Next, the attacker may utilize the intercepted messages to complete the reader’s
authentication. One of the solutions to overcome this threat is to utilize timestamps [100] and/or
pseudo-random numbers [101] along with every communicated message, in exchange for additional
space and connectivity requirements. Generally, this makes the replay attack more cumbersome for
the attackers.
Another attack to be considered is the so-called counterfeit-proof attack [102]. Similarly to the
method used against the replay attack, a timeout mechanism may be utilized to ensure that all of the
proof-involved tags coexist for a specific and limited time period.
Finally, the notorious person-in-the-middle attack may also take place [103]. Here, an attacker
can eavesdrop on the messages transmitted between the tag and the smartphone, and then modify
the information to counterfeit a legitimate role. This challenge is solved by utilizing secure cellular
assistance mechanisms by means of an extra SMS verification code, which solves most of the pressing
authentication issues. To this end, the operation of our proposed protocol primarily relies on the
assumption of a secure cellular channel. Since security-centric analysis is not the main goal of this
paper, the proposed protocol may require a deeper evaluation and testing in field scenarios.
7. Conclusions
Today, the rapidly expanding deployments of wearable technology as well as the rise of smart
cities are underpinning new opportunities for wearable paradigm adoption. While there have been
multiple attempts to deploy different IoT systems, our understanding of those and the corresponding
implications in the context of safety and security have only scratched the surface, especially in
wearable scenarios.
Particularly, we surveyed wireless technologies suitable for wearable-equipped consumers with
the emphasis on the AR/VR applications as well as the corresponding security challenges in case
of a mass sports event (e.g., a hockey match). Then, we utilized our developed ray-based simulator
employing the ray-launching principles to study some of those technologies at various frequencies
to conclude that WiGig (a 60-GHz solution) is the most appropriate choice for the broadcast content
delivery in terms of its achieved path loss. We also elaborated on how the utilization of our study may
improve security within the target scenario at the network planning phase. The proposed tool could
be further utilized for both indoor and outdoor radio network planning.
Further, we also proposed an authentication technique based on the Yoking–Proof protocol
that allows for secure content dissemination in the presence of simultaneous access to multiple
unique identifiers, such as the ticket, seat, SMS, etc., therefore enabling a secure ecosystem within our
representative scenario of interest.
The ultimate goal of this work is not to answer all of the pressing questions, but rather to bring the
community’s attention to the challenges of mass wearable scenarios. The state-of-the-art in wearables is
just at the beginning of a long journey, but there is already a lot to consider before making the next step.
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Abstract
System design where cyber-physical applications are coordinated from the cloud
may simplify the development process. However, all private data is then pushed to
these remote ‘swamps’, and human users are losing the actual control as compared
to when the applications are executed directly on their devices. At the same time,
computing at the network edges is still lacking support for such straightforward multi-
device development, which is essential for a wide range of dynamic cyber-physical
services. In this work, we propose a novel programming model as well as contribute
an associated connectivity framework for leveraging coordinated device proximity as
an additional degree of freedom between the remote cloud and the network edge.
This article proposes a programming model and an associated secure-connectivity
framework for leveraging safe coordinated device proximity as an additional degree
of freedom between the remote cloud and the safety-critical network edge, especially
under uncertain environment constraints.
1 Motivation and Background
Today, the cloud has evolved into a ubiquitous solution for enterprises in their quest for
a unified digital platform. To this end, it represents a centralized infrastructure that has
become the control point to manage computing power, storage, processing, integration, and
decision-making assets for modern corporations. Boosting these processing and decision-
making capabilities even further, there is a need to oﬀer novel high-confidence technologies
that will have the capability to support billions of networked devices, as we are stepping
into the era of interconnected Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) [1].
The particularly challenging operation conditions of future CPSs are represented by the
areas of poor or unavailable Internet connectivity, which need to be handled to maintain
sustainability and enable faster decision-making based on localized data intelligence across
heterogeneous system components. These considerations are underpinning the recent trend
to transition from the centralized cloud platforms to the network edge, which is essentially
dispersing the cloud back to the origin – the end devices [2]. With advanced microservices,
containers, and APIs, it is increasingly feasible to execute these smaller, self-contained,
and purpose-driven services that specifically target certain dedicated functions required on
the edge.
The distinct computing paradigms, such as “cloud” (computation on a remote server),
“edge” (computation on end devices), and “fog” (computation at the local-area-network
level) computing, act similarly under conventional use cases but become fundamentally
diﬀerent when considering safety-critical CPSs that operate in dynamic and uncertain
conditions [3]. Examples include overtaking control of a moving vehicle and hacking an
industrial robot, where various vulnerabilities may be exploited to hijack remote access to
the capable factory equipment.
To mitigate these vulnerabilities, new systems and software engineering methods are 
required where networked machines can interact more freely, by forming connections ac-
cording to the actual demand and not because this is requested by the central managing 
entity. This calls for revisiting the ways of interaction between the devices and their 
operating environment, which becomes the target of this article. Its main contributions 
thus are the Action-Oriented Programming (AcOP) model and an associated framework 
that can dynamically adapt to the edge and the cloud according to particular environment 
and connectivity conditions. Further, AcOP is compared to mobile-app-based and cloud-
based CPS deployments. Finally, a framework to enable secure coalitions and dynamic 
management of collective executions is also outlined.
2 Sensing and Actuation Executions at the Network Edge
Billions of smart CPS devices at the network edge require proximity-based communica-
tion together with the cloud connectivity, but these two aspects have traditionally been
addressed in isolation [4]. At the same time, the lion’s share of the CPS interactions is
still about their users (e.g., the concept of quantified self [5]), and the human element is
tightly involved into the decision-making process. The capability to switch from the cloud
to the edge (or the app) dynamically, based on the operation conditions and user requests,
allows to control device behavior more eﬃciently. In what follows, we focus on advancing
software development eﬀorts so that the said activities are executed on the network edge
to boost the dynamic adaptation of a CPS to complex environmental constraints, while
still being mindful of human perception.
2.1 Action-Oriented Programming Model
The AcOP model’s roots are in the so-called Social Devices concept [6], and the original
idea is tailored here to the context of fog computing as driven by CPS evolution. The
new model is realized on top of the JavaScript programming language and includes the
following constructs.
Sensation – An input coming from the physical, cyber, or social world.
Instrumental to CPSs is observation of various events coming from the outer world, and
then acting upon these events. In AcOP, these observed events are named sensations. The
abstraction level of the sensations may vary, and in addition to observing physical world’s
phenomena, the processes in cyber and social worlds can be monitored as well. A concrete
example of a sensation is the changed sensor value, while a more abstract sensation is, e.g.,
when a friend is nearby, which combines data from diﬀerent worlds (Facebook friendship
and Bluetooth signal strength values).
Capability – Physical objects as programmable JavaScript objects.
In AcOP, physical objects and digital (micro)services constitute programmable JavaScript
objects. They are described with AcOP capabilities that define the ways in which a certain
machine can interact with other machines and humans. An example here is the talking
capability where the device is able to translate text into speech. The capabilities produce
abstract capability sensations, such as “temperature has changed” or “coﬀee is ready”, which
are derived from raw sensations. These help the developers define scheduling policies for
collective executions.
Action – Joint behavior of machines and humans.
In the heart of our model are actions that define joint operations across multiple devices
and people. Typically, an action is a modular unit that determines how a predefined set of
devices interact with each other over a certain period of time. The actions are defined with
JavaScript and comprise two parts, an enabling condition and a body, used for programming
the interactions by utilizing the AcOP capabilities as well as the basic programming logic.
The modularity of the actions helps in making them more generic so that they may be
exploited in many diﬀerent executions; similarly, the device capabilities may be employed
by many actions.
Collective Execution – Coalition of trusted entities that sense and act to-
wards a common goal.
In AcOP, a set of machines and humans form coalitions by engaging into trust nego-
tiations. These coalitions then collectively execute software where machines and humans
interact and cooperate. The key idea of the collective execution is detecting and maintain-
ing information about the sensations coming from the various worlds as well as from the
coalition participants. Then, collective execution attempts to schedule an action for a set
of devices, which are selected for their roles in this action based on their capabilities and
properties. In practice, collective execution works so that one device in a coalition at a
time assumes the role of a coordinator and then executes the code that is responsible for
scheduling the actions. At the same time in the background, all of the other devices in a
coalition contribute by exchanging information that is essential for that specific execution
via secure connections.
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Figure 1: AcOP model example operation in an emergency scenario.
2.2 Traﬃc Emergency Context: AcOP Operation at the Network Edge
As a characteristic use case, we study the scenario where contemporary vehicles can call
911 in emergency situations. Consider Fig. 1 depicting a traﬃc accident, in which the
car involved would immediately report to the traﬃc monitoring system. The vehicle or
the traﬃc system also communicates the supporting information – or a sensation – to a
set of executions. For instance, Fire Department’s execution may detect the accident and
schedule an action to leverage the car’s talking capability to poll passengers whether they are
unharmed as well as provide instructions. The execution can also schedule further actions,
e.g., command a drone to fly over and analyze if a fire has started, call an ambulance if an
injury was suspected [7], etc.
Clearly, similar functionality might be achieved with conventional mobile applications
and – to some extent – with cloud-based services. However, these alternative solutions
fall short of providing adequate security and functional safety guarantees. Furthermore,
they also require that the coalition forming capabilities are included into each enabled
application. Further pain points of the traditional approaches are summarized in Table 1.
3 Establishing Secure Communicating Coalitions
To liberate the programmers from considering coalition forming as part of the application
logic, an appropriate framework is required to enable operation of communicating periph-
erals, e.g., in case of a traﬃc accident described in the previous section. Certain known
approaches exist already, thus bringing attention to the challenge of sandboxed executions
in the emerging CPSs (e.g., FlowFence [10]). However, sandboxed collective executions of
the same piece of software on the network edge devices have not gained suﬃcient atten-
tion thus far.
Today, mobile devices may establish and utilize a direct link only if they have a reli-
able connection to the server that is responsible for the key and connection management,
or if they trigger the connection themselves. In the latter case, no security and safety
guarantees can be provided by the operator. To mitigate this limitation, the Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) is commonly used to enable secure and authenticated communication
when a connection to the centralized authority is not always available [11]. Without it,
many applications might become disabled if a single user leaves the network coverage. This
particularly occurs in cases of disaster and/or when a cellular connection is unreliable (the
network is overloaded) or unavailable (on a train, airplane, elevator, etc.).
To augment edge- and fog- computing technologies, we propose to employ a secure
communication framework that we developed in a series of trials within a live cellular net-
work [12]. Our system is built upon the advanced security protocols contributed by 3GPP
specifications. This novel framework applies the knowledge of distributed solutions to
enable secure communication as, e.g., in the discussed traﬃc emergency example. Accord-
ingly, execution in the devices of people in the emergency scene enables them to seamlessly
join and leave a coalition without disrupting collective execution.
The main operation phases of the considered approach are illustrated in Fig. 2. The
only procedure that requires stable connectivity to the cloud is the coalition initialization.
First, the involved mobile devices receive their certificates with the corresponding secret
and public keys. These are utilized to establish secure direct connectivity with each rele-
vant device. When a device is willing to create a secure coalition with its “neighbors”, a
request containing the public identifiers of the future coalition members is issued to the
corresponding server in the network.
A polling procedure is then triggered by the network to ensure that the subject devices
are actually willing to join this coalition. After the confirmations have been received, both
coalition certificate and coalition secret (based on the Lagrange polynomials technique) are
Table 1: Comparing mobile app (M) and cloud service based (C) approaches with our
AcOP model (A) for CPS development.
Detecting and handling contingencies
M
Easy to catch errors with try-catch notation. How to handle errors that occur in coordination or on other
devices?
C
Easy to catch errors that occur on the server side. Some contingencies on the device side can be sent to the
server side. Internet connectivity, however, is not available in emergency zones, air planes, or crowded
locations. How to manage errors in between cloud and devices?
A
Contingency handlers for remote and coordination related issues. Within the handler methods, developers
can define ways for recovering from unwanted behavior and, e.g., replace a disconnected device with
another one, or change the connectivity type. It is also possible to reschedule an action, or take a
completely diﬀerent action.
Detecting sensations
M
Easy to implement detection, e.g., when device location and/or orientation change (for instance, with the
use of delegate methods). How to detect state changes on other devices?
C Data coming from multiple devices and sensors can be streamed to the cloud services and processed there.How does this approach scale when there are thousands of devices streaming data continuously?
A
Collective execution is designed to be used for detecting when a state changes on a device that is
participating in the same execution. Then, for the task at hand, the sensations can be combined and
processed from as many sources as required.
Reacting to sensations
M
When a sensation has been detected, the device can be instructed to act upon this event. How to select
and command another device or a group of devices?
C
Cloud-based approaches are typically used for coordinating the CPS devices. The coordination, however,
relies on the Internet connectivity, and communication in latency-sensitive systems can easily become a
bottleneck. How to ensure coordination without adequate Internet connectivity?
A
After collective execution on the network edge, a device detects certain sensation(s) and attempts to
schedule an action. Actions are designed to serve as the output to the world, for commanding joint
operations between one or many devices when performing a certain task.
Distributing computation and cooperation
M
Particular tasks can be posted to be executed by the background cloud service. For instance, recent
serverless approaches (e.g., Google’s Cloud Functions, Azure Functions, and AWS Lambda) gained certain
popularity. While the developer is liberated from server management, the computation distribution still
takes place on the servers [8].
C The executions in cloud-based approaches can be either centralized or distributed when executed byseveral services and machines [9]. How to harness other (nearby) devices to perform computation?
A
Collective executions and actions can run on any of the edge devices capable of handling JavaScript. It is
natural to motivate such distribution: privacy and security of content and data to be utilized on a specific
device.
Deployability of cooperation
M Mobile apps are deployed onto the devices via application stores. How to deploy cooperation?
C Tasks can be deployed onto cloud services, where the devices are instructed to cooperate. How to deploy acertain well-defined task to be executed by particular devices?
A AcOP components for executing certain tasks can be downloaded/installed from a repository in advance,or dynamically acquired at runtime whenever needed.
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delivered. After these steps, secure direct interaction may continue over any conventional
network protocols. The members of an existing coalition have the possibility to invite
new devices as well as remove the existing ones based on the flexible voting system, i.e.,
when k out ofM devices in the coalition agree on a particular decision (runs automatically
for machines and can be manual for humans). This allows the coalition to be updated
dynamically to manage collective executions in various scenarios. For example, predefined
“hidden” coalitions may be utilized in cases of disaster, thus enabling operational stability.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
Edge computing is increasingly demanded due to the CPS requirements for increased scal-
ability and functional safety – if the entities are coordinated from the cloud, a risk remains
that without reliable Internet connectivity the functional safety cannot be guaranteed. In
cooperation at the network edges, devices need to be able to trust each other, thus calling
for dynamic coalitions with secure and trusted topology. This, in its turn, improves func-
tional safety since trusted entities can cooperate and act as back-up options for one another
in various CPS applications (see Fig. 3): if one device fails, others are there to stand in.
In order to achieve this, we proposed the AcOP model and the associated framework that
can dynamically adapt to the cloud, the fog, and the edge.
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Abstract: Today, digitalization decisively penetrates all the sides of the modern society. One of
the key enablers to maintain this process secure is authentication. It covers many different
areas of a hyper-connected world, including online payments, communications, access right
management, etc. This work sheds light on the evolution of authentication systems towards
Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) starting from Single-Factor Authentication (SFA) and through
Two-Factor Authentication (2FA). Particularly, MFA is expected to be utilized for human-to-everything
interactions by enabling fast, user-friendly, and reliable authentication when accessing a service.
This paper surveys the already available and emerging sensors (factor providers) that allow for
authenticating a user with the system directly or by involving the cloud. The corresponding challenges
from the user as well as the service provider perspective are also reviewed. The MFA system based
on reversed Lagrange polynomial within Shamir’s Secret Sharing (SSS) scheme is further proposed to
enable more flexible authentication. This solution covers the cases of authenticating the user even
if some of the factors are mismatched or absent. Our framework allows for qualifying the missing
factors by authenticating the user without disclosing sensitive biometric data to the verification entity.
Finally, a vision of the future trends in MFA is discussed.
Keywords: survey; authentication; SFA; 2FA; MFA; evolution; vision
1. Introduction
The continuous growth in the numbers of smart devices and related connectivity loads has
impacted mobile services seamlessly offered anywhere around the globe [1]. In such connected world,
the enabler keeping the transmitted data secure is, in the first place, authentication [2–4].
According to the fundamental work in [5], authentication is a process where a “user identifies
himself by sending x to the system; the system authenticates his identity by computing F(x) and
checking that it equals the stored value y”. This definition has not changed significantly over time
despite the fact that a simple password is no longer the only factor for validating the user from the
information technology perspective [6].
Authentication remains a fundamental safeguard against illegitimate access to the device or any
other sensitive application, whether offline or online [7–9] (see Figure 1). Back in time, the transactions
were authenticated primarily by physical presence, i.e., for example, by applying the wax seal [10].
Closer to present days and with the advancement of our civilization, it was realized that the validation
based on the sender identification only is not always adequate on the global scale [11].
******
Login
******
Password
Ownership
Access card with photo
Knowledge
User name and password
Biometrics
Iris recognition
Figure 1. Conceptual authentication examples.
Initially, only one factor was utilized to authenticate the subject. By that time, Single-Factor
Authentication (SFA) was mostly adopted by the community due to its simplicity and user
friendliness [12,13]. As an example, the use of a password (or a PIN) to confirm the ownership
of the user ID could be considered. Apparently, this is the weakest level of authentication [14,15].
By sharing the password, one can compromise the account immediately. Moreover, an unauthorized
user can also attempt to gain access by utilizing the dictionary attack [16], rainbow table [17], or social
engineering techniques [18]. Commonly, the minimum password complexity requirement is to be
considered while utilizing this type of authentication [19].
Further, it was realized that authentication with just a single factor is not reliable to provide
adequate protection due to a number of security threats [20]. As an intuitive step forward, Two-Factor
Authentication (2FA) [21–23] was proposed that couples the representative data (username/password
combination) with the factor of personal ownership, such as a smartcard or a phone [24,25].
Today, three types of factor groups are available to connect an individual with the
established credentials [26]:
1. Knowledge factor—something the user knows, such as a password or, simply, a “secret”;
2. Ownership factor—something the user has, such as cards, smartphones, or other tokens;
3. Biometric factor—something the user is, i.e., biometric data or behavior pattern.
Subsequently, Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) was proposed to provide a higher level of
safety and facilitate continuous protection of computing devices as well as other critical services from
unauthorized access by using more than two categories of credentials [27–29]. For the most part, MFA
is based on biometrics, which is automated recognition of individuals based on their behavioral [30,31]
and biological characteristics [32]. This step offered an improved level of security as the users were
required to present the evidence of their identity, which relies on two or more different factors [33].
The discussed evolution of authentication methods is shown in Figure 2.
Single-factor authen�ca�on
Knowledge factor:
PIN, password,
security ques�ons
****
Two-factor authen�ca�on
Ownership factor:
Smartphone, key-card,
one-�me password
Mul�-factor authen�ca�on
Biometric factor:
Fingerprint, face recogni�on,
behavior recogni�on
Figure 2. Evolution of authentication methods from SFA to MFA.
Today, MFA is expected to be utilized in scenarios where safety requirements are higher than
usual [34,35]. According to SC Media UK, 68 percent of Europeans are willing to use biometric
authentication for payments [36]. Consider the daily routine of ATM cash withdrawal [37,38]. Here,
the user has to provide a physical token (a card) representing the ownership factor and support
it with a PIN code representing the knowledge factor to be able to access a personal account and
withdraw money.
This system could be easily made more complex by adding the second channel like, for example,
a one-time password to be entered after both the card and the user password were presented [39,40].
In a more interesting scenario, it could be done with the facial recognition methods [41,42]. Moreover,
a recent survey discovered that 30 percent of enterprises planned to implement the MFA solution in
2017, with 51 percent claiming that they already utilize MFA, and 38 percent saying that they utilize it
in “some areas” of operation [43]. This evidence supports the MFA as an extremely promising direction
of the authentication evolution.
As one of the interesting future trends, authentication between a vehicle and its owner or a
temporary user may be considered. Based on the statistics [44], a vehicle is stolen every 45 s in the U.S.
The current authentication method that allows for starting and using the vehicle is still an immobilizer
key [45,46]. The MFA may significantly improve access to most of the electronic devices from both
security and user experience perspectives [47,48].
Generally, MFA applications could be divided into three market-related groups: (i) commercial
applications [49,50], i.e., account login, e-commerce, ATM, physical access control, etc.; (ii) governmental
applications [51,52], i.e., identity documents, government ID, passport, driver’s license, social security,
border control, etc.; and (iii) forensic applications [53,54], i.e., criminal investigation, missing children,
corpse identification, etc. Generally, the number of scenarios related to authentication is indeed large.
Today, MFA becomes an extremely critical factor for:
• Validating the identity of the user and the electronic device (or its system) [55,56];
• Validating the infrastructure connection [57];
• Validating the interconnected IoT devices, such as a smartphone, tablet, wearable device, or any
other digital token (key dongle) [58].
Presently, one of the main MFA challenges is the absence of correlation between the user identity
and the identities of smart sensors within the electronic device/system [59]. Regarding security,
this relationship must be established so that only the legitimate operator, e.g., the one whose identity is
authenticated in advance, can gain the access rights [60,61]. At the same time, the MFA process should
be as user-friendly as possible, for example:
1. Customers first register and authenticate with the service provider to activate and manage
services they are willing to access;
2. Once accessing the service, the user is required to pass a simple SFA with the fingerprint/token
signed in advance by the service provider;
3. Once initially accepted by the system, the customer authenticates by logging in with the
same username and password as setup previously in the customer portal (or social login).
For additional security, the managing platform can enable secondary authentication factors.
Once the user has successfully passed all the tests, the framework automatically authenticates to
the service platform;
4. The secondary authentication occurs automatically based on the biometric MFA, so the user
would be requested to enter an additional code or provide a token password only in case the
MFA fails.
Biometrics indeed significantly contribute to the MFA scheme and can dramatically improve
identity proofing by pairing the knowledge factor with the multimodal biometric factors [62,63],
thus making it much more difficult for a criminal to eavesdrop on a system while pretending to be
another person. However, the utilization of biological factors has its challenges mainly related to the
ease of use [64], which largely impacts the MFA system usability.
From the user experience perspective, fingerprint scanner already provides the most widely
integrated biometric interface. This is mainly due to its adoption by smartphone vendors on the
market [65]. On the other hand, it is not recommended to be utilized as a standalone authentication
method [66]. However, the use of any biometrics often requires a set of separate sensing devices.
The utilization of already integrated ones allows for reducing the authentication system costs and
facilitate the adoption by end users. A fundamental trade-off between usability and security is one of
the critical drivers when considering the authentication systems of today [67].
Another challenge is that the use of biometrics relies on a binary decision mechanism [68].
This was well studied over past decades in classical statistical decision theory from the authentication
perspective [69,70]. There are various possible solutions to control a slight mismatch of the actual
“measured” biometrics and the data stored in previously captured samples. The two widely utilized
techniques are: false accept rate (FAR) [71] and false reject rate (FRR) [72]. Manipulations with the
decision criteria allow adjusting the authentication framework based on the predefined cost, risks,
and benefits. The MFA operation is highly dependent on FAR and FRR, since obtaining zero values for
both of the metrics is almost infeasible. The evaluation of more than one biometric feature to establish
the identity of an individual can improve the operation of the MFA system dramatically [73].
Since the currently available literature faces a lack of detailed MFA analysis suitable for
non-specialists in the field, the main contributions of this work are as follows:
1. This work provides a detailed analysis of factors that are presently utilized for MFA with their
corresponding operational requirements. Potential sensors to be utilized are surveyed based on
the academic and industrial sources (Section 2);
2. The survey is followed by the challenges related to MFA adoption from both the user experience
and the technological perspectives (Section 3);
3. Further, the framework based on the reversed Lagrange polynomial is proposed to allow for
utilizing MFA in cases where some of the factors are missing (Section 4). A discussion on the
potential evaluation methodology is also provided;
4. Finally, the vision of the future of MFA is discussed (Section 5).
2. State-of-the-Art and Potential MFA Sources
Presently, the authentication systems already utilize an enormous number of sensors that enable
identification of a user. In this section, we elaborate on the MFA-suitable factors, corresponding
market-available sensors, and related challenges. Furthermore, we provide additional details on the
ones that are to be potentially deployed in the near future.
2.1. Widely Deployed MFA Sensors/Sources
Today, identification and authentication for accessing sensitive data are one of the primary use
cases for MFA. We further list the factors already available for the MFA utilization without acquiring
additional specialized equipment.
2.1.1. Password Protection
The conventional way to authenticate a user is to request a PIN code, password, etc. [74]. The secret
pass-phrase traditionally represents a knowledge factor. It requires only a simple input device (at least
one button) to authenticate the user.
2.1.2. Token Presence
The password could then be supplemented with a physical token—for example, a card, which is
recommended as a second factor group—the ownership [75,76]. From the hardware perspective, a user
may present a smartcard, phone, wearable device, etc., which are more complicated to delegate [77].
In this case, the system should be equippedwith a radio interface allowing for two-way communication
with the token [78,79]. On the other hand, the most widely known software token is one-time software
generated password [80]. The main drawback of the above is the problem of uncontrollable duplication.
2.1.3. Voice Biometrics
Most of the contemporary smart electronic devices are equipped with a microphone that allows
utilizing voice recognition as a factor for MFA [81,82]. At the same time, the technology advancement
of tomorrow may allow special agencies not only to recognize the speakers but also to mimic their
voices including the intonation, timbre, etc., which is a serious drawback of utilizing voice as a primary
authentication method [83,84].
2.1.4. Facial Recognition
As the next step, facial recognition could be considered. At the beginning of its development,
the technology was based on the landmark picture analysis, which was relatively simple to replicate
by supplying the system with a photo [85]. The next phase was by enabling three-dimensional face
recognition, i.e., by asking the user to move head during the authentication process in a specific
manner [86,87]. Finally, the advancement of this system reached the point of recognizing the actual
expressions of the user [88]. To enable facial recognition, it is required to equip the system with at least
one output device and a camera [89].
2.1.5. Ocular-Based Methodology
The iris recognition techniques are on the market for more than 20 years [90]. This approach
does not require the user to be close to the capture device while analyzing the color pattern of the
human eye [91]. Retina analysis is another attractive technique [92]. Here, a thin tissue composed of
neural cells that are located in the posterior portion of the eye is captured and analyzed. Because of the
complex structure of the capillaries that supply the retina with blood, each person’s retina is unique.
The most prominent challenges in those methods are the need for high quality capture device and
robust mathematical technique to analyze the image [93].
2.1.6. Hand Geometry
Some systems employ the analysis of the physical shape of a hand to authenticate the user.
Initially, pegs were utilized to validate the subject, but the usability of such methods was low [94].
Further on, the flatbed scanner was used to obtain the image without the need to fix the user’s hand
in one specific position [95]. Today, some systems utilize conventional cameras not requiring close
contact with the capture surface. This approach is, however, not very robust to the environment [96].
Some vendors apply so-called photoplethysmography (PPG) to determine whether a wearable device
(e.g., a smartwatch) is currently on its user’s wrist or not [97,98]. The process is similar to the one
followed when measuring heart rate [99].
2.1.7. Vein Recognition
The advances in fingerprint scanners offer an opportunity to collect the vein picture of the
finger as well [100]. More complicated devices utilize palm print recognition to acquire and store the
shape/movement of the entire hand [101,102]. At the current stage of development, vein biometrics
are still vulnerable to spoofing attacks [103,104].
2.1.8. Fingerprint Scanner
Utilizing fingerprint scanner as the primary authentication mechanism is currently being pushed
by the majority of smartphone/personal computer vendors [105]. This solution is intuitive to use but
remains extremely simple to fabricate—mainly due to the fact that our fingerprints could be obtained
from almost anything we touch [106,107]. The integration potential of this method is indeed high [108],
even though it is also not recommended to be used as a standalone authentication approach. Most of
the smartphone vendors install an additional camera to obtain the fingerprint instead of more safe
vein recognition.
2.1.9. Thermal Image Recognition
Similarly to vein recognition, thermal sensor is utilized to reconstruct the unique thermal image
of one’s body blood flow in proximity [109,110]. Many challenges with this authentication method
may arise due to the user conditions: sickness or emotion may significantly influence the perceived
figures [111].
2.1.10. Geographical Location
Utilizing the device’s and user’s geographical location to validate whether access to the
device/service could be granted is a special case of location-based authentication [112,113].
Importantly, GPS signal could be easily jammed or considered faulty due to the propagation properties;
thus, it is recommended to utilize at least two location sources, for example, GPS and wireless network
cell ID [114]. A smartphone could be used to support MFA from the location acquisition perspective.
2.2. Future of MFA Integration
Accelerated adoption across many industries as well as increased availability of biometric services
in a wide range of readily-available consumer products is pushing the concept of tight MFA integration.
Currently, researchers and early technology adopters attempt to integrate new sensors to be utilized in
MFA systems.
2.2.1. Behavior Detection
Back in time, behavior recognition was utilized to analyze military telegraph operator’s typing
rhythm to track the movement of the troops [115]. Today, gestures for authentication purposes
may range from conventional to “hard-to-mimic” ones, since motor-programmed skill results in the
movement being organized before the actual execution [116].
Amodern example of such identification is the process of tapping the smartphone screen [117,118].
This approach could be easily combined with any text-input authentication methods as a typing pattern
is unique for each person [119–121]. In case the MFA system is specifically developed for predefined
gesture analysis [122], the user is required to replicate a previously learned movement while holding
or wearing the sensing device [123–125].
A natural step of authentication for widely used handheld and wearable devices is the utilization
of accelerometer fingerprinting [126,127]. For instance, each smartphone holder could be verified
based on the gait pattern by continuously monitoring the accelerometer data that is almost impossible
to fake by another individual [128].
For in-vehicle authentication, the integral system is expected to monitor the driver-specific
features [129,130], which could be analyzed from two perspectives: (i) vehicle-specific behavior:
steering angle sensor, speed sensor, brake pressure sensor, etc. [131,132]; and (ii) human factors: music
played, calls made, presence of people in the car, etc. [133]. Another important blocker-factor is alcohol
sensor. The engine start function could be blocked in case when the level of alcohol in the cabin is
above an acceptable legal limit [134].
2.2.2. Beam-Forming Techniques
From the telecommunication perspective, Radio-frequency Identification (RFID) and Near-Field
Communication (NFC) techniques have already observed widespread adoption and acceptance
within the community [135]. Recent trends in physical-layer security claim that utilizing wireless
Multiple-Input and Multiple-Output (MIMO) solutions to locate the source of the signal may become
a significant breakthrough in validating the token on the user body [136–138].
2.2.3. Occupant Classification Systems (OCS)
Some vehicular systems already have the OCS solutions integrated in consumer cars [139].
A system of sensors can detect who is currently in the passenger/driver seat by utilizing, for example,
weight or posture and automatically adjusting the vehicle to personal needs [140–142].
2.2.4. Electrocardiographic (ECG) Recognition
ECG data could be collected from the user’s smart watch or activity tracker and compared with
an individually stored pattern [143,144]. The main benefit of using this factor for authentication is that
ECG signals emerge as a potential biometric modality with the advantage of being difficult (or close to
impossible) to mimic. The only way is by utilizing the existing personal recording [145].
2.2.5. Electroencephalographic (EEG) Recognition
This solution is based on the brain waves analysis and could be considered from the fundamental
philosophical proposition “Cogito ergo sum” by R. Descartes, or “I think, therefore I am” [146].
It allows for obtaining a unique sample of the person’s brain activity pattern [147]. Formerly, EEG data
capture could have been performed only in clinical settings by using invasive probes under the skull
or wet-gel electrodes arrayed over the scalp. Today, the simple EEG collection is possible by utilizing
market-available devices having the size of a headset [148].
2.2.6. DNA Recognition
Human cell lines are an essential resource for research, which is most frequently used in reverse
genetic approaches or as in vitro models of human diseases [149]. It is also a source of unique DNA
fingerprinting information [106]. Even though the process is time-consuming and expensive, it may be
potentially utilized to pre-authorize the user to the highly secure facility along with other factors.
Subsequently, a comparison of the main indicators for the already deployed and emerging
factors [150] is given in Table 1. The factors/sensors are evaluated based on the following parameters:
• Universality stands for the presence of factor in each person;
• Uniqueness indicates how well the factor differentiates one person from another;
• Collectabilitymeasures how easy it is to acquire data for processing;
• Performance indicates the achievable accuracy, speed, and robustness;
• Acceptability stands for the degree of acceptance of the technology by people in their daily life;
• Spoofing indicates the level of difficulty to capture and spoof the sample.
Table 1. Comparison of suitable factors for MFA: H—high; M—medium; L—low; n/a—unavailable.
Factor Universality Uniqueness Collectability Performance Acceptability Spoofing
Password n/a L H H H H
Token n/a M H H H H
Voice M L M L H H
Facial H L M L H M
Ocular-based H H M M L H
Fingerprint M H M H M H
Hand geometry M M M M M M
Location n/a L M H M H
Vein M M M M M M
Thermal image H H L M H H
Behavior H H L L L L
Beam-forming n/a M L L L H
OCS n/a L L L L M
ECG L H L M M L
EEG L H L M L L
DNA H H L H L L
However, many other issues are to be addressed while integrating the MFA for the end users.
In the following section, we elaborate on those challenges and formalize the recommendations for
improved ease of integration.
3. MFA Operation Challenges
An integration of novel solutions has always been a major challenge for both developers and
managers. The key challenges are presented in Figure 3. In the first place, user acceptance is a
critical aspect for the adoption of strong identity and multi-factor authentication. While adopting
and deploying MFA solutions, it is required to follow a careful and thorough approach—where most
challenges arise from opportunities and potential benefits [151].
3.1. Usability
The main usability challenges emerging in the authentication process could be characterized from
three perspectives [152]:
• Task efficiency—time to register and time to authenticate with the system;
• Task effectiveness—the number login attempts to authenticate with the system;
• User preference—whether the user prefers a particular authentication scheme over another.
In addition to the approaches discussed previously, researchers have already started an investigation
of more specific effects in the authentication procedures based on a variety of human factors.
The authors of [153] provided a study on how the user age affects the task efficiency in cases of PIN
and graphic access mechanisms. It is concluded that younger generation can spend up to 50 percent
less time to pass the authentication procedure in both cases. Interestingly, the authors of [154] have
shown that gender, in the same case, does not affect the results.
Another direction in the authentication mechanisms usability is related to cognitive properties
of the selected human [155]. The work in [156] offered an overview on how to make the passwords
memorable while keeping them relatively usable and secure at the same time. Paper by Belk et al. [157]
delivered a research on the task completion efficiency and effectiveness among the conventional
passwords and the realistic ones. The results revealed that, for most of the participants, the utilization
of graphic passwords requires more time than for the textual ones. However, cognitive differences
between users, i.e., being Verbal or Imager [152], affect the task completion significantly. Here, Verbals
complete the text-based tasks faster than Imagers and vice versa. The work by Ma et al. [158] studied
the impact of disability (Down syndrome) in the same two scenarios. It was once again confirmed that
textual passwords are utilized better compared to the graphical ones.
MFA Challenges
Security
Data spoofing
Input, transmission security
Social engineering
Privacy
Resistance against known attacks
Investigation of potential attacks
Template protection
Probabilistic behavior
Biometric probabilistic
FAR, FRR, FTE, FTA
Robustness
Resistance against noise
Input device quality
Reliability
Usability
Task efficiency, effectiveness
User preferences
Age, cognitive abilities
Quality of input device
Special disabilities
Integration
New hardware, software
Systems interoperability
Vendor independency
Access to source code
Figure 3. Main operational challenges of MFA.
In addition, the properties of the authentication device play a major role in this process.
The authors of [159] investigated the usability of textual passwords on mobile devices. It was proven
that using a smartphone or other keyboardless equipment for creating a password suffers from poor
usability as compared to conventional personal computers. Another work [160] confirmed the same
theory from a task efficiency perspective.
Today, most of the online authentication services are knowledge-based [161], i.e., depend on
the username and password combination. More complex systems require the user to interact with
additional tokens (one-time passwords, code generators, phones, etc.). Complementing traditional
authentication strategies, MFA is not feasible without biometrics. From this perspective, the work
in [62] provided an analysis on how gamification and joy can positively impact the adoption of new
technology. The gesture-related user experience research conducted in [162] showed that security and
user experience do not necessarily need to contradict one other. This work also promoted pleasure
as the best way for fast technology adoption. The reference [163] addressed the usability of the ECG
solution for authentication, and it was concluded that the application of ECG is not yet suitable for
dynamic real-life scenarios.
Many researchers promoted the utilization of personal handheld devices to be utilized during
the MFA procedure. Michelin et al. [164] proposed using the smartphone’s camera for facial and iris
recognition while keeping the decision-making in the cloud. Another work on biometric authentication
for an Android device [165] demonstrated an increased level of satisfaction related to higher task
efficiency achieved with the MFA solution. Reference [166] studied the usability and practicality of
biometric authentication in the workplace. It was concluded that the ease of technology utilization
and its environmental context play a vital role—the integration and the adoption will always incur
additional and unexpected resource costs.
An extremely important problem of MFA usability roots in the fact that “not all users can use any
given biometric system” [167]. People who have lost their limb due to an accident may not be able to
authenticate using a fingerprint. Visually impaired people may have difficulties using the iris-based
authentication techniques.
Biometric authentication requires an integration of new services and devices that results in the
need for additional education during adoption, which becomes more complicated for seniors and
due to related understandability concerns. One fact is clear—user experience plays a prominent role in
successful MFA adoption; some say, “user comes first” [168]. Today, research in usable security for
knowledge-based user authentication is in the process of finding a viable compromise between the
usability and security—many challenges remain be addressed and will arise soon.
3.2. Integration
Even if all the usability challenges are resolved during the development phase, integration brings
further problems from both technological and human perspectives.
Most of the consumerMFA solutions remain hardware-based [52]. Generally, “integrating physical
and IT security can reap considerable benefits for an organization, including enhanced efficiency and
compliance plus improved security” [169]. However, convergence is not so simple. Related challenges
include bringing the physical and the IT security teams together, combining heterogeneous system
components, and upgrading the physical access systems.
While developing the MFA system, biometrics independence should be considered carefully,
i.e., assurance of interoperability criteria should be met [170]. The framework needs to have
functionality to handle the biometric data from sensors other than the initially deployed ones [171].
The utilization of multi-biometrics, that is, simultaneous usage of more than one factor should also be
taken into account [172].
Another major interoperability concern is vendor dependency [173]. Enterprise solutions are
commonly developed as stand-alone isolated systems that offer an extremely low level of flexibility.
Integration of newly introduced to the market sensors would require complicated and costly updates,
which most probably will not be considered soon.
Further, it should be noted that most of the currently available MFA solutions are not
fully/partially open source. This introduces the questions of trustworthiness and reliability to the third
party service providers. The available level of transparency delivered by both hardware and software
vendors should be taken into consideration while selecting the MFA framework in the first place.
3.3. Security and Privacy
Any MFA framework is a digital system composed of critical components, such as sensors, data
storage, processing devices, and communication channels [174]. All of those are typically vulnerable to
a variety of attacks at entirely different levels, ranging from replay attempts to adversary attacks [175].
Security is thus a necessary tool to enable and maintain privacy. Therefore, we begin with the attacks
executed on the input device itself [176]. Letting only the legitimate controller access and process
sensitive personal data exposes the community to the main risks related to MFA security that are
listed further.
The first of the key risks is related to data spoofing that would be successfully accepted by the
MFA system [177]. Notably, due to biometrics being used by a variety of MFA frameworks, a glaring
opportunity for the attacker to analyze both the technology underlying the sensor and the sensor
itself results in revealing the most suitable spoofing materials. The main goal of the system and
hardware architects is to provide either a secure environment or, in case it is not possible, to consider
the related spoofing possibilities in advance. A risk of capturing either physical or electronic patterns
and reproducing them within the MFA system should be addressed carefully.
Conventionally, the safeguard to protect against electronic replay attacks requires utilization
of a timestamp [178]. Unfortunately, a biometric spoofing attack is fairly simple to execute [179].
Even though biometrics can improve the performance of the MFA system, they can also increase the
number of vulnerabilities that can be exploited by an intruder. Further risk is sensitive data theft
during the transmission between the sensor and the processing/storage unit. Such theft may primarily
occur due to insecure transmission from the input device through extraction and matching blocks to
the database, and there is potential for an attack [180]. The required levels of data safety should be
guaranteed to resist against this risk type [181,182].
Another opportunity to attack the MFA system is by capturing the secret data sample [183].
For knowledge factors, the system would be immediately compromised in case zero-knowledge
solutions are not utilized [184]. Specific interest is dedicated to capturing a biometric sample that could
not be updated or changed over time [185]. Hence, protection of the biometric data requires a higher
level of security during capture, transmission, storage, and processing phases [186].
The following risk is related to the theft from the data storage. Conventionally, databases are
stored in a centralized manner, which offers a single point of failure [187,188]. At the same time, some
of the remote systems contacting the database are not always legitimately authorized to access the
personal data stored. High level of isolation is required to protect the data from theft in addition to
utilizing irreversible encryption [189]. Subsequent risk is related to location-related attacks. The GPS
signal could be vulnerable to position lock (jamming) or to feeding the receiver with false information,
so that it computes an erroneous time or location (spoofing) [190,191]. Similar techniques may be
applied to cellular- and WLAN-based location services [192,193].
Finally, being an information technology system, MFA framework should deliver relatively high
levels of “throughput” [194], which reflects the capability of a system to meet the needs of its users in
terms of the number of input attempts per time period [195]. Even if the biometrics are considered
suitable in every other aspect, but the system can only perform, e.g., one biometrics-based match
per hour, whereas it is required to operate at 100 samples per hour, such a solution should not be
considered as feasible. The recommendation here is to select appropriate processing hardware for the
server/capture side.
TheMFA security framework should also support a penetration testing panel to assess its potential
weaknesses. Today, the developers are often conducting external audit to evaluate the risks and act
based on such evaluation for more careful planning. The MFA system should thus be assessed to
deliver a more secure environment.
3.4. Robustness to Operating Environment
Even if the security and privacy aspects are fully resolved, the biometric systems, mainly
fingerprinting, were falling short of fulfilling the “robustness” requirement since the very beginning of
their journey [196]. This was mainly due to the operational trials being conducted in the laboratory
environment instead of the field tests. One distinct example is voice recognition, which was highly
reliable in a silent room but failed to verify the user in urban landscapes.
A similar problem applies to early facial recognition techniques, which failed to operate without
adequate light support, quality camera, etc. [197]. The flip side of the coin was the need for continuous
supervision of the examined subject. Even today, there are either bits of advice on where to
look/place fingers, or there is visual aid available during the security check. The lack of experience in
machine-to-human interaction is commonly analyzed with Failure to Enroll (FTE) as well as Failure
to Acquire (FTA) rates [198]. They both depend on the users themselves as well as the additive
environmental noise.
Since a significant part of MFA is highly dependent on biometry, it could be classified as inherently
probabilistic due to such nature [199]. The base of the biometric authentication lies in the field of pattern
matching, which in turn relies on approximation. Approximate matching is a critical consideration
in any MFA system, since difference between users could be crucial due to a variety of factors and
uncertainty. The image captured during a fingerprint scan would be different every time it is observed
because of the presentation angle, pressure, dirt, moisture, or differentiation of sensors even if taken of
the same person.
Two important error rates used to quantify the performance of a biometric authentication system
are FAR and FRR. FAR is the percentage of impostors inaccurately allowed as genuine users. It is
defined as the ratio of the number of false matches to the total number of impostor match attempts. FRR
is the number of genuine users rejected from using the system, which is defined as the ratio of the
number of false rejections to the total number of genuine match attempts.
Literature further recommends the utilization of the Crossover Error Rate (CER) in addition to the
previously discussed metrics [200]. This parameter is defined as the probability of the system being in
a state where FAR equals to FRR. The lower this value is, the better the system performs. According
to [201], “Higher FAR is preferred in systems where security is not of prime importance, whereas
higher FRR is preferred in high-security applications”. The point of equality between FAR and FRR is
referred to as Equal Error Rate (EER) [202]. Based on the above, it could be once again concluded that
a system utilizing solely biometrics may not be considered as a preferred MFA framework.
By analyzing the above listed challenges, it is possible to evaluate and assess the entire MFA
system. In what follows, we propose an approach to enable MFA for vehicular integration based on
the availability of a large number of sensors in modern vehicles.
4. Enabling Flexible MFA Operation
In this work, we offer a new authentication scheme that focuses on the vehicle-to-everything (V2X)
scenarios, since cars of today are already equipped with multiple sensors that could potentially be
utilized for MFA. Conventionally, the user has a username/password/PIN/token [203] and will
additionally be asked to utilize a biometric factor, such as facial features or fingerprints. The general
overview supported by a follow-up discussion is given in Figure 4. If the authentication procedure fails
to establish trust by using this combination of factors, then the user will be prompted to authenticate
by utilizing another previously registered factor or a set of those. This MFA system may not only
verify the accuracy of the user input but also determine how the user interacts with the devices,
i.e., analyze the behavior. The more the user interacts with the biometric system, the more accurate its
operation becomes.
Vehicle occupant weight sensor
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Vein recogni�on
Alcohol sensor
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Figure 4. Current and emerging MFA sensors for vehicles.
Another feature of the discussed scenario is the actual sensor usability in case of interaction with
a car [204]. If a sensor (e.g., a fingerprint reader) is being utilized and that device is not available from
where the user is attempting to log in or gain access—the user experience becomes inadequate. Having
a dual-purpose device—smartphone or smartwatch (suitable for executing the information security
primitives [205]), which the user already has in his or her possession—as an additional MFA factor
(not only as a token) makes both the system costs and usability much more reasonable [206].
The presence of large amounts of sensor data brings us to the logical next step of its application in
MFA. We further envision potential utilization of the corresponding factors to authenticate the user
without implementing a dedicated “verifier” with the actual biometric data except for the one collected
in real time.
4.1. Conventional Approach
One of the approaches considered within the scope of this work is based on utilizing Lagrange
polynomials for secret sharing [207]. The system secret S is usually “split” and distributed among a set
of key holders. It could be recovered later on, as described in [208–210] and numerous other works, as
f (x) = S+ a1x+ a2x2 + · · ·+ al 1xl 1,
f (0) = S,
(1)
where ai are the generated polynomial indexes and x is a unique identification factor Fi. In such
systems, every key holder with a factor ID obtains its own unique key share SID = f (ID).
In conventional systems, it is required to collect any l shares {SID1 , SID2 , . . . , SIDl} of the initial
secret to unlock the system, while the curve may offer n > l points, as it is shown in Figure 5. The basic
principle behind this approach is to specify the secret S and use the generated curve based on the
random coefficients ai to produce the secret shares Si. This methodology is successfully utilized in
many secret sharing systems that employ the Lagrange interpolation formula [211,212].
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Figure 5. Lagrange secret sharing scheme.
Unfortunately, this approach may not be applied for the MFA scenario directly [213], since the
biometric parameters are already in place, i.e., we can neither assign a new Si to a user nor modify
them. On the one hand, the user may set some of the personal factors, such as password, PIN-code, etc.
On the other hand, some of them may be unchangeable (biometric parameters and behavior attributes).
In this case, an inverse task where the shares of the secret SIDi are known as factor values Si is to be
solved. Basically, Si are fixed and become unique {S1, S2, . . . , Sl} when set for a user. In this case, S is
the secret for accessing the system and should be acquired with the user factor values. A possible
solution based on the reversed Lagrange interpolation formula is proposed in the following subsection.
4.2. Proposed Reversed Methodology
In this work, we consider the MFA system with explicit l factors F. Each factor Fi has a unique
secret Si obtained with the corresponding procedure (PIN, fingerprint, etc.) from the user. In the
worst case, it is related to the biometric data—the probability that it changes over time is low.
The corresponding factors and secrets could then be represented as
F1 : S1,
F2 : S2,
. . .
Fl : SL,
Fl+1 : T,
(2)
where Si is the secret value obtained from the sensor (factor), l is the number of factors required to
reconstruct the secret, and Fl+1 is a timestamp collected at time instant T.
It is important to note that providing the actual secrets to the verifier is not an option, especially in
case of sensitive biometric data, because a fingerprint is typically an unchangeable factor. Hence, letting
even a trusted instance obtain the corresponding data is a questionable step to make. Conversely,
compared to the method considered in Section 4.1, the modified algorithm implies that Si are obtained from
the factors (only one polynomial describes the corresponding curve), as it is shown in Figure 5. In other
words, the proposed methodology produces the system secret S based on the collected factor values Si
instead of assigning them in the first place.
A system of equations connected to the Lagrange interpolation formula with the factors,
their values, and the secret for the system access is
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
S1 = S+ a1F1 + a2F21 + · · ·+ al 1Fl 11 + alFl1,
S2 = S+ a1F2 + a2F22 + · · ·+ al 1Fl 12 + alFl2,
. . .
Sl = S+ a1Fl + a2F2l + · · ·+ al 1Fl 1l + alFll ,
T = S+ a1T + a2T2 + · · ·+ al 1Tl 1 + alTl ,
(3)
where ai are the corresponding generated coefficients, f (x) = S + a1x + a2x2 + · · · + al 1xl 1,
and f (0) = S. The system in Equation (3) has only one solution for S and it is well known from the
Lagrange interpolation formula.
Lemma 1. One and only one polynomial curve f (x) of degree l   1 could be described by l points on the plane
(x1, y1), (x2, y2), . . . , (xl , yl)
fx = a0 + a1x+ . . .+ al 1xl 1, { f (xi) = yi}li=1 .
Hence, the system secret S may be recovered based on l collected shares as given by the
conventional Lagrange interpolation formula without the need to transfer the original factor secrets Si
to the verifier. Hence, the sensitive person-related data is kept private, as
S = ( 1)l
l+1
Â
i=1
Si
l+1
’
j = 1, j 6= i
Fj
Fi   Fj , (4)
where Fl+1 = T. The proposed modifications are required to assure the uniqueness of the acquired
data, see Figure 6.
Due to the properties of the Lagrange formulation, there can only be one curve described by
the corresponding polynomial (Lemma 1); therefore, each set of [Fi : Si] will produce its unique S.
However, if the biometric data collected by MFA has not been changed over time, the secret will
always remain the same, which is an obvious vulnerability of the considered system. On the other
hand, a simple addition of the timestamp should always produce a unique curve, as it is shown in
Figure 6 for T, T1, and T2.
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Figure 6. Reversed method based on the Lagrange polynomial.
The proposed solution provides robustness against the case where all Si remain unchanged over
time. This is achieved by adding a unique factor of time T, which enables the presence of Fl with
the corresponding secret. It is necessary to mention that the considered threshold scheme based on
the Lagrange interpolation formula utilizes Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA) mechanism or ElGamal
encryption/decryption algorithm for authentication during the final step. In this case, it is proven that
we obtain a secure threshold scheme related to secrets Si in [214].
4.3. Proposed MFA Solution for V2X Applications
Indeed, our proposed solution may operate out-of-the-box in case where all l factors are present.
The system may thus provide a possibility to identify and report any outdated factor information—for
example, weight fluctuation [215]. Access to a service could be automated when some of the factors
are not present [216]. We further elaborate on this feature in the current subsection.
4.3.1. Factor Mismatch
Assuming that the number of factors in our system is l = 4, the system secret S can be represented
in a simplified way as a group of
S 
h
F1 F2 F3 F4
i
.
Here, if any of Si are modified—the secret recovery mechanism would fail. An improvement to
this algorithm is delivered by providing separate system solutions Si for a lower number of factors
collected. Basically, for l = 3, the number of possible combinations of factors with one missing is
equal to four, as follows
S1  
h
F1 F2 F3
i
,
S2  
h
F1 F3 F4
i
,
S3  
h
F1 F2 F4
i
,
S3  
h
F2 F3 F4
i
. (5)
The device may thus grant access based on a predefined risk function policy. As the second
benefit, it can inform the user (or the authority) that a particular factor Fi has to be updated based on
the failed Si combination. Indeed, this modification brings only marginal transmission overheads, but,
on the other hand, enables higher flexibility in authentication and missing factor validation.
4.3.2. Cloud Assistance
Another important scenario for MFA is potential assistance of the trusted authority in Fi : Si
mismatch or loss. In case when the user fails to present a sufficient number of factors, the trusted
authority can be requested to provide the temporary factor keys, as it is demonstrated in Figure 7.
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Figure 7. Trusted authority assistance in authentication when user is missing two factors.
For example, assume that the user forgot or lost two factors F2 and F3 with the corresponding
keys S1 = f (F1) and S2 = f (F2). The trusted authority is willing to assist in authentication—two
temporary keys SF1 = f (F1) and SF2 = f (F2) are thus generated and sent to the user via a
secure channel. Obtaining these keys and applying the Lagrange interpolation formula with RSA or
ElGamal encryption/decryption-based threshold authentication procedure involves the following
factors and keys
F1 : S1,
F2 : S2,
. . .
Fl : SL,
Fl+1 : T,
F1 : SF1 ,
F2 : SF2 ,
(6)
as described in [214]. This allows for gaining access to the device.
The proposed solution is designed explicitly to complete the MFA step of the authentication,
that is, its usage for SFA and 2FA is not recommended. This is mainly due to the features of the
Lagrange interpolation formula. Basically, in the SFA case and without the Fl+1 : T factor, the equation
at hand can be simply represented as S1 = S + b1F1, i.e., it will become ‘a point’. Even adding a
random timestamp factor will not provide any valuable level of biometric data protection, since an
eavesdropper could be able to immediately recover the factor secret.
The above is not suitable for the 2FA either, since providing two factors allows the curve to have
linear behavior, i.e., the eavesdropper is required two attempts to recover the secrets. However, adding
a timestamp factor here allows for providing the necessary level of safety with three actual factors,
as discussed below.
4.4. Potential Evaluation Techniques
Conventionally, authentication systems utilizing only the knowledge of ownership factors operate
in pass/fail mode, i.e., the input data is either correct or incorrect. When it comes to using biometrics,
the system faces potential errors during the biometric sample capturing, which was discussed
previously in Section 3.4. We further elaborate on our proposed methodology from the crucial
FAR/FRR perspective.
Typically, the FAR/FRR parameters of a sensor are provided by vendors based on the statistically
collected data [217]. For the MFA framework, we assume two possible decisions made during the user
authentication phase, as it is displayed in Figure 8: (i) H0—the user is not legitimate; or (ii) H1—the user
is legitimate. These form the entire sample space of P(H0) + P(H1) = 1. The risk policy is assumed
to be handled by the authentication system owner who also sets up the distributions of P(H0) and
P(H1).
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Figure 8. MFA system mode. PTH is the selected threshold.
Generalizing, there might be n biometric sensors collecting the user input data. Each individual
sensor measurement from the set Z = {z1, . . . , zn} is distributed within [0, 1], and this set is further
analyzed under the conditions of two previously considered hypotheses. The measurements delivered
from the sensors could be processed in two different ways as introduced in the sequel.
4.4.1. Strict Decision Methodology
Each sensor decides whether the user is legitimate or not by returning either accept or reject.
The MFA system then combines the collected results and provides a group decision based on the
resulting vector. Hence, it is possible to utilize the threshold decision functions or weighted threshold
functions depending on the reliability of the sensor.
For the first case, the sensor will return the value zi, zi = [0; 1], which could be interpreted as
either YES or NO. Then, the conditional probabilities P (zi |H0 ) and P (zi |H1 ) are defined by FARi
and FRRi values, respectively, for i-th sensor. Here, FARi and FRRi are taken at the CER/EER point,
e.g., zi is selected at the point where FARi = FRRi. Generally, this methodology reflects the scenarios
of ownership or knowledge factors from the biometric perspective.
4.4.2. Probabilistic Decision Methodology
The sensor responds with a result of its measurements as well as a probabilistic characteristics.
Further, the data is merged before the final decision is made. Therefore, the entire set of the measured
data could be utilized when making a group decision and, accordingly, a common result might be
established based on the set collected from all sensors.
In the second case, the sensor returns a result of the measurements as well as the template
comparison in the form of a match score zi (0  zi  1). For each of the values zi, the conditional
probability P (zi |H0 ) is calculated based on the FARi values at zi. In addition, the conditional
probability P (zi |H1 ) is determined by FRRi values at zi.
This approach offers an opportunity to consider the strict decision methodology as a simplified
model of the probabilistic one for the case where FARi and FRRi are given only in one point. Here,
the measurement result can only take two values, i.e., higher or lower than the selected threshold.
4.4.3. Evaluation
In this work, we consider a more general case of the probabilistic decision-making methodology,
while a combination of the measurement results for the individual sensors is made similarly to the
previous works by using the Bayes estimator [218]. Since the outcomes of measurements have a
probabilistic nature, the decision function is suitable for the maximum a posteriori probability solution.
In more detail, the decision function may be described as follows. At the input, it requires a
conditional probability of the measured value from each sensor P (zi |H0 ) and P (zi |H1 ) together with
a priori probabilities of the hypotheses P(H0) and P(H1). The latter values could be a part of the
company’s risk policy as they determine the degree of confidence for specific users. Then, the decision
function evaluates the a posteriori probability of the hypothesis P (H1 |Z ) and validates that the
corresponding probability is higher than a given threshold PTH .
The measurement-related conditional probabilities can be considered as independent random
variables; hence, the general conditional probability is as follows:
P
 
Z
  HJ   = ’
zi2Z
P
 
zi
  HJ  , J 2 {0; 1} . (7)
Further, the total probability P(Z) is calculated as
P(Z) = ’
zi2Z
P (zi |H0 )P(H0) + ’
zi2Z
P (zi |H1 )P(H1), (8)
where P
 
zi
  HJ   , J 2 {0; 1} are known from the sensor characteristics, while P(H0) and P(H1) are a
priori probabilities of the hypotheses (a part of the company’s risk policy).
Based on the obtained results, the posterior probability for each hypothesis HJ , J 2 {0; 1} can be
produced as
P (H1 |Z ) =
’zi2Z P (zi |H1 )P(H1)
P(Z)
. (9)
For a comprehensive decision over the entire set of sensors, the following rule applies
P (H1 |Z ) > PTH ) {Accept}, else {Reject}. (10)
As a result, the decision may be correct or may lead to an error. The FAR and FRR values could
then be utilized for selecting the appropriate threshold PTH based on all of the involved sensors.
5. Discussion and Future Prospects
Today, authentication matters more than ever before. In the digital era, most users will rely on
biometrics in matters concerning systems security and authorization to complement the conventional
passwords. Even though privacy, security, usability, and accuracy concerns are still in place, MFA
becomes a system that promises the security and ease of use needed for modern users while acquiring
access to sensitive data.
Without a doubt, biometrics are one of the key layers to enable the future of MFA.
This functionality is often regarded not standalone but as a supplement to traditional authentication
approaches like passwords, smart cards, and PINs. Combining two ormore authenticationmechanisms
is expected to provide a higher level of security when verifying the user. The expected evolution
towards MFA is rooted in the synergistic biometric systems that allow for significantly improved
user experience and MFA system throughput, which would be beneficial for various applications
(see Figure 9). Such systems will intelligently couple all three factor types, namely, knowledge,
biometrics, and ownership.
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Figure 9. Biometric MFA for the airport scenario.
Since conventional single-factor systems of today are based on only one parameter (unimodality
property), if its acquisition is affected in any way (be it noise or disruption), the overall accuracy will
degrade. As a reminder, collecting a single type of non-knowledge related data, e.g., biometrics, could
exclude part of the user population when particular disabilities are present. Moreover, spoofing this
only factor is a relatively simple task.
One of the most promising directions in MFA is behavior-based biometrics providing entirely
new ways of authenticating the users. The solutions that are based on muscular memory, e.g., writing
or gestures, coupled with machine learning become more prominent examples. Already today,
software can extrapolate user handwriting and reach the confidence levels of above 99.97 percent [219].
More forward-looking MFA sources to be utilized in the nearest future are heart and brain [220].
The attractive area of ECG and EEG analysis is also expected to provide unique identification samples
for each subject.
Another military-inspired research activity already shows the capability to identify the users
based on the way they interact with computer [221]. This approach takes into consideration the typing
speed, typical spelling mistakes, writing rhythm, and other factors [222]. The appropriate terminology
is not settled yet, and some call this methodology Passive Biometrics [223], while others name it
Continuous Authentication [224]. It results in having a unique fingerprint of the user–computer
interaction pattern, which is extremely difficult to replicate.
All of the discussedMFA scenarios require significant memory resources to statistically analyze the
input data and store the biometric samples even if utilizing different optimization techniques [225,226].
A very promising direction of the MFA development is therefore in the area of neural networks and
Big Data [227]. Here, many successful applications have been known to the community for more
than a decade. Examples could be found in [228–230] where conventional factors, such as iris, retina,
fingerprints, etc., are considered. Utilizing neural networks for the next-generation biometrics is the
most likely way to proceed due to presently high levels of the analysis complexity [231,232].
In summary, biometric technology is a prominent direction driven by the mobile device market.
The number of smartphones to be sold only in the US is expected to reach 175 million units by 2018
with the corresponding market to exceed $50.6B in revenues by 2022 [233,234]. It is believed that a
strong push towards the utilization of biometrics in many areas of life is imminent, since most of the
flagman devices are already equipped with the fingerprint scanner and facial recognition technology
in addition to convention PIN codes.
This work provided a systematic overview of the state-of-the-art in both technical and usability
issues, as well as the major challenges in currently available MFA systems. In this study, we discussed
the evolution of authentication from single- through two- and towards multi-factor systems. Primarily,
we focused on the MFA factors constituting the state-of-the-art, future possible directions, respective
challenges, and promising solutions. We also proposed an MFA solution based on the reversed
Lagrange polynomial as an extension of Shamir’s Secret Sharing scheme, which covers the cases of
authenticating the user even if some of the factors are mismatched or absent. It also helps qualify the
missing factors without disclosing the sensitive data to the verifier.
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MFA Multi-Factor Authentication
SFA Single-Factor Authentication
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ID Identification Number
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FAR False Accept Rate
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RFID Radio-Frequency Identification
NFC Near-Field Communication
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Challenges of Multi-Factor Authentication for
Securing Advanced IoT (A-IoT) Applications
Aleksandr Ometov, Vitaly Petrov, Sergey Bezzateev,
Sergey Andreev, Yevgeni Koucheryavy, and Mario Gerla
Abstract—The unprecedented proliferation of smart devices
together with novel communication, computing, and control
technologies have paved the way for the Advanced Internet of
Things (A-IoT). This development involves new categories of
capable devices, such as high-end wearables, smart vehicles, and
consumer drones aiming to enable efficient and collaborative
utilization within the Smart City paradigm. While massive
deployments of these objects may enrich people’s lives, unau-
thorized access to the said equipment is potentially dangerous.
Hence, highly-secure human authentication mechanisms have
to be designed. At the same time, human beings desire to
comfortably interact with their owned devices on a daily basis,
thus demanding the authentication procedures to be seamless
and user-friendly, mindful of contemporary urban dynamics.
In response to these unique challenges, this work advocates
for the adoption of multi-factor authentication for A-IoT, such
that multiple heterogeneous methods – both well-established and
emerging – are combined intelligently to reliably grant or deny
access. We thus discuss the pros and cons of various solutions
as well as introduce tools to combine the authentication factors,
with an emphasis on challenging Smart City environments. We
finally outline the open questions to shape future research efforts
in this emerging field.
I. INTRODUCTION AND RATIONALE
The vision of the Internet of Things (IoT) opens a new era
of technology penetration into the human lives, which touches
upon a wide range of use cases: from Smart Home to Smart
City and from Smart Grid to Factory Automation [1]. The
numbers of IoT devices that are able to collect, store, combine,
and analyze the massive amounts of data around them by
producing valuable knowledge and making relevant actions is
growing uncontrollably in an attempt to offer decisive societal
benefits while handling both routine and critical tasks across
multiple verticals [2].
As it simplifies the lives of people, the IoT also brings
unprecedented security and privacy risks, since close to any
object around us becomes interconnected with others to col-
lect and process sensitive information [3]. The conventional
massive IoT involves numerous low-cost devices (e.g., sensors,
actuators, and smart meters), with limited computational capa-
bilities and stringent power constraints; hence, the traditional
security and privacy solutions had to be reconsidered and
adjusted to the specifics of massive IoT. Over the recent
decades, security and privacy in IoT remained a major re-
search topic subject to heated discussions e.g., in the area
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of lightweight cryptography [4], secure connection and trust
establishment [5], and privacy-preserving data processing [6].
While there are multiple open problems yet to be solved, the
current progress in this field promises to provide the demanded
levels of security to these massive IoT deployments.
Meanwhile, in contrast to the massive and low-cost IoT
solutions, an emerging trend in today’s IoT is a rapid pro-
liferation of high-end IoT equipment that features more capa-
ble connected devices. These include sophisticated wearables
(including augmented, virtual, and mixed reality systems),
smart vehicles, and consumer drones (see Fig. 1) – that may
collectively be named Advanced IoT (A-IoT). These relatively
high-cost devices have more abundant performance, memory,
and battery resources to execute full-scale security and pri-
vacy protocols; thus, the establishment of secure machine-to-
machine connections may not be a challenging problem for
the A-IoT.
Consumer Drones
Smart VehiclesHi-End Wearables
Fig. 1. Human-centric Advanced IoT (A-IoT) applications in a Smart City.
At the same time, a number of specific security and privacy
concerns emerge in connection with such systems, since unau-
thorized access to these powerful devices may lead to severe
risks that range from theft of this high-cost equipment (drones
or cars) and up to putting human lives in danger by e.g., manip-
ulating with the information projected to the augmented reality
grasses or maneuvering smart vehicles uncontrollably [7].
Therefore, reliable assessment of the fact of ownership for
the A-IoT devices that belong to both personal and collective
use becomes one of the key challenges that is being faced
today [8], which is very different from massive IoT.
In this work, we first systematically review the unprece-
dented research challenges related to determining the human
ownership of the A-IoT systems. We then classify the specific
features of the A-IoT that can be employed to securely
verify the fact of ownership of the A-IoT devices and map
them onto the challenges by illustrating how the features can
complement each other while covering the potential issues. We
also discuss the concept of multi-factor human authentication
to the A-IoT system, where multiple heterogeneous factors
are intelligently combined to achieve higher levels of security
while not compromising the usability levels of the A-IoT
services. We finally enumerate the important practical matters
to be resolved on the way towards successful implementation
of the introduced concept.
II. CHALLENGES OF DETERMINING OWNERSHIP IN A-IOT
As unauthorized access to A-IoT systems brings severe se-
curity threats, the challenge of reliable access control becomes
one of the most crucial research problems for securing the A-
IoT solutions. An access control procedure can generally be
decomposed into user authentication and authorization. The
second stage is relatively simpler and can be implemented
by conventional discretionary, mandatory, or role-based access
control methods. However, the first stage introduces a number
of A-IoT-specific research questions that we carefully review
in this section.
A. Multi-Modality of Human-Computer Interaction
Today, most of the conventional ICT systems are equipped
with advanced input devices, such as keyboards and touch-
screens, as well as output devices, most commonly, LCD
screens used for human-computer interaction (HCI). Since
textual input remains the dominating form of HCI, these
systems have historically been adopted for authentication pur-
poses: memorable textual or numerical passwords, possibility
to display a hint or visual advanced instructions, etc.
In contrast, the very nature of authentication does not
imply text-based commands or responses. Very few of the
emerging IoT devices are controlled by a keyboard; hence,
the authentication methods based on textual passwords will
need to evolve accordingly for them to continue being usable
on the mass IoT market.
B. Robustness to Environment and User Behavior
The authentication process of today is typically applied in
dedicated, comfortable, and stationary environments. Many
such actions occur indoors, where neither weather conditions
nor other unpredictable factors can impact the authentication
decisions. Even when this process happens outdoors, the input
devices to enter the security credentials acquire additional
protection to resist the environmental changes up to a certain
extent.
However, the A-IoT systems in Smart Cities are mobile
by design. Their interactions with a user are spontaneous
and occur in uncontrolled and unpredictable environments.
Moreover, even under regular weather/environment conditions,
the initial state as the user begins interacting with the A-
IoT system may be notably different. For example, the user
opening a vehicle may be wearing gloves during winter time,
such that the fingerprint scanner installed on the door handle
may be not be available. Therefore, authentication of A-IoT
devices must be made robust to both dynamic environmental
conditions and flexible user behavior.
C. High Levels of Reliance and Trust
The wide penetration of the ICT systems on the consumer
market and their role in the daily human life have always
been associated with a level of trust that people grant to
these systems. High trust is impossible to achieve without
appropriate authentication and authorization procedures [9].
At the same time, the A-IoT systems are more elaborate
than the ICT platforms of today. They are often granted direct
access to sensitive personal information; hence, the data they
collect and handle should not be made available to potential
third parties. On the other hand, large vehicles, drones, and
industrial robots represent more capable platforms, sometimes
termed as sources of increased danger. This recognizes that
they may become hazardous as long as health and even lives
of humans are concerned. Therefore, A-IoT systems have
to be featured with more secure and reliable authentication
procedures, so that they are capable of distinguishing their
valid user from an unauthorized adversary.
D. Constrained Response Times and Usability
Regardless of their stringent security demands, the response
levels of A-IoT authentication are also crucial for its successful
adoption. Previously, authentication process was a dedicated
phase of the HCI thus making users prepare for it both phys-
ically and mentally: recall the secret phrase, bring the token
key, etc. With further development and penetration of the A-
IoT systems, they become more ubiquitous and omnipresent.
In future Smart Cities, users will be interacting with various
A-IoT devices multiple times a day; hence, they cannot afford
to spend several second by authenticating to each of those and
tolerate second-long delays in acquiring access.
In response to these demands, A-IoT authentication must
evolve to become capable of operating within stringent time
intervals, preferably in an inconspicuous form, i.e., transparent
to the user. For multi-functional A-IoT systems, this may
even bring the need to temporarily provide access to certain
basic functionality sooner, while more rigorous authentication
is performed in the background. This is because the users
are unlikely to require sensitive actions from the very first
moments of their interaction with the target A-IoT platform.
From the above, it follows that designing adequate A-IoT
authentication mechanisms is challenging. However, the more
advanced capabilities and functions of A-IoT devices can be
beneficial when coining novel authentication schemes and we
review these in the next section.
III. ENABLERS FOR IMPROVED A-IOT AUTHENTICATION
Reliable human user authentication by the A-IoT sys-
tem is a complex task due to a number of challenges as
discussed previously. Fortunately, modern A-IoT platforms
feature a number of dedicated input devices as well as rich
sensing, communication, and computation capabilities, which
altogether can be employed during the authentication stage.
Utilizing this diverse functionality, various user authentication
methods become suitable for new A-IoT systems. In this
section, we discuss these authentication methods and their
applicability in the A-IoT systems. For convenience, we order
them by following their mass adoption: from well-known to
emerging, see Table I.
TABLE I
AUTHENTICATION FACTORS SUITABLE FOR A-IOT.
TYPE: K – KNOWLEDGE; O – OWNERSHIP; BI – BIOMETRIC;
BE – BEHAVIOR. ACTION: A – ACTIVE; P – PASSIVE.
DURATION: S – SHORT (< 1 SEC); M – MEDIUM (1− 15 SEC);
L – LONG (> 15 SEC).
Factor Type Action Duration
PIN code K A S
Password K A M
Token O P S
Voice BI/BE A/P S/M
Facial BI A/P S/M
Ocular-based BI A S/M
Fingerprint BI A/P S
Hand geometry BI A/P S
Geographical location BE P L
Vein recognition BI A/P S
Thermal image BI/BE P S/M
Behavior patterns BE P L
Weight BI P S
Electrocardiographic (ECG)
recognition BI/BE P S-L
A. Review of Possible Enablers
1) Hardware tokens: The automotive cluster has its own
legacy security mechanisms, primarily centered around the
use of hardware tokens that represent the ownership factor.
Recently, such tokens have been complemented by increas-
ingly popular software-based replacements installed on smart-
phones1. By leveraging this concept, the A-IoT systems can
make a step forward and utilize the tokens placed not only in
the smartphones but also on wearable devices.
2) Memorable passwords/PINs: Utilization of conventional
PINs is currently acceptable worldwide owing to widespread
adoption of ATMs and early-mobile phone era. A combination
of button presses to unlock a feature (e.g., engine start) or to
access a restricted area in addition to the key are typical so-
lutions. Finally, knowledge-based approaches are used widely
to access a web-service. The A-IoT systems may intelligently
1F. Lardinois, “BMW wants to turn your smart-
phone into your car key,” https://techcrunch.com/2018/02/26/
bmw-wants-to-turn-your-smartphone-into-your-car-key/ [Ac-
cessed June 2018]
utilize similar solutions as well, where password inputs can
effectively become replaced by the use of touchscreen (where
applicable) or e.g., audio forms of input.
3) Fingerprint/palm/eye scanner: While core technology
principles for fingerprint and palm recognition have been
known for already a while, the recent achievements in the
respective miniaturization made them accessible by a wide
range of consumer products, namely, smartphones. Installation
of biometric scanning devices within a conventional input
interface (e.g., Home button in Apple iPhones) or behind a
touchscreen is not a science fiction anymore2. Hence, au-
thentication process can become transparent for the user, thus
improving the overall system usability.
4) Facial recognition: The methods of facial recognition by
built-in video cameras originally started with landmark picture
analysis, which appeared to be vulnerable to trivial attacks of
e.g., presenting a photo instead of the real face. Over the last
two decades, these tools have significantly developed towards
three-dimensional face and expression recognition that is much
more resilient to such attacks3. The security levels can be
enhanced further by prompting the user to move the head in
a specific manner, so that a particular pattern to follow is not
known in advance [10]. Solving this task from another angle,
a drone can fly around the user to construct a 3D map of
face/body without making the user move.
5) Voice recognition: All of the considered A-IoT de-
vices are typically equipped with a microphone that enables
voice recognition. The recently announced implementations
are capable of distinguishing millions of different voices after
capturing only a short phrase. These solutions are however
more vulnerable to presentation attacks than the facial recog-
nition. Therefore, pseudo-random generation of phrases to
be pronounced is a pressing demand. While it is technically
possible for an adversary to construct a phrase based on the
recorded pronunciation of syllables and sounds, the A-IoT
systems are likely to have sufficient computational power for
timely recognition of the corresponding attacks.
6) Data from wearables: The A-IoT devices may also em-
ploy their advanced communication capabilities. Particularly,
if the authenticating user holds wearable devices, they could
act as providers of the authentication factors. Being connected
to the A-IoT system via a short-range radio, wearables can
present the security credentials of their user, such as heart
rate or electrocardiogram. The utilization of this method
requires support from appropriate security protocols, so that
the platform may trust the data collected by the user-controlled
equipment on the one hand, and the users can be certain
that their sensitive personal information is not disclosed, on
the other.
7) Behavioral patterns: The A-IoT system can utilize one
or several input interfaces to record and analyze the individual
2V. Savov, “I tried the first phone with an in-display fin-
gerprint sensor,” https://www.theverge.com/circuitbreaker/2018/1/9/
16867536/vivo-fingerprint-reader-integrated-display-biometric-ces-2018
[Accessed June 2018]
3V. Petrov, S. Andreev, M. Gerla, Y. Koucheryavy, “Breaking the limits in
urban video monitoring: Massive crowd sourced surveillance over vehicles,”
To appear in IEEE Wireless Communications Magazine. Preprint available:
https://arxiv.org/abs/1806.09171 [Accessed June 2018]
features of user behavior: response time to typical requests,
typing rhythm, micro- or macro-scale mobility, etc. Here, the
choice of particular factors to monitor highly depends on the
form-factor of the A-IoT device: for wearable electronics these
could be accelerometer fingerprinting, for drones they are the
control operations, while for smart vehicles there are plenty of
options that range from brake pressure and position of hands
on the wheel to musical and radio preferences.
B. Mapping Enablers onto Challenges
While each of the A-IoT-specific authentication methods can
bring its additional benefits, none of them alone is capable
of efficiently solving all of the discussed A-IoT challenges.
To this end, Table II offers a mapping of the authentication
methods onto the challenges introduced in Section II.
Notably, knowledge-based methods have their most severe
limitations with usability and security requirements [11], since
the user is expected to create, remember, and timely update
the secret passwords for all A-IoT devices. In this case, it
is very likely that the same password will be selected for
multiple systems, which degrades the levels of security. In
contrast, hardware tokens are more scalable to be used for
multiple A-IoT systems. However, the security levels may still
be insufficient as the token(s) can easily be stolen.
Biometrics allow to be authenticated without an additional
device or knowledge but the fingerprint, ocular scanning, or
voice recognition may require further effort from the user
(e.g., remove gloves or glasses, say a particular phrase, etc.)
as well as remain not fully robust to the environmental
conditions. Finally, the risk of losing a biometric template
has to be considered. Then, authentication with wearable data
has a significant advantage over the conventional voice/face
recognition, since the user is not required to perform any
explicit action. Meanwhile, this method has similar drawbacks
as do the tokens, where the user has to continuously carry the
necessary devices, always turned on and charged.
The methods of behavior recognition allow for mitigating
most of the constraints by observing the user behavior over a
certain period of time. However, the amounts of time necessary
for such monitoring are at least an order of magnitude higher
than those for other methods, which may become a severe
usability concern in delay-sensitive A-IoT applications. In
addition, behavior recognition is a complex task from the
algorithm design perspective, as there should be a constructive
differentiation between a valid deviation in the monitored
factor by the actual user and invalid patterns by adversaries.
As can be concluded from our analysis and Table II, neither
of the presented methods alone is sufficient to effectively
authenticate the user over a broad range of possible scenarios
related to the A-IoT systems. In the following section, we
propose a novel approach to construct reliable authentication
solutions for A-IoT devices by intelligently combining mul-
tiple potentially unreliable methods, which follows the multi-
factor authentication (MFA) paradigm.
IV. USE OF MULTI-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION FOR A-IOT
Since no single authentication method is likely to be suitable
to resolve all of A-IoT challenges, the use of MFA is a natural
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Fig. 2. Heterogeneous MFA for A-IoT (by example of smart vehicles).
approach to construct compound solutions (see Fig. 2). At the
same time, designing adequate MFA mechanisms is a complex
matter, which calls for careful selection, harmonization, and
combination of various individual methods, such that the
resulting solution could outperform its component elements
in terms of both security and usability. Below, we summarize
the four key design principles to be considered when building
A-IoT-ready MFA solutions.
A. Means to Compare
Before combining several heterogeneous authentication
methods together, one needs to harmonize across them, such
that knowledge-based methods could be integrated with e.g.,
biometric and ownership schemes within a single-stop A-
IoT authentication mechanism. Importantly, the output of the
overwhelming majority of individual authentication solutions
is binary: either accept or reject, i.e., {0; 1}. In rare cases, a
continuous variable that characterizes the “likelihood” ([0; 1])
could be retrieved from certain biometric systems. However,
most vendors do not provide with access to those values but
rather convert the likelihood factor into a binary decision
internally.
In addition to the output data format, alternative methods
can be characterized by their accuracy, which is typically
estimated with two probabilities: (i) false accept rate (FAR),
the probability that an unauthorized user is accepted; and
(ii) false reject rate (FRR), the probability that a valid user is
rejected. These reflect two major qualities of an authentication
system: security (FAR) and usability (FRR). We here advocate
their generalization to knowledge and ownership methods.
For instance, in password-based protection, FAR may corre-
spond to the probability of guessing the secret, while FRR may
characterize the possibility of making an accidental mistake
during input. In turn, FAR and FRR may also reflect the
chances for a token to be stolen or lost for ownership factors.
Therefore, we conclude that all of the discussed authentication
methods can be well-represented in a unified output format and
supplemented with their suitable FAR/FRR values.
B. Means to Combine
The use of several individual authentication methods does
not offer immediate advantages, since it still remains unclear
how to combine them efficiently. At the first glance, one may
come up with either of the two extreme strategies: “A user
TABLE II
COMPARING A-IOT AUTHENTICATION METHODS
Authentication
method Non-text input Short contact time Stringent usability Environmental robustness High security level
Hardware tokens + + - + -
Password/PIN - + - + -
Fingerprint/Palm
scanner + + +/- - +
Facial recognition + - + - +
Voice recognition + - +/- + +/-
Data from wearables + + - - +
Behavior patterns + - + - +
should successfully pass all the checks to get access” (All)
and “A user should successfully pass any of the checks to get
access” (Any).
Below, we present a typical example that numerically il-
lustrates the inherent weaknesses of these extreme strategies
as well as emphasizes importance of a certain level of intelli-
gence when deriving the resulting decision from a number of
individual outcomes by the component methods. We assume
a number of factors, each characterized with its own FAR and
FRR values. For simplicity, we require that all the FARs are
equal to 0.03% whereas all the FRRs are equal to 2%. The
resultant values for FAR/FRR are then derived by the Law of
Total Probability.
Observing Fig. 3, the All approach has the lowest FAR,
thus yielding the best security level. However, its FRR is
higher than with other approaches, by reaching over 12% with
7 independent factors combined. Hence, the usability of All
approach remains low, which makes it non-applicable in the
A-IoT context. Further, we notice the opposite trend for the
Any approach that increases the FAR value at the expense of
much better FRR. Therefore, Any solution is not applicable
either. Consequently, none of the trivial MFA combinations
are directly usable in the challenging A-IoT scenarios.
In contrast, a more intelligent Balanced approach – “A
user should successfully pass most of the checks to get
access” – constitutes a viable compromise between security
and usability, by decreasing both FAR and FRR indicators. The
quantitative gains highly depend on the input parameters and
reach 104 vs. 108 when 7 factors are combined. This example
also highlights the importance of threshold value selection,
since incorrect combining may often result in rapid system
performance degradation [12]. The same holds true for any
other values of FAR/FRR, even though they may actually vary
for different factors.
C. Means to Evaluate
Given that A-IoT scenarios are highly heterogeneous, the
results delivered by the individual devices should not lead to
blind accept/reject decisions. Instead, additional data must be
considered when comparing the output of the authentication
function against a threshold value.
1) Binary decision: The first and foremost sub-factor to
be considered is a binary decision delivered by the individual
device.
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Fig. 3. Comparing alternative factor combining approaches.
2) Vendor-specific metrics: The second sub-factor is the
level of accuracy, which is directly related to FAR/FRR
parameters. For example, the data collected with cameras by
various vendors may deliver different probabilities during a
facial recognition of the same user.
3) Level of trust: Many factors may impact user and device
trust. Here, trust in the “owned” devices (e.g., built-in cameras)
should be valued higher than that in external equipment.
Further, historically familiar devices may have higher trust
levels than stranger nodes, see the paradigm of Social IoT [13].
A significant benefit may be made available by utilizing social
networks, since the devices owned by a friend or a colleague
may also be considered as more trustworthy.
The set of selected sub-factors can significantly affect the
operation of the authentication solution. However, the above
three factors are relatively stable – the overall changes in
the A-IoT system from these perspectives are not as abrupt
and thus could be determined in advance. Conversely, the
authentication system designer should be provided with a
higher level of flexibility for a given application. This could be
achieved by adding another dimension – specific factor weight
per application (or even per user).
Accordingly, the general authentication function is to be
considered as
∑
δiµiτiϕi > T, where i is the factor number,
δi is a binary decision, µi is the accuracy level provided by
the vendor, τi is the trust level to the selected source, ϕi
is the factor weight, and T is the system threshold set by
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Fig. 4. Considered phases of time-separated MFA for A-IoT.
the designer. Hence, the system may be adjusted per device,
while the ultimate decision can be made flexibly based on
statistical analysis and machine learning techniques. Finally,
the use of various factors consumes different amounts of time,
see Table I.
D. Means to Evolve
The conventional ICT systems typically exploit a single-
stage authentication method, such that the user is either
granted or denied access as the result of authentication. In
contrast, the more stringent time constraints of A-IoT authenti-
cation dictate the need to complement the main authentication
phase with additional checks that happen before and/or after it.
Here, the considered MFA solution may benefit from a range
of sensing devices widely deployed in Smart Cities as well as
exploit the very nature of the human interaction with the A-
IoT system. Therefore, the overall authentication process can
be divided into several phases and, consequently, the level of
trust to the user begins to evolve in time.
1) Pre-authentication phase: This phase is the most dy-
namic and unpredictable as a person ‘approaches’ the target
vehicle. Here, the surrounding environment plays a crucial
role by providing with additional information. The only option
during this phase is to utilize passive authentication strategies
i.e., ‘observe’ the user biometrics/behavior that could be
delivered by user-worn wearables, user-carried deceives, and
other vehicles/infrastructure.
2) Active authentication phase: The most conventional
phase relies upon active interaction. Hence, the user provides
relevant input to the system directly. The most suitable au-
thentication methods are knowledge- and biometrics-based.
3) Continuous (post) authentication phase: Another key
part of the envisioned A-IoT authentication process is con-
tinuous monitoring of the fact that the user remains legitimate
to operate the system even after the previous phases are
completed successfully [14]. Monitoring and analyzing the
subject by the smart vehicle, infrastructure, and other cars
become a preferred option. Consider a case where the driver
has provided all of the tokens, passed all of the biometric
tests but faced a seizure during a highway trip. In this case,
the vehicle may automatically overtake the control, connect
with neighboring cars, and safely stop by the wayside. As an
example, recent works confirm that it is necessary to monitor
the driver for just under 2.5 minutes in order to validate the
behavior with 95% accuracy [15].
V. ECOSYSTEM OF MFA-POWERED A-IOT
The previous section summarized the underlying design
principles of the MFA solutions in A-IoT, at large. However,
even if these principles are followed, further development and
mass adoption of MFA-powered A-IoT systems should be
considered in perspective. This section brings the community’s
attention to the most significant questions to be answered in
this context.
1) How to weight factors?: While the MFA concept offers
sufficient flexibility to adapt the authentication system to a
wide range of possible scenarios, the choice of particular
numerical weights and threshold values requires an extensive
study, which needs to carefully balance the FAR and FRR
values of the resulting system depending on the target use
case. The system should also be made reconfigurable, such
that its internal parameters are updated appropriately whenever
an A-IoT device is e.g., sold to another person with different
attributes.
2) How to adapt decisions?: Another key challenge is
dynamic system adaptation in relation to a number of fac-
tors involved in the authentication process. For instance,
recognition based on a video camera may be unavailable at
nighttime or in bad weather. Hence, the decision function
should dynamically adjust the weights of the factors that are
available during the authentication process based on contextual
data. This task is much more challenging as compared to
conventional single- and two-factor authentication with only
a few static factors involved.
3) How to earn user trust?: The next question is related to
making a legitimate user trust the system in its operations.
For example, the user had a video surveillance camera at
the parking near home, which contributed 20% to the overall
authentication process, while the threshold was configured to
grant access. Then, the user moved the car to another address
and cannot open it anymore without an additional weight from
the infrastructure, since there is no external camera nearby to
participate in the authentication process. Hence, it is crucial
that decision-making process is at least partially transparent
to the user.
4) How to receive assistance?: The A-IoT framework
involves not only in-built authentication factors but also data
from proximate sources. Therefore, the question remains of
how secure and trusted such assistance from the neighboring
devices could be. Our illustrative example considered above
receives additional data from the wearable devices owned by
the human user; the camera mounted on a lamp post; a surveil-
lance drone patrolling the street, etc. Hence, designing secure
and reliable methods to deliver the sensitive authentication
data from these dissimilar Smart City devices to the target
A-IoT system – while not compromising the user privacy for
third-party entities – is an open problem.
5) How to delegate A-IoT devices?: Users tend to share
their devices both privately (family) an publicly (car rent).
However, secure collective delegation of use is not straight-
forward for the A-IoT systems. Conventional landing of a
physical token is not a sufficient option anymore, since it
does not necessarily confirms the right to operate the A-IoT
device. From the A-IoT platform perspective, most of the
factors related to its temporary userwill be received for the
first time. Therefore, effective delegation of A-IoT systems is
another important open challenge on the way to their mass
adoption.
VI. CONCLUSION
Reliable and secure human authentication by various smart
devices is one of the key drivers in the Advanced IoT era.
We reviewed the existing research challenges and possible
enablers for user authentication within the A-IoT ecosystem.
We introduced a concept of multi-factor authentication for
A-IoT as an attractive alternative to existing single-factor
solutions with limited potential. The key design principles of
MFA for A-IoT were highlighted by providing useful insights
into facilitation of the future MFA applications for the A-
IoT. Finally, key open questions related to the development,
practical implementation, and adoption of MFA for diverse A-
IoT systems were discussed together with potential use cases,
thus laying the foundation for further research in this emerging
area.
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